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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation is a collection of three essays that investigate the role and 
importance of intermediaries in corporate finance and financial markets. Chapter 1 
investigates whether bond rating agencies convey new information when they 
announce a rating change by studying the corporate bond market reaction to rating 
change announcements. Abnormal bond returns over a two-day event window that 
includes the downgrade (upgrade) are negative (positive) and statistically significant, 
although the reaction to upgrades is economically small. The bond market response 
is stronger for rating changes that appear more surprising, rating changes of lower 
rated firms, and upgrades that move the firm from speculative grade to investment 
grade. These findings support the hypothesis that both rating upgrades and 
downgrades convey some new information. Chapter 2 examines the long-standing 
question of whether firms derive value from investment banking relationships by 
studying how the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers affected industrial firms that 
received underwriting, advisory, analyst, and market-making services from Lehman. 
Equity underwriting clients experienced an abnormal stock return of around -5%, on 
average, in the seven days surrounding Lehman’s bankruptcy, amounting to $23 
billion in aggregate, risk-adjusted losses. Losses were especially severe for 
companies that had stronger and broader security underwriting relationships with 
Lehman or were smaller, younger, and more financially constrained. All other client 
groups were not adversely affected, on average. These results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that equity underwriting relationships are valuable to client firms and 
x 
 
costly to replace. Chapter 3 examines the question of whether firms derive value 
from lending relationships by studying how the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers 
affected corporate borrowers that had syndicated loans from Lehman. Firms with 
syndicated credit facilities from Lehman experienced abnormal stock returns of -3%, 
on average, during a seven day period that includes the bankruptcy announcement. 
These losses were more severe if Lehman was the firm’s lead lender or if Lehman 
recently underwrote the firm’s equity securities. Firms with more severe information 
asymmetry and moral hazard problems, less profitable firms, and firms with less 
cash and larger undrawn credit lines from Lehman also suffered greater losses. 
Lehman’s borrowers also experienced significant reductions in profitability and 
investment relative to their industry peers in the year following Lehman’ failure. 
These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that lending relationships 
developed through syndicated loans are valuable to corporate borrowers and costly to 
replace. 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
 
THE IMPACT OF BOND RATING CHANGES ON CORPORATE BOND 
PRICES: NEW EVIDENCE FROM THE OVER-THE-COUNTER MARKET 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
High profile bankruptcies of highly rated firms in recent years, such as that of 
Enron in 2001 and Lehman Brothers in 2008,
1
 have led many to question the value 
of bond ratings. Rating agencies claim that their bond ratings partially reflect private 
information, and hence the information content of bond rating changes is a topic that 
has received considerable attention in the academic literature. Numerous studies find 
that the stock market reacts negatively and significantly to bond rating downgrades. 
With the exception of a few recent studies, most fail to find a significant stock 
market reaction to upgrades.
2
 A handful of studies have focused on the bond market 
reaction and produced mixed evidence. Consequently, whether and to what extent 
rating changes bring new information to financial markets, especially bond markets, 
is a question unresolved by the literature.  
Using monthly corporate bond returns, Weinstein (1977) and Wansley and 
Clauretie (1985) do not find significant reactions to downgrades or upgrades in the 
month of and month following a rating change. In contrast, Grier and Katz (1976) 
find that industrial bonds react negatively in the months following a downgrade, 
                                                          
1
 Enron was rated investment grade by both Moody’s and S&P four days prior to its bankruptcy filing, 
2
 Griffin and Sanvicente (1982), Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), Wansley and Clauretie (1985), 
Cornell et al. (1989), Hand et al. (1992), Goh and Ederington (1993), Ederington and Goh (1998), 
Goh and Ederington (1999), Norden and Weber (2004),  Li et al. (2006), and Kim and Nabar (2007) 
find significant stock price reactions to downgrades but not to upgrades. Dichev and Piotroski (2001), 
Jorion et al. (2005), and Jorion and Zhang (2007) find statistically significant stock price responses to 
both downgrades and upgrades. 
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while Hite and Warga (1997), using monthly dealer quotes, find significant bond 
market responses to both downgrades and upgrades.
3
 Using daily bond price data 
from the NYSE, Hand et al. (1992) find significant reactions to both downgrades and 
upgrades in their full sample. However, after removing contaminated rating changes 
that occur contemporaneously with non-rating, firm specific news, they find an 
insignificant reaction to downgrades and a significant positive reaction to upgrades. 
The results from their uncontaminated sample are inconsistent with prevailing 
evidence on daily abnormal stock returns around downgrades.
4
 
The mixed evidence in the literature can be attributed to the past quality and 
availability of bond price data. With the exception of Hite and Warga (1997),
5
 the 
studies mentioned above use data on bond trades from the NYSE, which is a small, 
odd-lot market characterized by infrequent trading. The corporate bond market is 
institutional in nature with trading conducted primarily over-the-counter (OTC). 
Listed securities and trades on the NYSE account for a negligible fraction of overall 
market size and activity.
6
 Until recently, however, there was no system in place to 
                                                          
3
 Wansley et al. (1992) use weekly bond price estimates (“matrix” prices) from the Merrill Lynch 
Bond Pricing Service and find a significant response to downgrades. A potential concern in 
interpreting these results is that matrix prices are predicted, not actual, and ratings are one of the 
predictors.   
4
 While the information content of rating changes is the focus of this paper, in general there is a large 
literature on bond ratings. Recent papers study issues such as conflicts of interest in the ratings 
industry (Stopler, 2009), the role of rating outlooks and watch lists (Boot et al., 2006; Altman and 
Rijken, 2007), unsolicited ratings (Behr and Güttler, 2008), split ratings (Livingston et al., 2008), 
rating dynamics (Frydman and Schuermann, 2008; Kadam and Lenk, 2008) and public vs. private 
ratings (Mählmann, 2008). 
5
 Hite and Warga (1997) use proprietary data on monthly quotes from traders employed by Lehman 
Brothers. 
6
  In 2005, the NYSE reported that only 534 corporate bonds were listed on the NYSE, that 
transactions in all listed bonds averaged a mere 128 per day, and that the average par volume per trade 
was $29,600 (NYSE, 2007). Comparatively, the NASD reported that over 27,000 corporate bonds 
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collect and disseminate comprehensive information on OTC trades. Previous 
research, therefore, has been largely limited to small samples comprised of thinly 
traded bonds. Furthermore, most prior studies employ large event windows, typically 
a month or a week, due to a past lack of widely available daily bond data. The 
weaker power of tests that use monthly returns relative to daily returns, especially in 
small samples, is well documented (Brown and Warner, 1985; Bessembinder et al., 
2009). On the other hand, non-rating, firm specific news may confound monthly 
returns because downgrades (upgrades) tend to occur when the firm is performing 
poorly (well). Since it is infeasible to eliminate observations that are contaminated 
with non-rating news during a month long window, monthly return estimates may be 
biased away from zero. With respect to statistical inferences, this contamination 
problem works in the opposite direction of the power problem associated with using 
monthly returns and also works to overstate economic significance. The validity of 
inferences from analyses of monthly returns around bond rating changes is, 
therefore, unclear regardless of whether the outcome is a rejection or failure to reject 
the null.  
In this paper, I use comprehensive data on OTC corporate bond trades from 
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority’s (FINRA) Trade Reporting and 
Compliance Engine (TRACE) to measure daily abnormal bond returns over the day 
of and day following a bond rating change. In a large sample of rating changes by 
Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch during September 2002 to March 2009, I find statistically 
                                                                                                                                                                    
were traded in the OTC market in 2005, with a daily average of 23,856 trades per day and an average 
par volume per trade of $785,000 (NASD, 2006). 
4 
 
significant bond market reactions to both downgrades and upgrades not 
contaminated by non-rating news. The response to downgrades is about three times 
larger in magnitude than that to upgrades. Although statistically significant, the 
positive reaction to upgrades is small relative to bond trading costs. These results 
indicate that the bond market infers some new information from downgrades and, to 
a much lesser extent, upgrades.  
A contribution of this study over existing literature is the use of daily bond 
data, which provides greater precision and accuracy in the measurement of abnormal 
bond returns attributable to rating changes. Given that much of the prevailing 
evidence on the impact of rating changes in bond markets is based on monthly 
returns, I also document monthly abnormal bond returns around rating changes 
during my sample period to determine if and how conclusions would change relative 
to those obtained from daily return analyses. For both downgrades and upgrades, 
abnormal bond returns in the month of a rating change are statistically significant. 
The lack of a relative power advantage in using daily data is due to the ability to 
construct large samples of rating changes with the TRACE data. However, monthly 
return estimates tend to overstate the magnitude and economic significance of the 
market reaction relative to daily returns. For downgrades, monthly abnormal returns 
are more than three times larger in magnitude than two-day abnormal returns. These 
results suggest that researchers should be wary when using monthly returns in event 
studies, especially when contaminating news is expected to induce a bias in the 
abnormal returns. 
5 
 
My finding of a statistically significant bond market reaction to upgrades is at 
odds with much of the literature on the stock market reaction to rating changes. I 
therefore examine the stock market reaction to rating changes during the sample 
period and find that daily abnormal stock returns are negative and statistically 
significant around downgrades and positive but statistically insignificant around 
upgrades. These findings are consistent with the numerous studies that find 
significant stock market reactions to downgrades but not upgrades, but they contrast 
with the bond market reaction to upgrades, which is small, positive, and statistically 
significant. I conjecture that the differing statistical inferences regarding the effect of 
upgrades on bond and stock prices may be due to the small information content of 
the average upgrade combined with the differing implications that some rating 
changes may have for stockholders and bondholders (i.e. wealth transfer effects). I 
find evidence that is consistent with this conjecture.  
Finally, I explore the cross-sectional variation in the bond market response to 
rating changes and find that the reaction to rating changes that appear to be less 
anticipated is significantly stronger, i.e., downgrades (upgrades) preceded by positive 
(negative) abnormal bond returns elicit significantly stronger reactions. The reaction 
is stronger among firms with lower credit quality, which is consistent with larger 
differences in historical default rates between adjacent rating classes at lower credit 
qualities (Hamilton and Cantor, 2004). Finally, the response to an upgrade is 
exceptionally strong if the firm is moved from speculative to investment grade, 
6 
 
which may reflect the influence that ratings-based regulations have on financial 
institutions’ demands for speculative grade bonds.  
 The remainder of paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief 
overview of the bond rating process. Sections III and IV describe the data and 
methodology. Section V reports event study results. Section VI explores the cross-
sectional variation in the bond market response to rating changes. Section VII 
concludes.     
 
II. The Bond Rating Process 
 A bond rating is intended to reflect the ability of an issuer to make promised 
debt payments in a timely fashion. Before issuing debt, corporations can approach a 
rating agency or agencies to request a rating. Upon receiving the request, the agency 
assigns a team of credit analysts to assess the firm’s creditworthiness and assign a 
rating. Ratings are based on information from publicly available information and, 
according to the rating agencies, private information that analysts gather during 
meetings and conversations with the firm’s management.  
 The process for bond rating changes is similar. After an initial rating is 
assigned, an agency analyst remains in periodic contact with the firm.  As with initial 
ratings, the agencies claim that this process affords them access to confidential 
information not publicly available to investors. If the agency perceives a significant 
change in the firm’s credit quality, it will either announce a rating change or place 
7 
 
the firm on its “credit watch” list.7 In the vast majority of cases, the agency will 
indicate the direction of a possible future rating change when a firm is credit watch 
listed. After a watch listing, credit analysts will meet with the firm’s management 
and conduct an evaluation of the firm’s financial condition, after which the agency 
will announce either a rating change or confirmation. 
 Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch are the three largest bond rating agencies, and most 
U.S. corporations with publicly traded debt are rated by at least one of the three. 
Rated corporations typically carry an issue rating or ratings, which correspond to 
individual bond issues, as well as an issuer rating. In general, an issue rating is an 
opinion of the creditworthiness of the issuer with respect to a specific issue, while an 
issuer rating encompasses an issuer’s overall ability to meet its financial obligations 
(Moody’s Investors Service, 2007). Depending on priority, individual bond issues 
can have ratings that are higher or lower than the issuer rating. As in most previous 
studies on the information content of rating changes, I use the issue ratings assigned 
to long-term corporate bonds in my analysis. Moody’s rates long-term issues from 
Aaa to C, with fine modifiers of 1, 2, and 3 for letter classes Aa to Caa, e.g. Aa1, 
Aa2, Aa3. S&P and Fitch rate long-term bond issues from AAA to D, with modifiers 
of plus and minus for letter classes AA to CCC, e.g. AA+, AA, AA-. Issues rated 
BBB- (Baa3) and above are said to be investment grade. Issues rated BB+ (Ba1) and 
below are said to be speculative grade.  
                                                          
7
 Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch maintain “watch” lists which are meant to identify firms whose bond 
ratings are under review for possible change in the short term, usually within ninety days. S&P’s list 
is called Credit Watch, Moody’s is called the Watchlist, and Fitch’s is called Rating Watch. For 
simplicity, I refer to all three as credit watch lists.  
8 
 
 
III. Data and Sample Selection 
I use transaction data from FINRA’s TRACE database, which was introduced 
by the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)
8
 in 2002 in an effort to 
improve transparency in the OTC corporate bond market. Although the data begins 
in July 2002, TRACE’s coverage of the OTC market is not virtually comprehensive 
until 2005. Prior to October 2004, between 470 and 4,600 large investment grade 
bonds are covered, with coverage increasing with time. Only fifty non-investment 
grade issues are covered prior to October 2004, after which coverage begins to 
expand dramatically. By February 2005, 99% of all transactions and 95% (in par 
value) of all TRACE-eligible bonds,
9
 including investment grade, non-investment 
grade, and convertible bonds are covered. The data is organized by transaction, and 
relevant fields include trade date, time, par volume, yield, and price.
10
 
I use Bloomberg to identify rating changes by Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch 
during September 2002 to March 2009. During the sample period, there are 37,266 
bond issues with at least one trade in TRACE. I was able to obtain the ratings history 
and necessary bond characteristic data (e.g. maturity, coupon rate, etc.) for 36,416 
(97.7%) of these issues from Bloomberg. As described in Section IV, I construct 
                                                          
8
 In 2007, FINRA was formed through a consolidation of the NASD and the enforcement arm of the 
NYSE. 
9
 “TRACE-eligible” securities include US$ denominated public bonds that are registered with the 
SEC. Rule 144A bonds, government bonds, mortgage or asset backed securities, collateralized 
mortgage obligations, and bonds with maturities at issuance of one year or less are not covered by 
TRACE. 
10
 As in Edwards et al. (2007), I delete cancelled, reversed, and duplicate interdealer trades. As in 
Bessembinder et al. (2009), I exclude trades if TRACE indicates that special conditions impacted the 
execution price or if the execution price includes dealer commission.    
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bond return indices for each rating class using all issues available in TRACE in order 
to control for market fluctuations in computing abnormal bond returns, which 
requires a sufficiently large number of bonds in a given rating class with observable 
returns. For this reason, I exclude rating changes prior to January 2005 if the old or 
new rating is speculative grade, as TRACE only covers fifty non-investment grade 
bonds prior to October 2004. Investment grade bonds are included prior to 2005 as 
long as the bond is covered by TRACE at the time of the rating change.  
Like Hand et al. (1992), I include nonconvertible, fixed-rate corporate bonds 
issued by U.S. firms. Like Bessembinder et al. (2009), I exclude zero coupon and 
putable bonds. I also require that the bond’s maturity date is at least one year from 
the rating change date. If a firm experiences multiple rating changes within a five-
day period, I include only the earliest rating change. I exclude downgrades where the 
new rating is CC (Ca) or below since they are more likely to be associated with 
contaminating information, such as defaults or bankruptcy. For consistency, I also 
exclude upgrades where the old rating is CC (Ca) or below.   
 At the issue level, the imposition of these screens results in a preliminary 
sample of 67,583 bond rating changes (48,915 downgrades and 18,668 upgrades). 
However, at the firm level, many of these constitute duplicate observations because 
they pertain to multiple bonds from the same firm affected by a rating change on the 
10 
 
same day. At the firm level, these represent 4,886 unique rating change events (2,869 
downgrades and 2,017 upgrades).
11
  
Trading activity around rating changes illustrates the illiquidity of the 
corporate bond market. 50% of the 67,583 issue level observations mentioned above 
trade on fewer than fourteen days during the 101 market days centered around Day 0 
(Day -50 to +50), where Day 0 is the rating change date. 16% do not trade at all, and 
only 1.5% trade on every day during this period. To deal with this illiquidity, I 
impose trading restrictions. For all my analyses of daily returns, I require a bond to 
trade on at least ten days during Day +31 to +50. This screen is similar to the one 
employed by Bessembinder et al. (2009), except that they use a pre-event period 
(Day-20 to -1). I choose a post-event period for this screen because prior literature 
has found significant abnormal bond and stock returns just prior to rating changes. 
This screen eliminates 52,604 observations at the issue level (37,305 downgrades 
and 15,299 upgrades) and 2,390 observations at the firm level (1,299 downgrades 
and 1,091 upgrades). I use a two-day window (0,+1) to measure the market’s 
reaction rather than a one-day window because the data in Bloomberg only indicate 
the date of the rating change and not the time of day. Hence, in my baseline analysis, 
I also require that a bond trade on Day -1 and on Day +1 to ensure that event period 
returns reflect observable movements of prevailing market prices. This screen 
eliminates another 6,153 issue level observations (4,690 downgrades and 1,463 
upgrades) and 727 firm level observations (411 downgrades and 316 upgrades). 
                                                          
11
 When members of the same corporate family experience a rating change on the same day (e.g. a 
parent and its subsidiaries), I sample bonds from each entity but treat the entities all as one distinct 
firm. 
11 
 
After imposing these trading restrictions, the final baseline sample consists of 6,920 
downgrades and 1,906 upgrades at the issue level that represent 1,159 firm 
downgrades and 610 firm upgrades.  
 Since rating changes may be contaminated by other non-rating disclosures, I 
use Factiva to search the Wall Street Journal, Business Wire, PR Newswire, Dow 
Jones News Service, and Reuters News for other non-rating news about the firm in 
the three-day period, Day -1 to +1. If an article published in this period contains 
contaminating information, I classify it as contaminated.
12
 After removing 
contaminated observations, the uncontaminated baseline sample consists of 2,210 
downgrades and 1,230 upgrades at the issue level that represent 652 downgrades and 
441 upgrades at the firm level.  
Table I reports summary statistics on trading activity by event day for 
individual bond issues in the baseline sample. Over the (-20,+10) window, a large 
percentage of bonds in the sample (no less than 75%) are traded on any given day, 
with the largest trading volume occurring on Day 0 for both upgrades and 
downgrades. Downgraded bonds typically trade about two times as frequently as 
upgraded bonds in the days surrounding the rating change.  
**** Insert Table I here **** 
Because the contemporaneous returns exhibited by different bond issues from 
the same firm should be positively correlated, in my event study analyses I use a 
                                                          
12
 Contaminating information includes items such as earnings or earnings guidance, mergers or 
acquisitions, spinoffs, divestures, dividends, security repurchases,  public, private, or government 
financing,  bankruptcy, default, covenant violations or renegotiations, executive appointments or 
resignations, board elections, antitakeover amendments, lawsuits, and regulatory actions that may 
affect the firm. 
12 
 
portfolio approach to compute firm abnormal bond returns and treat each firm level 
rating change as a single observation. Henceforth, references to the number of 
observations reflect rating changes at the firm level unless otherwise specified.  
Table II reports the distribution of the baseline sample by rating agency and 
by rating change characteristics. The full baseline sample of downgrades, which 
contains both contaminated and uncontaminated observations, consists of 504 by 
Moody’s, 460 by S&P, and 195 by Fitch. The full baseline sample of upgrades 
consists of 244 by Moody’s, 253 by S&P, and 113 by Fitch. Fewer Fitch rating 
changes is consistent with Fitch’s smaller market share. Regarding sample 
distribution by calendar year, there are fewer rating changes in the earlier years 
because TRACE’s coverage of the market did not become virtually comprehensive 
until 2005. A large number of downgrades occurred in 2008, which reflects the 
recent economic recession and financial crisis. Regarding the size of the rating 
change (number of fine grades that the rating is changed), the majority of 
observations constitute changes of only one grade.
13
 In addition, 55% of downgrades 
and 41% of upgrades in the full sample affected investment grade firms (BBB letter 
class or above), but investment grade firms comprise a smaller portion of the 
uncontaminated sample (41% of downgrades and 38% of upgrades), which likely 
reflects the fact that investment grade firms tend to be larger and generate more 
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 49 downgrades and 17 upgrades in the full sample constitute observations where the firm had 
different bond issues whose ratings were changed by a different number of grades (e.g., one bond 
issue was downgraded one grade and another was downgraded two grades). For these firms, Table II 
reports the change of the highest rated (closest to AAA) issue. 
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contaminating news. 9% of both downgrades and upgrades in the full sample crossed 
the investment grade boundary.  
**** Insert Table II here **** 
While the baseline sample described above is the focus of most of my 
analyses, I must acknowledge a potential sample selection bias that may be induced 
by the requirement that bonds trade on Days -1 and +1. If some rating changes are 
informative while others are not, and if significant new information induces trading 
when there otherwise would be none, then this requirement will bias the sample 
toward more informative rating changes. Hence, for robustness, I consider two 
alternative samples. The first consists of all bonds that traded on at least ten days 
during Day +31 to Day +50, irrespective of whether the bond traded in the days 
surrounding the rating change. Unlike the baseline sample, this sample includes 
some bonds that did not trade at all during the (0,+1) period. As explained in Section 
IV, for a day on which a bond does not trade, I assume that the bond’s price did not 
change so that the raw return reflects accrued interest. The advantage of this sample 
is that it should not contain the previously discussed selection bias.
14
 A disadvantage 
is that it may understate the impact of rating changes due to the assumption that 
bonds not traded around the event did not do so due to a lack of information content 
rather than illiquidity. At the issue level, this sample consists of 11,610 downgrades 
and 3,369 upgrades that represent 1,570 firm downgrades and 926 firm upgrades. 
After removing observations with contaminating news during Day -1 to +1, it 
consists of 3,848 downgrades and 2,300 upgrades at the issue level that represent 959 
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 I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this sample. 
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firm downgrades and 689 firm upgrades. As an additional means of addressing 
concerns of a selection bias, I also consider a sample of liquid bonds that traded on 
every day during Day +31 to Day +50, irrespective of whether the bond traded 
around the rating change. This sample is much smaller and consists of 2,395 
downgrades and 543 upgrades at the issue level that represent 494 firm downgrades 
and 203 firm upgrades. After removing contaminated observations, it consists of 606 
downgrades and 322 upgrades at the issue level that represent 214 firm downgrades 
and 137 firm upgrades. Although not all, the large majority (93%) of these bonds 
traded on both Days -1 and +1. The rationale for considering this sample is that it 
includes only securities that could be considered liquid in that they are likely to trade 
on any given day regardless of whether an informative event occurs. In this respect, 
this sample more closely resembles a sample of common stocks. A disadvantage is 
that the sample size is much smaller and less representative of the population with 
respect to liquidity and other characteristics that are correlated with liquidity, such as 
issue size and rating.  
 
IV. Methodology 
 I compute daily raw returns on individual bond issues following 
Bessembinder et al. (2009):   
   
1
1
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where Pt-1 and Pt are the daily prices on Days t-1 and t, respectively, and AIt is the 
interest accrued over Day t.
15
 If the bond is not traded on Day t, Pt is set equal to the 
most recent observed daily price. Hence, the raw return on a day with no trades 
simply reflects the accrued interest. Rather than using the last price of the day as the 
daily price, I estimate daily prices using the “trade-weighted price, all trades” 
method of Bessembinder et al. (2009). This method uses all trades on a given day 
and estimates the daily price as the volume-weighted average price. Bessembinder et 
al. (2009) find that statistical tests on daily abnormal returns estimated with this 
method are better specified and more powerful than those on returns computed with 
end-of-day prices. The power advantage is due to the fact that returns computed with 
end-of-day prices are much noisier because the reported prices in TRACE include 
bid/ask fees, which are negatively related to trade size and considerably large for 
small trades.
16
 The simulation evidence of Bessembinder et al. (2009) shows that the 
“trade-weighted price, all trades” method mitigates the problem associated with the 
bid/ask spread because it gives more weight to large trades that should have lower 
trading costs and that should, therefore, more accurately reflect the prevailing market 
price. A potential disadvantage is that the daily price will reflect prices throughout 
the course of the day and not necessarily at market close. However, this problem is 
mitigated by using a two-day event window that includes Day +1. Alternatively, 
Bessembinder et al. (2009) find that their “trade-weighted price, trade ≥ 100k” 
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 The accrued interest on Day t is computed as the annual coupon payment multiplied by L, all 
divided by 360, where L is the number of calendar days elapsed between the close of market Day t-1 
and the close of Day t. 
16
 Edwards et al. (2007) estimate an average half spread of 0.75% for a small retail trade of $5,000 
and 0.04% for a large institutional trade of $10 million. 
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method, which employs trade-weighted prices but uses only trades of $100,000 or 
more, is even more powerful than the “trade-weighted price, all trades” method. 
However, they note that it has the disadvantage of fewer observations due to the 
elimination of days with only trades of less than $100,000. I choose the “trade-
weighted price, all trades” method to avoid this problem. However, for robustness I 
also examine whether my main conclusions are affected if the “trade-weighted price, 
trade ≥ 100k” method is used. I find that they are not and discuss the results in 
greater detail in Section V.A.   
I compute the daily abnormal bond return as the raw return minus the 
contemporaneous return on an index of matched corporate bonds: 
  
ttt IRRABR                            (2) 
where, on Day t, ABRt is the abnormal bond return, Rt is the raw bond return, and IRt 
is the return on a value-weighted index of matched corporate bonds that did not 
experience a rating change in the period Day t-30 to Day t+30. I use the entire 
TRACE universe to construct the matched corporate bond indices. The matching 
criteria include 7 letter classifications based on S&P’s ratings and, if unrated by 
S&P, Moody’s ratings of the matched corporate bonds. These classifications include 
AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, and CCC.
 
To control for risk related to maturity, I 
partition the AAA, AA, A, BBB, and BB classes into long and short maturity bands. 
For the AAA, BBB, and BB classes, the two maturity bands are below seven years 
and seven years and above. For the A and B classes, the two bands are below six 
years and six years and above. For the AA class, the two bands are below five years 
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and five years and above. These cutoffs are chosen so that, within a letter class, there 
is roughly the same number of matched bonds in each band. The CCC class is not 
partitioned by maturity due to the much smaller number of traded bonds in this class. 
Theses indices are restricted to non-convertible, non-putable, fixed-rate corporate 
bonds with non-zero coupon rates and one or more years to maturity. For each of the 
thirteen bond indices, I compute the value-weighted daily return for each day in the 
sample period. As in Bessembinder et al. (2009), to be included in a given index on 
Day t, I require that a bond be traded on Day t and Day t-1. Sample bonds are 
matched to the appropriate index based on maturity and rating on Day t-1.   
 For firms in the sample with multiple bonds affected on the same day, I 
aggregate abnormal bond returns by firm and treat each firm rating change as a 
single observation. Specifically, suppose firm j had n different bond issues affected 
by a rating change on the same day. In this case, I compute the firm’s abnormal bond 
return on Day t as the weighted average of the abnormal returns of the different bond 
issues. Hence, the abnormal bond return for firm j on Day t is: 
    
n
i
tititj wABRABR
1
1,,,                (3) 
where n is the number of bonds issues in the sample for firm j and wi,t-1 is the ratio of 
bond i’s market value on Day t-1 to the total market value of firm j’s bonds in the 
sample. For a multiple day window, Days 0 and +1 for example, cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) are computed as the sum of the firm’s daily abnormal bond 
returns over the window.  
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V. Results 
A. The Corporate Bond Market Reaction to Bond Rating Changes 
 Table III reports mean CARs for the full (contaminated and uncontaminated) 
and uncontaminated baseline samples of downgrades and upgrades. Mean CARs are 
also reported by whether the firm’s pre-downgrade or pre-upgrade rating is 
investment grade or speculative grade. For each window, I report a t-statistic based 
on the cross-sectional standard error of CARs and a Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
statistic for whether the median CAR differs from zero. Results in Panel B of Table 
III suggest that downgrades have a significant effect on bond prices. For the 652 
downgrades in the uncontaminated sample (Panel B), the mean cumulative abnormal 
return over Days 0 and +1 ((0,+1) CAR) of -0.64% is significant based on both the t-
test and the signed-rank test.
17
 As would be expected, the mean (0,+1) CAR for the 
full sample of downgrades in Panel A of -0.99% is larger in magnitude and highly 
significant. When the sample of uncontaminated downgrades is split into investment 
grade and speculative grade firms, the mean (0,+1) CARs are -0.45% and -0.83% 
respectively and both are significant. As reported in Panel D, uncontaminated 
upgrades also elicit a statistically significant response. The mean (0,+1) CAR of 
0.21% is significant. The mean (0,+1) CAR in the full sample (Panel C) is slightly 
larger and statistically significant. The positive reaction to upgrades appears to be 
driven by speculative grade firms. The mean (0,+1) CARs for speculative grade and 
investment grade firms in the uncontaminated sample are 0.33% and 0.02% 
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 Unless otherwise specified, proclamations of statistical significance refer to the 5% level or better 
(two-tailed) in both the t-test and signed-rank test. 
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respectively. The former is statistically significant while the latter is not. In the full 
sample of upgrades, a similar pattern is observed. 
**** Insert Table III here **** 
 In addition to significant abnormal returns at announcement, Table III also 
provides evidence of negative abnormal bond returns prior to downgrades. In Panel 
B, the mean (-15,-1) and (-30,-1) CARs among uncontaminated downgrades are -
1.44% and -2.85%, and both are significant. In addition, both investment grade and 
speculative grade firms earn significantly negative abnormal returns prior to 
downgrades. Although weaker, there is also some evidence of positive abnormal 
returns prior to uncontaminated downgrades, as the (-15,-1) CAR of 0.19% is 
significant based on the t-stat. These findings are consistent with the notion that 
rating changes are partially anticipated by the corporate bond market, and they 
complement the findings of Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), Goh and Ederington 
(1993), and Goh and Ederington (1999), who report significant abnormal stock 
returns prior to downgrades.  
Finally, Table III reports that downgraded firms experience significantly 
negative abnormal bond returns in the days after a downgrade. The mean (+2,+10) 
CAR in the uncontaminated (full) sample of  downgrades of -0.95% (-0.65%) is 
highly significant. Goh and Ederington (1993) and Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) 
document a similar result for the common stock of downgraded firms. This evidence 
suggests that the information conveyed by a downgrade may not be fully 
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incorporated into bond prices immediately. In contrast, the mean (+2,+10) CARs in 
all the upgrade samples are insignificant. 
Overall, results are consistent with downgrades and upgrades conveying 
some new information to the bond market in the sense that the (0,+1) CARs are 
statistically significant.  However, the economic value of the information is much 
smaller for upgrades. In fact, the (0,+1) abnormal returns around upgrades would 
likely be too small to cover the costs of trading in the corporate bond market. Before 
conditioning on credit quality, Edwards et al. (2007) estimate a mean round-trip 
transaction cost of 0.48% for a “representative” institutional trade of $200,000. For 
speculative grade bonds, their average cost estimate is 0.7%. In addition, they find 
that costs are much larger for smaller trades and only moderately smaller for much 
larger trades.
18
 Thus, relative to trading costs, the (0,+1) abnormal returns around 
upgrades are economically small.  
B. Robustness checks 
In untabulated analyses, I rerun the event study in Table III using the “trade-
weighted price, trade ≥ 100k” method of Bessembinder et al. (2009). Although this 
alternative specification results in the loss of 309 downgrades and 167 upgrades from 
the full sample due to the elimination of bonds without trades of $100,000 or more 
on both Day -1 and Day +1, it yields statistically significant mean (0,+1) CARs for 
both upgrades and downgrades with magnitudes very similar to those reported in 
Table III.  
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 For speculative grade bonds, Edwards et al. (2007) estimate average round-trip costs of 1% and 
2.5% for trade sizes of $100,000 and $5,000 respectively. For a very large speculative bond trade of 
$2 million, the cost is 0.25%.  
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My sample period includes the recent economic recession that, according to 
the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), began in December 2007. As 
noted by Jorion et al. (2005), downgrades (upgrades) are more (less) frequent during 
recessions and, therefore, downgrades (upgrades) may be more (less) expected by the 
market. This would imply weaker (stronger) responses to downgrades (upgrades) 
during recession. On the other hand, a counter argument could be that investors are 
more pessimistic and overreact (underreact) to downgrades (upgrades) during 
recession. To check whether my conclusions are driven by unusual market 
conditions during the recession, in untabulated analyses I rerun the event study in 
Table III after eliminating rating changes that took place during or after December 
2007.
19
 For both uncontaminated upgrades and downgrades, the mean (0,+1) CAR 
remains highly significant during the non-recessionary period, indicating that my 
basic conclusions are unaffected by the inclusion of the recent recessionary period. 
In Section VI, I further explore whether there were significant differences in the 
market reaction across the two economic regimes in a multivariate context.  
As discussed in Section III, a concern with the baseline sample is that it may 
contain a selection bias due the restriction that bonds trade on Days -1 and +1. The 
analyses in Table IV examine samples without imposing this requirement. The 
results reported in Table IV pertain only to uncontaminated observations. In 
untabulated analyses, I also examine CARs for the full versions of these samples that 
include contaminated rating changes and, as in the baseline sample, the (0,+1) CARs 
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 As of this version of the paper (June 2010), NBER has not declared if or when the recession ended. 
Hence, I assume that the economy was still in recession during the last month of the sample period 
(March 2009).  
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for the full samples are stronger in magnitude and statistical significance. For brevity 
these results for the full sample are not reported. Panel A of Table IV reports mean 
CARs for the uncontaminated sample that includes all downgraded bonds that were 
traded on at least ten days during Day +31 to +50, irrespective of trading activity in 
the days surrounding the rating change. As expected, the mean (0,+1) CAR of -
0.47% is weaker than that of the baseline sample, although it is highly significant. 
Furthermore, the mean (0,+1) CARs are negative and significant for both investment 
grade and speculative grade firms, with more negative abnormal returns for 
speculative grade firms. Panel C reports mean CARs for uncontaminated upgrades 
that include all bonds that traded on at least ten days during Day +31 to +50, 
irrespective of trading activity in the days surrounding the upgrade. Again, the mean 
(0,+1) CAR of 0.12% is smaller than that of the baseline sample but remains 
statistically significant at the 1% level. In addition, the pattern of stronger (0,+1) 
CARs among speculative grade firms persists in this sample.
20
  
 **** Insert Table IV here **** 
In Panels B and D of Table IV, I examine mean CARs for samples that 
include only liquid bonds that traded on every day during Day +31 to +50, 
irrespective of trading activity around the rating change. The samples are much 
smaller but the results are in agreement with those from the baseline sample. In Panel 
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 The samples in Panels A and C of Table IV contain some bonds that traded on either Day 0 or +1 
but not on Day -1. For a bond that traded on Day -5 and not again until Day +1, for example, my 
methodology assumes that the change in price occurred on Day +1.This assumption is questionable 
and the concern exists that the estimated return on Day +1 for such a bond incorrectly reflects not 
only the information in the rating change but also information conveyed by non-rating news that may 
have occurred prior to the rating change. For robustness, in untabulated analyses I rerun the event 
studies in Panels A and C of Table IV after dropping any bonds that traded on Day 0 or +1 but not on 
Day -1. Those results are in complete agreement with those reported in Panels A and C of Table IV.  
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B, the mean (0,+1) CAR for downgrades of -0.45% is statistically significant. In 
Panel D, the mean (0,+1) CAR for upgrades of 0.21% is significant and identical in 
magnitude to that of the baseline sample. Furthermore, for both upgrades and 
downgrades, the (0,+1) CARs for speculative grade firms are stronger in magnitude.  
C. Monthly Abnormal Bond Returns 
A contribution of this study over previous works that examine the bond 
market reaction to rating changes is the use of the TRACE data, which enables the 
examination of daily returns in a more comprehensive sample of bonds. Given that 
most prior studies have used monthly bond returns to estimate the bond market 
reaction to rating changes, it is beneficial to examine if and how inferences and 
conclusions would change if one used monthly returns to infer the information 
content of rating changes during the sample period. In addition to lower power due to 
larger standard errors (Bessembinder et al., 2009), another disadvantage of using 
monthly bond returns is that downgrades (upgrades) tend to occur 
contemporaneously with other non-rating events and disclosures that should be bad 
(good) news for bondholders. Removing observations that are contaminated during a 
window of a few days is feasible, but doing so over a month long window is 
infeasible because it would almost certainly result in the elimination of most of the 
sample.
21
 If the researcher’s objective is to infer the information content of the rating 
change, and not simply to measure how bond prices change with default risk, then 
using monthly returns will tend to bias the return estimates away from zero. With 
                                                          
21
 Weinstein (1977), Wansley and Clauretie (1985), Grier and Katz (1976), and Hite and Warga 
(1997), who examine monthly bond returns around rating changes, do not attempt to remove 
contaminated observations. 
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respect to statistical inferences, this problem works in the opposite direction of the 
power problem associated with monthly returns and also works to overstate 
economic significance. A priori, if and how conclusions based on monthly returns 
would differ from those based on daily returns is ambiguous and, therefore, worth 
examining.
22
     
I examine monthly abnormal bond returns around rating changes during my 
sample period for a sample that includes all bonds that traded in the prior calendar 
month (Month -1) and month of the rating change (Month 0). For this sample, I do 
not impose any of the additional trading restrictions that were imposed in the 
previously discussed analyses of daily returns. In addition, this sample was not 
checked for contaminated observations to be consistent with previous studies of 
monthly bond returns around rating changes. The rationale for employing this 
sample is that a researcher examining only monthly returns would likely impose 
monthly trading screens, such as trading in Month -1 and Month 0, as opposed to 
daily trading screens. However, for direct comparison I also examine the monthly 
abnormal returns earned by firms in the baseline sample from Table III. In all 
monthly analyses, I sample only the earliest rating change in cases where a firm 
experienced multiple rating changes over the course of a single calendar month. This 
results in a small attrition of the baseline sample size. 
Panel A of Table V reports monthly abnormal bond returns around 
downgrades for the sample that includes all bonds that traded in Month 0 and Month 
-1. The average monthly abnormal return in Month 0 for this sample is -2.29% and it 
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is highly significant. Panels B and C report monthly abnormal bond returns for the 
full and uncontaminated baseline samples of downgrades respectively. I refer to the 
latter as the uncontaminated baseline sample to be consistent with previously used 
nomenclature, but it is only uncontaminated in the sense that observations with non-
rating news during Days -1 to +1 have been removed. The mean Month 0 abnormal 
returns for the full and uncontaminated baseline samples are -2.74% and -2.37% 
respectively, and both are highly significant. Thus, in all three of these samples, the 
null is rejected and a researcher would conclude that downgrades have a significant 
impact on bond prices. This result is not completely unexpected given the very large 
sample sizes. Bessembinder et al. (2009) find that there is virtually no relative power 
advantage to using daily returns rather than monthly returns in a sample of 500 firms. 
However, as previously anticipated, the mean Month 0 abnormal return estimates are 
much larger than the daily abnormal return estimates over Days 0 and +1 for 
downgrades documented in Table III. With respect to the (0,+1) daily CARs 
documented for uncontaminated downgrades in Panel B of Table III, the mean 
Month 0 abnormal returns in Panels A, B, and C of Table V are more than three 
times as large in magnitude.  
**** Insert Table V here **** 
Panels D, E, and F of Table V document the monthly abnormal returns for 
upgrades. In all samples, the Month 0 abnormal return is significant at the 1% level, 
and the estimates range from 0.30% (the sample that includes all bonds traded in 
Month -1 and Month 0) to 0.48% (uncontaminated baseline sample). These are larger 
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than the daily (0,+1) CARs for upgrades in Table IV, although they are not as 
overstated as the monthly returns for downgrades. The largest discrepancy occurs in 
the uncontaminated baseline sample, where the Month 0 abnormal return of 0.48% 
(Table V, Panel E) is more than two times as large as the daily (0,+1) CAR of 0.21% 
(Table III, Panel D) from the same sample of firms. Furthermore, the Month 0 
abnormal return for investment grade firms in the sample that includes all bonds 
traded in Month -1 and Month 0 is 0.20%, and it is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. This contrasts with the daily evidence from Table III, in which the mean daily 
(0,+1) CARs for investment grade firms are all very close to zero and insignificant. 
Summarily, if one has access to the TRACE data, there appears to be no 
power advantage in using daily returns to study the bond market reaction to rating 
changes. This is probably because one can construct very large samples due to the 
high frequency of rating changes and TRACE’s comprehensive coverage of the bond 
market. However, the monthly returns do appear to overestimate the market reaction 
to rating changes if one considers uncontaminated daily returns to be more credible.   
D. The Stock Market Reaction to Bond Rating Changes 
The finding of a statistically significant bond market reaction to upgrades is 
inconsistent with the findings of Griffin and Sanvicente (1982), Holthausen and 
Leftwich (1986), Wansley and Clauretie (1985), Cornell et al. (1989), Hand et al. 
(1992), Goh and Ederington (1993), Ederington and Goh (1998), Goh and 
Ederington (1999), Norden and Weber (2004),  Li et al. (2006), and Kim and Nabar 
(2007), who all find statistically insignificant abnormal stock returns in response to 
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upgrades. However, they are consistent with findings from a few recent studies. 
Dichev and Piotroski (2001) find a mean stock market reaction of 0.5% in a large 
sample of Moody’s upgrades during 1970 to 1997, although they do not remove 
contaminated observations because their focus is long-run returns. In a sample of 
rating changes by Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch during 1998 to 2002, Jorion et al. (2005) 
find a significantly positive mean stock price reaction of  1.17% for the 127 upgrades 
in their sample that occurred after October 2000. They find an insignificantly 
negative market reaction to upgrades prior to October 2000. They attribute the 
difference to an increase in the relative informational advantage of rating agencies 
over analysts and other securities professionals that resulted from Regulation Fair 
Disclosure, which became effective in October 2000. Jorion and Zhang (2007) find a 
stock market reaction to uncontaminated Moody’s upgrades during 1996 to 2003 of 
0.31% that is significant at the 10% level. They also find that the reaction grows 
stronger as credit quality decreases.  
Given my evidence of a statistically significant bond market response to 
upgrades during the recent September 2002 to March 2009 period and the mixed 
evidence in the literature on the stock market response to upgrades, a question of 
interest is how did stockholders of firms in my sample respond to upgrades? The 
results of Jorion et al. (2005) suggest that upgrades may have been more informative 
during my sample period relative to less recent periods examined in many previous 
studies. To examine this issue and as a means of benchmarking my sample to prior 
works on the stock market response to rating changes, I examine the stock price 
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reaction to rating changes for firms in my baseline sample. For comparison, I also 
examine the stock market reaction to rating changes during the sample period for all 
CRSP firms, regardless of whether the firm is in TRACE and has actively traded 
bonds.
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As in Jorion et al. (2005), I compute daily abnormal stock returns as the raw 
return minus the contemporaneous return on the value-weighted CRSP market index. 
In addition to upgrades, for completeness I also examine the stock price reaction to 
downgrades in the baseline sample. Panels A and B of Table VI report the results of 
this analysis for downgrades. Of the 1,159 downgrades in the baseline sample, 775 
have stock return data in CRSP on Day 0 and Day +1.
24
 As in previous works, the 
results indicate that stock prices respond negatively to downgrades. The mean (0,+1) 
CAR for stocks in the full (uncontaminated) baseline sample of -2.36% (-1.54%) is 
significant. For comparison, there were 2,478 downgrades that affected firms with 
return data in CRSP during my sample period. The untabulated mean (0,+1) CAR for 
this sample of all CRSP firms is -2.09%, and it is statistically significant (t = -9.80). 
After removing observations with contaminating news during Days -1 to +1, this 
sample reduces to 1,520 uncontaminated downgrades, for which the mean (0,+1) 
CAR is -1.50% (t = -7.93). These abnormal stock returns are similar in magnitude to 
those documented in the baseline sample in Panels A and B of Table VI.    
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 I restrict this sample to rating changes of public debt issued by U.S. domiciled firms with non-
missing returns in CRSP on Days 0 and +1. I exclude rating changes if the old or new rating is below 
CC (Ca). For consistency with previous studies on the stock market reaction to rating changes, I do 
not impose any additional restrictions on bond characteristic (e.g. coupon rates, maturity, putability, 
etc.).  
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 The attrition of the sample from 1,159 to 775 is due to the absence of privately owned firms and 
public firms with equity traded exclusively over-the-counter in CRSP. TRACE includes such firms if 
they have public bonds.   
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**** Insert Table VI here **** 
Panels A and B of Table VII report abnormal stock returns associated with 
upgrades in the baseline sample. Of the 610 upgrades in the full baseline sample, 364 
have stock return data in CRSP on Day 0 and Day +1. In Panel A, the (0,+1) mean 
CAR for stocks in the full sample is 0.25%. While not significant based on the t-test, 
it is significant based on the signed-rank test at the 10% level. In the uncontaminated 
sample (Panel B), the (0,+1) mean CAR for stocks of 0.17% is slightly smaller and 
statistically insignificant. Furthermore, splitting the uncontaminated sample into 
investment and speculative grade firms does not yield a significant mean (0,+1) CAR 
in either group. For comparison, there were 1,585 upgrades that affected CRSP firms 
during the sample period. The untabulated mean (0,+1) CAR for this sample is 
0.20%. This estimate is significant at the 10% level based on a t-stat of 1.95 but not 
significant at the 10% level based on a signed-rank test. However, after removing 
contaminated observations, this sample reduces to 1,176 upgrades, among which the 
mean stock price reaction in the (0,+1) period is 0.07%. As in the uncontaminated 
baseline sample of upgrades, this estimate is statistically insignificant. 
**** Insert Table VII here **** 
In order to directly compare the reactions across bonds and stocks of the 
same firms, I report abnormal bond returns around upgrades for CRSP firms in the 
baseline sample in Panels C and D of Table VII. The mean (0,+1) CARs for bonds 
are 0.20% and 0.13% in the full and uncontaminated samples respectively, and both 
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are statistically significant. In addition, only the speculative grade firms have 
significant abnormal bond returns around upgrades.  
As in many previous studies, the evidence reported in this paper indicates that 
downgrades bring more information to the market than upgrades. However, an 
interesting result of the previous analysis is that, for upgrades, the bond market 
response is statistically significant, at least in the case of speculative grade firms, 
while the stock market response is not. I briefly consider two possible explanations 
for this differing result across the two markets. The first is that upgrades, on average, 
bring no new information to the market but, because the bond market is less efficient 
than the stock market, bond prices fail to fully incorporate the information prior to 
upgrades. The second is that some upgrades may be indicative of wealth transfer 
effects which have negative implications for stockholders but positive implications 
for bondholders.  
Downing et al. (2009) find that the bond market is slower in responding to 
positive news than the stock market. If upgrades tend to be triggered by other public 
disclosures, then it is possible that the positive mean bond CAR during the (0,+1) 
window around upgrades is indicative of a delayed reaction to positive news 
preceding the upgrade. If this is the case, the positive abnormal bond returns around 
upgrades should not be concentrated in the (0,+1) window. Rather, there should be 
some indication of positive abnormal bond returns in the days just prior to upgrades. 
To examine this possibility, I analyze two-day bond CARs during the (-4,-3), (-3,-2), 
and (-2,-1) periods preceding upgrades. I do so for the uncontaminated baseline 
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sample of only speculative grade firms in Table III and for the uncontaminated 
baseline sample of speculative grade TRACE firms with CRSP data examined in 
Table VII, since investment grade bonds do not react to upgrades. In both samples, I 
find no indication of significantly positive abnormal bond returns in these two-day 
windows preceding upgrades. For example, for uncontaminated upgrades of 
speculative grade firms in the baseline sample (from Panel D of Table III), the 
untabulated mean (-4,-3), (-3,-2), and (-2,-1) bond CARs are 0.08% (t = 1.14), -
0.01% (t = -0.13), and -0.04% (t = -0.81). These are all close to zero and small in 
magnitude relative to the mean (0,+1) bond CAR of 0.33% for this sample. The same 
conclusion is drawn for the uncontaminated sample of speculative grade TRACE 
firms with CRSP data mentioned above. Hence, there is no direct evidence that the 
positive bond market reaction to upgrades is a delayed reaction to positive news just 
prior to upgrades. 
As noted by Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), Goh and Ederington (1993), 
and Kim and Nabar (2005), some bond rating changes may have different 
implications for bondholders and stockholders due to wealth transfer effects. A 
rating change reflects the agency’s perception of a change in default risk, which is 
determined by the firm’s capital structure and the mean and variance of the value of 
its assets. Thus, a rating change may reflect a past or anticipated change in one or 
any combination of these factors. An anticipated increase in the mean of the firm’s 
asset value should lower default risk and have positive implications for both 
bondholders and stockholders. On the other hand, an anticipated decrease in leverage 
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should lower default risk, thereby increasing the value of the firm’s debt, but it may 
also transfer wealth from stockholders to bondholders, thereby lowering the value of 
the firm’s equity. Similarly, if one views the value of equity as a call option on firm 
value (Merton, 1974), a decrease in asset variance should transfer wealth from 
stockholders to bondholders. My evidence from the bond market suggests that the 
average upgrade conveys some new information but that, at best, its value is small. 
Given the small information content, even a small portion of upgrades reflecting 
situations where bondholders’ and stockholders’ interest are not aligned could be 
enough to result in a statistically insignificant stock market reaction to upgrades. One 
way to assess the validity of this conjecture would be to examine the bond and stock 
market reaction to upgrades conditional on the reason for the rating change cited by 
the rating agency. Unfortunately, my ratings data does not contain such information. 
Another means of addressing this is to examine the bond market reaction to upgrades 
conditional on the stock market reaction. As argued by Kim and Nabar (2005), a 
sample that includes only upgrades where the stock market reacts negatively should 
presumably capture those upgrades where all or a significant portion of the new 
information, if any, reflects a wealth transfer from stockholders to bondholders. If 
the average upgrade in such instances contains some new information, then the bond 
market reaction should be positive, even though the stock market reaction is 
negative. On the other side, for instances where the stock market reacts positively to 
an upgrade, the bond market reaction should also be positive if there is some new 
information in the average upgrade. Hence, I split the sample in Panel D of Table VII 
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into those upgrades where the stock market reaction is negative and those where it is 
positive. I do so for the sample that includes only speculative grade firms, since 
investment grade bonds do not react to upgrades. Splitting the observations in this 
manner results in 70 upgrades where the abnormal stock return over the (0,+1) 
period is negative and 83 where it is positive. In the former group, the mean stock 
market reaction over the (0,+1) window is -2.13%, while in the latter group it is 
2.14%. For the former group, the mean (0,+1) CAR for bonds is 0.23%, and it is 
statistically significant (t = 2.13). For the latter group, the mean (0,+1) CAR for 
bonds is 0.24%, and it is statistically significant at the 10% level (t=1.93). Thus, in 
both groups the average bond market reaction is small but statistically significant. 
This result is consistent with the conjecture that upgrades, on average, reflect a small 
amount of new information that is good for bondholders, even in cases where it is 
not all good for stockholders. For stocks, though, the average market reaction to 
upgrades could be statistically indistinguishable from zero because the information 
content, on average, is very small and because some upgrades may convey 
information pertaining to situations in which wealth will be transferred from 
stockholders to bondholders.
25
 
 
VI. Cross-Sectional Analysis of the Bond Market Reaction to Rating Changes 
 In this section, I aim to identify cross-sectional determinants of the bond 
market’s response to rating changes. The market reaction should be stronger (1) the 
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 Consistent with these results, the mean (0,+1) bond CAR for uncontaminated downgrades is  -
0.52% (t = -2.36) in cases where the (0,+1) stock CAR is positive.  
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greater the surprise and (2) if the change carries important implications. My cross-
sectional hypotheses are motivated by this line of reasoning.    
A. Cross-Sectional Hypotheses 
 As previously reported, negative abnormal bond returns precede downgrades, 
indicating that some downgrades are not entirely surprising. In an efficient market, 
all of the price adjustment associated with a downgrade that is fully anticipated 
should occur before the downgrade is announced. A downgrade that is largely a 
surprise to the market, though, should to be associated with zero or positive returns 
before the downgrade and a large negative response at the announcement of the 
downgrade. The same line of reasoning can be applied to upgrades. Hence, I 
hypothesize a stronger response to downgrades (upgrades) that are preceded by zero 
or positive (zero or negative) abnormal bond returns.  
 As reported in Table II, many rating changes are preceded by a credit watch 
listing. Altman & Rijken (2007) note that two thirds of firms placed on Moody’s 
watch list experience a rating change at the end of a watch procedure, implying that a 
watch listing might increase market expectations of a rating change and result in a 
weaker reaction. Alternatively, Boot et al. (2006) theorize that a credit watch 
procedure increases the informativeness of a rating change since it generates more 
private information for the rating agency, implying a stronger market response to 
rating changes preceded by a credit watch listing. Given these two competing 
hypotheses, the expected relationship between the market reaction and the existence 
of a prior credit watch listing is ambiguous. 
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 Different rating agencies sometimes disagree on the credit quality of a 
particular issue, leading to what are known as split ratings. This begs the question of 
whether the informaveness of one agency’s rating depends on the ratings assigned by 
other agencies. For example, consider the case in which a firm that carries the same 
rating from Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch (e.g. BB+ from S&P and Fitch and Ba1 from 
Moody’s) is downgraded by one of the agencies. Contrast this to the case in which 
one of the agencies has the firm rated lower than the other two, and one of the 
agencies with the higher rating downgrades the firm. The rating change in the latter 
case might be less informative, all else equal. Hence, I expect the reaction to a 
downgrade (upgrade) to be weaker if the rating assigned by one or both of the other 
agencies at the time of the rating change is lower (higher) than the pre-downgrade 
(pre-upgrade) rating assigned by the agency making the rating change.   
Hamilton and Cantor (2004) document three-year default rates of 0.0%, 
0.0%, 0.4%, 1.5%, 4.4%, 17.7%, and 31% for Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B, and Caa 
bonds respectively. These default rates suggest that a move from Aa to A, for 
example, is much less consequential than a move from B to Caa. I hypothesize, 
therefore, that lower rated firms respond more strongly to rating changes.  
Dating as far back as 1936, U.S. government regulations have prohibited 
some financial institutions from holding speculative grade bonds.
26
 It has also been 
observed that the investment grade cutoff is used by some fund managers and plan 
sponsors in portfolio decision making, either as a result of imposed regulation or in 
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 In 1936, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the federal regulator of banks, 
prohibited banks from investing in speculative grade bonds, an institution that still exists today 
(Cantor and Packer, 1997). 
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response to client demand (Cantor et al., 2007). I hypothesize these institutional 
rigidities that discourage or prohibit financial institutions from holding speculative 
grade debt to result in a stronger market reaction to rating changes that cross the 
investment grade boundary.  
 The number of grades that the rating is changed should represent the extent of 
the change in credit quality perceived by the agency. Hence, I hypothesize a negative 
(positive) relation between the market reaction to downgrades (upgrades) and the 
absolute value of the number of grades that the rating is changed. 
 The sample period includes the recent economic recession that began in 
December 2007. Jorion et al. (2005) find that the stock market reaction to 
downgrades was significantly less negative during the recession of 2001. Hence, I 
control for whether the rating change occurred during the economic recession that 
began in December 2007. Finally, to explore the possibility of differing 
informativeness or timeliness of rating changes across the three rating agencies, I 
include a set of indicator variables to capture any mean differences across the three 
agencies.  
B. Cross-Sectional Results 
 Table VIII reports multivariate results for the baseline sample of 
uncontaminated downgrades and upgrade separately. I estimate all regressions using 
OLS with (0,+1) percentage bond CARs as the dependent variable. The results in 
Table VIII indicate that the bond market reaction to a downgrade is significantly 
more negative if the firm’s (-15,-1) bond CAR is positive or zero. This is consistent 
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with the hypothesis that downgrades preceded by positive or zero abnormal bond 
returns are more surprising and, therefore, elicit a stronger reaction. In addition, the 
reaction to a downgrade is significantly and positively related to the firm’s pre-
downgrade rating, indicating that lower rated firms respond more negatively. Finally, 
the reaction to downgrades is significantly more negative during the recession that 
began in December 2007.  
**** Insert Table VIII here **** 
For upgrades, the bond market reaction is significantly more positive if the 
firm’s (-15,-1) bond CAR is negative or zero, which is consistent with such upgrades 
being more surprising. There is weak evidence that the reaction is more positive if 
preceded by a credit watch listing. In specification 7, the dummy that equals one for 
a credit watch listing prior to the rating change and zero otherwise is positive and 
significant at the 10% level. It is not significant, however, in specification 10. In 
addition, there is evidence that S&P and, to a lesser extent, Moody’s upgrades result 
in a more positive reaction than Fitch upgrades. In specification 8, the Moody’s 
dummy is positive and significant at the 10% level but is not in specification 10, 
which constitutes only weak evidence. The S&P dummy is positive and significant at 
the 5% level in specifications 8 and 10, indicating that the reaction to an S&P 
upgrade is significantly stronger than the reaction to a Fitch upgrade. The reaction to 
S&P and Moody’s upgrades are not significantly different on average, as the 
untabulated difference between the S&P and Moody’s dummy coefficients is 
insignificant in all specifications. Furthermore, the bond market reaction to an 
38 
 
upgrade is significantly and negatively related to the firm’s pre-upgrade rating, 
indicating that lower rated firms respond more positively. Finally, the reaction to an 
upgrade is significantly more positive if the firm is moved into the investment grade 
category. This result is consistent with the investment grade cutoff holding special 
significance due to ratings based regulations and guidelines that discourage or 
prohibit some investors from holding speculative grade securities.  
  
VII. Conclusions 
 I use daily data on bond transactions from TRACE to study the information 
content of bond rating changes during a period that spans September 2002 to March 
2009. In a sample of 652 downgrades and 441 upgrades not accompanied by other 
non-rating news, I find that the corporate bond market infers some new information 
from both downgrades and upgrades. Downgrades elicit an average two-day 
abnormal bond return of -0.64% that is statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
mean two-day abnormal return for upgrades of 0.21% is smaller in magnitude but 
statistically significant at the 1% level. These abnormal returns are largest in 
magnitude among speculative grade firms, which exhibit significant two-day 
abnormal returns of -0.88% and 0.33% in response to downgrades and upgrades 
respectively. While statistically significant, the bond market reaction to upgrades is 
economically small relative to transaction costs.  
 To determine if and how conclusions and inferences might change if one 
used monthly bond returns to study the information content of rating changes, I 
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examine monthly abnormal bond returns around rating changes during my sample 
period. For both downgrades and upgrades, I find statistically significant abnormal 
bond returns in the month of the rating change. The relative power advantage that 
one might expect from using daily data appears to be mitigated by the ability to 
construct large samples of rating changes with the comprehensive TRACE data. 
However, a weakness of monthly abnormal bond returns is that they tend to overstate 
the magnitude and economic significance of the market reaction relative to daily 
returns. This is likely due to contaminating, non-rating events and disclosures during 
the month of the rating change.  
 I examine the stock market reaction to bond rating changes during my sample 
period and find that stock prices react negatively and significantly to downgrades. 
The stock market reaction to upgrades, however, is positive but statistically 
insignificant. This contrasts with the bond market reaction to upgrades, which is, 
although small in magnitude, positive and statistically significant. I conjecture that 
the differing statistical inferences regarding the effect of upgrades on bond and stock 
prices may be due to the small information content of the average upgrade and the 
wealth transfer effects that may be implied by some upgrades. I find some evidence 
that is consistent with this conjecture.  
Finally, in cross-sectional analyses, I find that corporate bond prices respond 
more negatively (positively) to a downgrade (upgrade) if abnormal bond returns 
prior to the announcement are positive (negative), suggesting that downgrades 
(upgrades) preceded by positive (negative) price-movements are more surprising. 
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The bond market reaction also varies across credit qualities. For upgrades, the 
boundary that separates investment grade debt from speculative grade debt holds 
special significance, as firms moved into the investment grade category respond 
much more positively, all else equal. In addition, lower rated firms react more 
strongly than higher rated firms to both upgrades and downgrades. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
THE VALUE OF INVESTMENT BANKING RELATIONSHIPS: EVIDENCE 
FROM THE COLLAPSE OF LEHMAN BROTHERS
27
 
 
I. Introduction 
The question of whether firms derive value from investment banking relationships 
has received considerable attention in the literature, especially since the increasingly 
competitive market for investment banking services would suggest that firms can 
switch investment banks costlessly. Extant research has failed to come up with an 
unambiguous answer, due in part to the difficulty in measuring the value of 
relationship capital.  
The sudden collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 14, 2008 (then the 
fifth largest investment bank in the world) provides a unique natural experimental 
setting to measure the value of the relationships that client firms had with Lehman. 
Whereas large U.S. financial institutions in distress have almost invariably been 
prevented from declaring bankruptcy by being acquired by other large institutions 
(often with the intervention of the U.S. government), Lehman was explicitly allowed 
to fail.
28
 This unprecedented collapse was all the more shocking since Barclays Bank 
had been negotiating an acquisition with Lehman’s managers right up to Saturday, 
September 13, 2008, the day before Lehman announced the largest bankruptcy filing 
in U.S. history. When stock market trading resumed on Monday, September 15, 
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 This chapter is based on collaborative work with Chitru S. Fernando and William L. Megginson. 
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 Examples of rescues during the 2008 financial crisis include the J.P. Morgan takeover of Bear 
Stearns, Bank of America’s takeover of Merrill Lynch and the U.S. Government’s bailout of 
American International Group, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
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2008, Lehman’s stock lost virtually all its value, the U.S. stock market experienced 
one of its worst single-day losses, and the entire global financial system was pushed 
to the edge of collapse.  
The acquisition by an investment bank of valuable private information about 
a firm (James (1992), Schenone (2004), and Drucker and Puri (2005)), investment 
bank monitoring (Hansen and Torregrosa (1992)), investment by banks in 
institutional investor networks (Benveniste and Spindt (1989), Cornelli and 
Goldreich (2001), Ritter and Welch (2002) and Ljungqvist, Jenkinson and Wilhelm 
(2003)), switching costs incurred by firms in moving to a new underwriter (Burch, 
Nanda, and Warther (2005) and Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (2006)) and optimal 
firm-underwriter matching (Fernando, Gatchev and Spindt (2005)) would all suggest 
that the relationship is jointly valuable to the firm and its underwriter. However, 
there is no clear evidence on the extent to which client firms receive a share of any 
value created from the relationship. Moreover, there is considerable evidence that 
client firms frequently switch underwriters, especially to those of higher reputation 
(Krigman, Shaw and Womack (2001) and Fernando, Gatchev and Spindt (2005)), 
which also raises questions about the extent to which client firms share any value 
created by the relationship. Additionally, while investment banks provide a variety of 
services in addition to underwriting equity and debt offerings, the extent to which 
these services create value to clients from a long-term investment bank relationship 
is also unknown.  
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We examine how the Lehman collapse affected industrial firms that received 
underwriting, advisory, analyst, and market-making services from Lehman by 
studying how their stock prices reacted on Monday, September 15 and over various 
short-term windows around that day. We identify more than 800 public industrial 
companies that received one or more of these five services from Lehman during the 
10 years leading up to and including 2008, as well as a comparable number (944) of 
firms that received equity underwriting services from Lehman’s competitors. We 
address two specific research questions: First, did Lehman’s collapse impact its 
investment banking (IB) clients over and above the impact the firm’s collapse had on 
the equity market in general, and second, did the impact of Lehman’s failure vary 
with the type of IB service received, client characteristics, and/or the strength of the 
client’s relationship with Lehman? These questions are central to understanding how 
intermediaries create value for their clients. To our knowledge, this is the first study 
that attempts to isolate the value of the investment bank relationship to clients using 
a broad group of client firms and all major investment banking services. 
Companies that had used Lehman as lead underwriter for one or more equity 
offerings during the 10 years leading up to September 2008 suffered economically 
and statistically significant negative abnormal returns. Based on Fama-French-
Carhart four-factor model adjusted abnormal returns, the 184 equity underwriting 
clients that we study lost 4.85% of their market value, on average, over a seven-day 
period spanning the five trading days prior to and the first and second trading days 
immediately following Lehman’s bankruptcy filing, amounting to approximately $23 
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billion in aggregate, risk-adjusted losses. We arrive at similar value loss estimates 
and conclusions using alternative return generating models. These losses were 
significantly larger than those for firms that were equity underwriting clients of other 
large investment banks, and were especially severe for companies that had stronger 
and broader underwriting relationships with Lehman, including equity clients that 
also engaged Lehman for debt and convertible debt underwriting. Losses were also 
higher for smaller, younger, and more financially constrained firms. No other client 
groups were significantly adversely affected by Lehman’s bankruptcy.  
These results show that Lehman’s collapse did, in fact, impose material 
losses on its customers, but for the most part these losses were confined to those 
companies that employed Lehman for equity underwriting. Furthermore, to the 
extent that investors partially anticipated Lehman’s failure prior to the days 
surrounding Lehman’s bankruptcy announcement, these estimates may actually 
understate the losses suffered by Lehman’s equity underwriting clients. More 
broadly, these results tell us that underwriting is the principal portion of the overall 
investment banking relationship that is irreplaceable without significant cost and 
whose value will be forfeited if the relationship were to be involuntarily ruptured. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we briefly review 
the existing literature on firm-intermediary relationships in corporate finance and 
formulate our empirical hypotheses. Section III describes the data and methodology. 
Section IV presents our findings on the impact of the Lehman collapse. Section V 
concludes. 
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II. Background 
We organize our discussion by first reviewing the literature on investment 
banking relationships and then discussing the empirical implications pertaining to the 
value to clients of investment banking relationships.  
A. Firm-Investment Bank Relationships 
The extant theoretical and empirical literature has examined ways in which a 
long-term equity underwriting relationship between an investment bank and a client 
firm can create value for both parties. The first such channel is economies of scale. 
James (1992) and Burch, et al. (2005) show that set-up costs in the IPO due diligence 
process create durable relationship capital that will lower underwriting spreads for 
firms that are expected to issue equity again, and Kovner (2010) provides evidence 
of valuable relationship capital being created for IPO clients. Equity underwriters 
also create significant value for their clients by monitoring (Hansen and Torregrosa 
(1992)) and by investing in the development and maintenance of institutional 
investor networks that serve as channels not only for collecting information but also 
for the distribution of shares through book building, thereby reducing the indirect 
costs of equity offerings.
29
 Finally, the presence of switching costs also suggests that 
an underwriting relationship will be valuable due to the cost of rupturing it to 
establish a new equity underwriting relationship (Burch, Nanda, and Warther (2005) 
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 Benveniste and Spindt (1989) present a theoretical rationale for this argument, while Benveniste 
and Wilhelm (1990), Cornelli and Goldreich (2001), Ritter and Welch (2002), Ljungqvist, et al. 
(2003), and Gao and Ritter (2010) provide empirical support. Brau and Fawcett (2006) observe that 
the majority of CFOs in their survey carefully weigh the institutional client base of the underwriter. 
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and Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (2006)). However, these studies do not account for 
the added benefit that firms may receive by employing a higher quality underwriter. 
Krigman, Shaw and Womack (2001) and Fernando, Gatchev and Spindt (2005) show 
that seasoned firms often voluntarily switch from lower to higher-quality 
underwriters, which suggests that the benefits of establishing a new underwriting 
relationship may sometimes outweigh the costs of doing so.  
Burch, et al. (2005) argue that firms derive less value from a debt 
underwriting relationship based on their finding that in contrast to repeat equity 
issuers, which benefit from significantly reduced underwriting fees for subsequent 
offerings, debt issuers are actually penalized (charged higher underwriting fees) for 
retaining the previous underwriter for subsequent bond offerings. While several 
studies, including Rajan (1992), Boot and Thakor (2000), Schenone (2004), Yasuda 
(2005), and Bharath, et al. (2007) argue that an existing lending relationship between 
a bank and borrowing firm can be mutually beneficial, it is unknown whether these 
findings carry over to debt underwriting, although some of these studies also 
document economies of scope between lending and underwriting.
30
 Additionally, in 
contrast to equity offerings, debt ratings by rating agencies make underwriter debt 
certification and placement less valuable to clients. 
Studies that examine the relationship between acquiring firms and the 
investment banks that advise them generally show that banks do provide valuable 
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 More generally, Gande, et al. (1999), Song (2004), and Narayanan, et al. (2004) all document that 
the entry of commercial banks into the securities underwriting business (mostly debt underwriting) 
has benefited issuing firms by reducing average fees charged by all underwriters. However, 
Shivdasani and Song (2010) argue that these benefits came at the cost of lower screening incentives 
among bond underwriters and show that industries with higher commercial bank penetration tended to 
have lower screening standards during 1996-2000. 
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advisory services to acquirers involved in takeover contests, and that employing 
more prestigious banks is associated with superior outcomes for clients.
31
 However, 
these studies also generally find that banks advising clients on acquisitions face 
conflicts of interest between their desire to provide unbiased advice and their desire 
to consummate deals in order to collect completion payments. Additionally, there is 
no evidence that client acquirer firms derive persistent value from such a relationship 
or that any relationship is not transferable to another investment bank without a 
significant cost to the client. Much of the private information collected during the 
M&A process pertains to the target firm and this information loses value 
immediately after a deal is consummated.  
The investment banking literature indicates that security analysts employed 
by prestigious banks can provide valuable services to client firms, as shown by 
Mikhail, et al. (2004) and Ivković and Jegadeesh (2004). However, it is less clear 
whether that relationship is firm-specific (between client firm and bank) or person-
specific (between client firm and analyst). The available evidence suggests that any 
value in an existing analyst relationship will simply be transferred costlessly to a new 
bank that employs the analyst after the original bank’s failure (Ljungqvist, et al. 
(2006) and Clarke, et al. (2007)). 
Finally, while several studies examine the value of market making for NYSE 
listed firms,
32
 the value of any market making provided by underwriters appears to 
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 See McLaughlin (1990), Servaes and Zenner (1996), Rau (2000), Kale, et al. (2003), Allen, et al. 
(2004), and Kisgen, et al. (2009).  
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 See Cao, et al. (1997), Corwin (1999), Coughenour and Deli (2002), Ellis, et al. (2000, 2002) and 
Corwin, et al. (2004).  
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be short-lived, helping to stabilize an offering in the immediate aftermath of an IPO 
but progressively becoming less important over the ensuing months. Ellis, et al. 
(2000) show that the underwriter is almost always the dominant dealer in the three 
month period after a Nasdaq IPO and that the underwriter engages in price 
stabilization during this period. Schultz and Zaman (1994), Aggarwal (2000), and 
Corwin, Harris and Lipson (2004) also show that the underwriter engages in price 
stabilization just after the IPO.  
B. Empirical Implications 
Equity underwriting relationships (especially relationships with high 
reputation underwriters) appear to be potentially valuable to client firms due to 
equity clients (i) being able to share the benefit of an underwriter’s investment in 
information generation via reduced fees for subsequent equity offerings; and (ii) 
having the ability to benefit from underwriter monitoring and the underwriter’s 
investment in a network of institutional investors, who provide information and also 
subscribe to the underwriter’s offerings. If so, the rupture of an existing equity 
underwriting relationship could potentially be highly damaging for client firms, 
especially for those relatively small and lesser known companies that rely heavily on 
their current underwriters to access public stock markets and are unable to easily 
migrate to other underwriters. Additionally, even if some companies are able to 
swiftly enlist new underwriters, this will involve significant switching costs and any 
relationship-specific capital embodied in the prior relationship will be forfeited. 
However, in an environment where a free market exists for underwriter services and 
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underwriter switching is common, the questions of what value client firms obtain by 
staying in an underwriting relationship and what the sources of this value are, if any, 
remain unresolved. The question of how this value might be affected by the 
emergence of co-led underwriting (Shivdasani and Song (2010)) has also not been 
examined. 
Debt underwriting relationships appear to be less valuable to client firms than 
equity underwriting relationships. While debt offerings also entail information 
generation, there is no evidence in the literature to suggest that client firms are able 
to share in the benefit of an underwriter’s investment in information when it comes 
to subsequent offerings. Additionally, since many debt securities have credit ratings, 
they are easier to price and place, making underwriter certification and the book 
building process considerably less valuable to client firms. Therefore, to the extent 
Lehman debt underwriting relationships are valuable to clients, we expect this value 
to be less than for equity underwriting relationships. 
While M&A advisory relationships involve intense information gathering 
prior to a deal, there is no evidence to suggest that client acquirer firms derive 
persistent value from such a relationship or that any relationship is not easily 
transferable to another investment bank. Much of the private information collected 
during the M&A process pertains to the target firm and this information largely 
dissipates after a deal is consummated. Additionally, serial acquirers are invariably 
larger and would have a relatively easier time in transferring to another investment 
bank for M&A advisory services. 
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If analyst coverage relationships are analyst specific rather than bank specific 
as suggested by Ljungqvist, et al. (2006) and Clarke, et al. (2007), any value that is 
embedded in the analyst-client relationship will simply be transferred to the analyst’s 
new employers without diminishing the client firm’s market value. Finally, the value 
of any market making provided by underwriters is short-lived, helping to stabilize an 
offering in the immediate aftermath of an IPO but progressively becoming less 
important over the ensuing months. Therefore, it seems unlikely that client firms 
would derive value from a long term market making relationship.  
Conditional on a relationship developed through the provision of investment 
banking services having value, we expect cross-sectional variation in client losses 
around Lehman’s bankruptcy to be related to the strength of the relationship and 
client characteristics. For equity underwriting, we conjecture that the number of past 
equity deals with Lehman and Lehman’s share of the client’s past common stock 
offerings would be a measure of the strength of the relationship. Additionally, the 
commonality in information used by investment banks across all underwriting 
services for the same firm (equity, convertible debt, and straight debt) would suggest 
the presence of economies of scope. If equity underwriting clients that utilize other 
underwriting services receive some of this benefit, we would expect to see it 
reflected in the abnormal return. Furthermore, any client lending facilities that 
involve Lehman as lead or participant lender would add to the strength of the 
relationship. Finally, to the extent that Lehman’s ownership of the client’s shares is 
an indicator of a stronger relationship (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) and 
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Ljungqvist, et al. (2006)) a negative relation is implied between the client’s abnormal 
returns and Lehman’s ownership of the client’s shares. Aside from this relationship 
based interpretation, Lehman’s failure may have also disproportionately affected 
clients in which it owned shares due to a supply-side effect. If Lehman’s bankruptcy 
triggered the sale of its clients’ shares, either voluntarily or as a result of forced 
liquidation during the impending bankruptcy process, then a more negative reaction 
among such firms should be observed. 
Regarding client characteristics, we hypothesize that clients with greater 
immediate need for external capital will be more adversely affected by the loss of an 
underwriting relationship. Specifically, we expect firms with less financial slack and 
firms in greater financial distress to have greater need for external capital and 
therefore we expect such firms to suffer greater losses in response to Lehman’s 
bankruptcy. Finally, since smaller and younger firms generally have less established 
reputations in financial markets, the information production role of an intermediary 
is more important to them relative to larger, more established firms (Diamond 
(1991)), and so they should be more adversely affected by Lehman’s collapse. 
 
III. Data and Methodology 
A. Equity Underwriting 
We use the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Global New Issues database 
to identify firms that employed Lehman Brothers as the lead or co-lead underwriter 
on a public offering of common stock in the U.S. market during the ten years 
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preceding Lehman’s bankruptcy (Sep. 14, 1998 to Sep. 14, 2008).33 We restrict the 
sample to U.S. firms in CRSP and Compustat with publicly traded common stock 
(CRSP share codes of 10 or 11) at the time of the bankruptcy announcement. We 
exclude utilities (two-digit SIC code 49) because their financing decisions are highly 
regulated. The Lehman bankruptcy also triggered a wave of creditor claims, 
overwhelmingly from other financial firms and arising largely from debt and OTC 
derivatives counterparty claims.
34
 Thus we also exclude all financial (one digit SIC 
code 6) firms from our analyses to prevent this purely financial, counter-party 
exposure from obscuring the impact of Lehman’s bankruptcy on its corporate finance 
clients. 
For our event study, we identify September 15, 2008 as Day 0 because it was 
the first day on which the market could react to the bankruptcy announcement. For 
the purpose of estimating abnormal stock returns during the event period, we use a 
260-day estimation period (Day -290 to Day -31), and we require that firms have 
non-missing returns on at least 100 days during this estimation period and non-
missing returns on all days during the period Day -5 to Day +5. Imposing these 
restrictions yields an initial sample of 199 industrial (i.e., non-financial, non-utility) 
firms that employed Lehman as a lead underwriter on at least one common stock 
offering during the ten years preceding Lehman’s bankruptcy. 
                                                          
33
 Throughout, any references to underwriters or underwriting refer only to lead or co-lead 
underwriters, not co-managers.  
34
 For example, 95% of the largest 1000 claims among the 57,057 claims lodged as of the November 
2, 2009 final filing deadline (In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., 08-13555, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, 
Southern District of New York) were from financial firms. 
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In addition to excluding financial firms, we also screen the industrial firms in 
our initial sample for material derivatives and other financial exposure to Lehman. 
Since the SEC requires a firm to file an 8-K report when an event triggers a material 
change in the firm’s financial condition, we search the SEC’s EDGAR system for 8-
K reports filed by all our sample firms between September 1, 2008 and December 
31, 2009 that describe derivatives counterparty relationships or exposure to securities 
issued by Lehman. We also search quarterly (10-Q) and annual (10-K) reports filed 
between September 1, 2008 and December 31, 2009 for disclosure of derivatives 
counterparty relationships with Lehman. We identify and drop 15 firms from the 
sample, yielding a final sample of 184 equity underwriting clients. As an added 
check, we verify that our sample does not contain firms that had material claims 
against Lehman in the aforementioned bankruptcy case docket. We use this same 
screening procedure to eliminate firms with material exposure to Lehman in all 
samples discussed in subsequent portions of the paper. While our results are 
substantively unchanged whether or not we apply these screens, the results we report 
pertain to these screened samples. Using SEC filings and LPC’s Dealscan database, 
we also identify 42 firms in our sample to whom Lehman was a lender in one or 
more of their credit facilities. In addition to verifying the robustness of our findings 
when these firms are excluded from our analysis, we control for lending relationships 
with Lehman in all our cross-sectional regressions.  
Since Lehman’s collapse had an adverse impact on the investment banking 
industry and may have signaled that it would be relatively more costly to issue equity 
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in the near future, we conjecture that the broader population of equity issuers may 
also have been abnormally affected by Lehman’s collapse. We investigate this 
possibility by computing abnormal returns earned by clients of similarly positioned 
investment banks around the time of Lehman’s bankruptcy. We identify banks with 
industry status similar to that of Lehman using the two underwriter reputation 
metrics commonly employed in the literature – underwriting market share 
(Megginson and Weiss (1991)) and reputation ranking (Carter and Manaster 
(1990)).
35
 We first identify all banks with an updated (2005-2007) Carter-Manaster 
ranking that is no more than one point lower or one point higher than that of 
Lehman. We then pick the ten underwriters from this pool of banks that survive to 
September 14, 2008 and that are closest (according to difference in percentage 
points) to Lehman in 2007 U.S. common stock underwriting market share. These ten 
banks are Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan, Citibank, 
UBS, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Bank of America, and Wachovia. We identify 
firms that employed at least one of these banks but did not employ Lehman as a lead 
underwriter in a public common stock offering during the ten years preceding 
Lehman’s bankruptcy, yielding an initial sample of 963 firms. After searching these 
firms’ SEC filings following the procedure outlined above, we eliminate 17 firms 
with material financial exposure to Lehman, leading to a final sample of 946 firms. 
                                                          
35
 Megginson and Weiss (1991) compute underwriting market share as the fraction of prior year 
equity offerings underwritten by a given bank, while Carter and Manaster (1990) assign numerical 
scores of 0 to 9 to denote the frequency with which a bank is listed in the bulge bracket or lower 
rankings of the title pages of prior year equity underwritings. The updated Carter-Manaster rankings 
are generously provided by Jay Ritter on his webpage. 
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B. Debt Underwriting, M&A Advising, Market Making, and Analyst Coverage 
In addition to equity underwriting, we also examine the effect of Lehman’s 
collapse on firms that received other services from Lehman, including debt 
underwriting, M&A advising, market making, and analyst coverage. We do so using 
samples that include all industrial firms that receive the particular service of interest 
from Lehman, constructed using the same restrictions regarding SIC codes and 
available CRSP/Compustat data as those used to construct the sample of equity 
underwriting clients. 
 We identify an initial sample of 61 industrial firms that employed Lehman as 
an underwriter in at least one public straight debt offering during the ten-year period 
prior to Lehman’s bankruptcy. Screening for firms with material financial exposure 
to Lehman eliminates eight companies, yielding a final sample of 53 firms. Next, we 
construct an initial sample of 10 firms that use Lehman as an underwriter for at least 
one public convertible debt offering during the sample period. After screening for 
firms with material financial exposure to Lehman, the final sample of convertible 
debt underwriting clients consists of seven firms. As with equity underwriting, these 
samples are restricted to offerings made in the U.S. market. 
We use the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database to identify an initial 
sample of 94 acquiring firms that employ Lehman as a financial advisor in at least 
one completed acquisition of a U.S. target during the ten years prior to Lehman’s 
bankruptcy. Removing firms with material financial exposure to Lehman reduces the 
final sample to 87 firms. 
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We use the NYSE’s Post and Panel File to identify 158 NYSE firms for 
whom Lehman was the specialist at the time of the bankruptcy. This initial sample is 
reduced to 151 firms once companies with material exposure to Lehman are 
removed.  
We use the Thomson I/B/E/S Detail History database to identify companies 
that are covered by an analyst from Lehman Brothers just prior to its bankruptcy.
36
 
We define a firm as receiving coverage if an analyst from Lehman made at least one 
earnings forecast in either the firm’s current fiscal quarter or last fiscal quarter. The 
initial sample of 659 firms is reduced to 633 companies after screening for material 
exposure to Lehman. 
C. Measures of Investment Bank-Client Relationship Strength and Client 
Characteristics 
This subsection describes measures of the strength of a client’s relationship to 
Lehman and other client characteristics we use as independent variables in our cross-
sectional regressions pertaining to equity underwriting clients. We employ several 
measures of the strength of Lehman’s investment banking relationships with equity 
underwriting clients. Our first proxy for relationship strength is the total number of 
common stock offerings underwritten by Lehman during our sample period. Since 
this variable does not capture the client’s reliance on Lehman relative to other banks, 
we also employ the number of a client’s equity offerings underwritten by Lehman 
divided by the total number of the client’s equity offerings over the prior ten years as 
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 Thomson has removed all earnings forecasts made by a Lehman analyst from the August 2009 
I/B/E/S data that is available through WRDS.  We obtained our I/B/E/S data directly from Thomson, 
and Thomson generously provided us the data that still contains those observations. 
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a measure for the client’s loyalty to Lehman in common stock deals, which we call 
Lehman’s share of the client’s common stock offerings. Because our aim is to 
capture the client’s degree of exclusivity or loyalty to Lehman relative to other 
banks, this variable is constructed such that, for offerings with n lead underwriters, 
Lehman is credited with 1/n share of that offering. This variable ranges between zero 
and one, with one indicating that the firm dealt exclusively with Lehman in its equity 
offerings. Additionally, we also employ an underwriting relationship scope index as 
our third proxy for relationship strength, which would also reflect any economies of 
scope in underwriting captured by the client. This variable receives one point for 
each of the three underwriting services that a firm can receive (equity, straight debt, 
and convertible debt) and will therefore range from one to three for equity 
underwriting clients. 
As noted previously, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) and Ljungqvist, et al. 
(2006) conjecture that an investment bank holding an equity stake in the client may 
serve as a means of “cementing” a relationship. Following Ljungqvist, et al. (2006), 
we use the CDA/Spectrum database on institutional 13f holdings to identify clients 
in which Lehman held common shares at the time of the bankruptcy. Since Lehman 
was a large financial institution with multiple subsidiaries that could potentially own 
shares, we use Lehman’s 10-K filing for fiscal year 2007 to identify subsidiaries of 
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (the ultimate parent company of all Lehman 
Brothers entities). We then search the SEC’s EDGAR database for 13f filings by 
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc (LBHI) and its subsidiaries, and find 13f filings by 
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two Lehman Brothers entities: LBHI and Neuberger Berman LLC, part of Lehman’s 
asset management arm.
37
 We construct two variables that measure the proportions of 
the client firm’s outstanding shares owned by LBHI and Neuberger Berman. We 
regress abnormal returns on these two variables to determine whether clients with 
larger proportions of shares owned by Lehman Brothers entities are more adversely 
affected by Lehman’s collapse.38 
Lehman Brothers acted as a lead lender or participant lender in many 
syndicated credit facilities. We use facility-level data from Loan Pricing 
Corporation’s (LPC) Dealscan database along with SEC filings to identify firms in 
our sample that have credit facilities from Lehman at the time of the bankruptcy. 
Among Lehman’s equity underwriting clients, 42 firms had active credit facilities 
where Lehman was a member of the lending syndicate. For 14 of these firms, 
Lehman was the lead lender (administrative agent) in at least one of the firm’s 
facilities. In our cross-sectional analyses, we use two dummy variables that control 
for Lehman’s role as lender. The first equals one if Lehman was a lead lender in at 
least one of the firm’s facilities and zero otherwise. The second equals one if 
Lehman was not a lead lender but was a participating lender in at least one of the 
firm’s facilities and zero otherwise. 
We expect firms with greater immediate need for external capital to be more 
adversely affected by the failure of their equity underwriter. Since firms with greater 
                                                          
37
 SEC Rule 13f is set up to have no overlap in the holdings reported by subsidiaries and parents or 
different subsidiaries of the same parent. Parents may file on behalf of subsidiaries, but if a subsidiary 
files on its own behalf, the holdings reported by the subsidiary are not reported on the 13f filing of the 
parent, and vice versa.   
38
 The data in CDA/Spectrum are based on quarterly SEC filings. We measure these variables over the 
prior calendar quarter, which ended June 30, 2008.  
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amounts of financial slack should have smaller immediate needs for external 
financing, we use net market leverage and cash-to-assets to test this hypothesis. 
Financially distressed firms should have a greater need for external equity capital 
and so we use Altman’s Z-score. As additional determinants, we include firm size 
and age. We expect larger and older firms to have more established reputations in 
financial markets so that the information production role of an underwriter is less 
important to them. 
Finally, we include a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the client 
shelf registered (Rule 415) an equity offering during the two years preceding 
Lehman’s bankruptcy and did not take any of the registered equity off the shelf 
before September 14, 2008, and zero otherwise. Our intent in using this variable is to 
capture firms that were likely to be issuing equity in the near future. 
**** Insert Table IX about here **** 
D. Estimating Abnormal Returns 
We estimate daily abnormal stock returns using the Fama-French-Carhart 
four-factor model, which includes the Fama and French (1993) factors and the 
Carhart (1997) momentum factor: 
 , , ,i t i i M t i t i t i t i t
R R s SMB h HML uUMD                     (4) 
where on Day t, Ri,t is the return to firm i, RM,t is the return to the value-weighted 
CRSP market index, and SMBt, HMLt, and UMDt are the returns to the Small-Minus-
Big (SMB), High-Minus-Low (HML), and Up-Minus-Down (UMD) portfolios 
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meant to capture size, book-to-market, and return momentum effects, respectively.
39
 
For each firm in the sample, we estimate the parameters in the four-factor model 
over a 260-day pre-event period (Day -290 to Day -31). Daily abnormal returns 
during the event period are calculated in the usual manner by subtracting the 
expected return implied by the four-factor model from the firm’s realized return.  
While most short-term event studies typically employ a simpler return 
generating model, such as the market model, we choose the four-factor model as our 
primary method due to the unusual nature of the event in our study. Lehman’s 
collapse had a system-wide impact, as evidenced by the fact that the market 
experienced a one-day return of nearly -5% on September 15. In addition, the SMB 
portfolio gained 1.4%, indicating that larger firms were more adversely affected than 
smaller firms, the HML portfolio lost over 2%, indicating that value stocks suffered 
greater losses than growth stocks, and the UMD portfolio gained nearly 3%, 
indicating that past losers were more adversely affected than past winners. The aim 
of our study is to isolate the effect of Lehman’s collapse on Lehman clients after 
filtering out systematic effects. Since many of our samples could be considered non-
random, especially with respect to size or book-to-market,
40
 we consider the four-
factor model more robust than the market model because it attempts to control for 
systematic risk, size, value, and momentum effects, which were significant during 
our event period. Therefore, using the four-factor model reduces the likelihood that 
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 The daily factor returns for the SMB, HML, and UMD portfolios are generously provided by 
Kenneth French on his website.  
40
 For example, our sample of Lehman equity underwriting clients is typical of recent stock issuer 
samples in that the average market capitalization is lower than the CRSP average and the average and 
median book-to-market ratios are lower than the CRSP average and median, respectively. 
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our results may be influenced by anomalous factors, such as a small firm effect.
41
 
Nonetheless, in some of our analyses we also report abnormal returns estimated with 
the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993), the market model, and two 
procedures that match each sample firm to a non-sample firm according to (1) size 
and book-to-market ratio and (2) industry and size. In these matching procedures, the 
abnormal return is computed as the raw return of the sample firm minus the raw 
return of the matched non-sample firm. For size and book-to-market matching, 
matched firms are selected such that the sum of the absolute percentage differences 
between the sizes (market value of equity) and book-to-market ratios of the sample 
firm and matched firm is minimized. For industry and size matching, matches are 
selected such that the matched firm is in the same Fama-French 49 industry, and the 
difference in market value of equity between the sample firm and matched firm is 
minimized.  
Because all firms in our analysis have the same event period in calendar time, 
some degree of cross-sectional correlation in abnormal returns across firms is 
expected and conventional test-statistics will be biased. Hence, we test for statistical 
significance using the test statistic proposed by Kolari and Pynnönen (2010), which 
is a modified version of the widely used t-statistic of Boehmer, Musumeci, and 
Poulsen (BMP) (1991). Kolari and Pynnönen modify the BMP t-statistic to account 
for contemporaneous correlation in abnormal returns across sample firms. The 
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 Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000) find that equally-weighted portfolios comprised of recent stock 
issuers (IPOs and SEOs) do not exhibit long-run abnormal underperformance when the Carhart (1997) 
four-factor model is used to estimate abnormal returns. They conclude that the model sufficiently 
captures the joint covariation of issuer returns. 
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modification is a multiplier applied to the standard error that is increasing with the 
average correlation of abnormal returns across stocks in the sample. If correlations 
tend to be positive on average (as they are in all our samples), the modification will 
result in a more conservative (closer to zero) test-statistic. This statistic is 
particularly applicable in our setting because it is well-specified when the variance of 
abnormal returns is higher during the event period than in the estimation period and 
when abnormal returns are cross-sectionally correlated. 
 
IV. Results 
A. The Collapse of Lehman Brothers 
Table X documents the significant events surrounding the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers and Lehman’s stock price performance. On Sunday evening, 
September 14, 2008, Lehman announced that it would file for protection in the U.S. 
bankruptcy court. The following day (Day 0), Lehman’s shareholders experienced a 
raw return of -94%, which came on the heels of significant losses during the week 
prior to the bankruptcy announcement (September 8 to September 12; Days -5 to -1). 
During this period, Lehman announced a $3.9 billion loss and a dividend cut, the 
major rating agencies put Lehman’s credit rating on “watch,” and a deal involving a 
potential investment in Lehman by Korea Development Bank reportedly fell through. 
After Lehman filed for bankruptcy, Barclays announced on September 16 that it had 
reached an agreement to purchase Lehman’s North American investment banking 
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and capital markets businesses, and the following day Lehman was delisted from the 
NYSE. 
**** Insert Table X about here **** 
B. The Stock Price Reaction of Lehman’s Equity Underwriting Clients to Lehman’s 
Bankruptcy 
Table X also reports abnormal returns for Lehman’s equity underwriting 
clients using the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model. Client firms experienced a 
statistically significant mean four-factor adjusted abnormal return of -1.48% 
(equally-weighted) or -1.76% (value-weighted) on Day 0.
42
 In addition, Lehman’s 
equity underwriting clients earned a significant negative abnormal return on the day 
the major rating agencies put Lehman’s credit rating on “watch” and a deal involving 
a potential investment in Lehman by Korea Development Bank reportedly fell 
through (Day -4). Over the seven-day period (-5,+1) that includes the week prior to 
the bankruptcy announcement, Panel A of Table XI shows that Lehman’s equity 
underwriting clients experienced a sharp -4.85% cumulative abnormal return (CAR) 
that is highly significant both economically and statistically. The mean (0,+1) CAR 
for this sample is also negative and statistically significant. Panel A of Table XI also 
reports mean CARs for clients of banks with industry status similar to that of 
Lehman, using the four-factor model. Clients of Lehman’s industry peers 
experienced a smaller (in magnitude) and statistically insignificant mean four-factor 
adjusted abnormal return of -0.66% on Day 0. The -0.82% difference in mean 
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 Unless otherwise stated, all statements of statistical significance refer to the 5% level or better in 
two-tailed tests. 
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abnormal returns on Day 0 between Lehman clients and clients of similar banks is 
statistically significant, indicating that Lehman’s bankruptcy had a relatively more 
adverse effect on Lehman clients. The same conclusion is drawn when the mean (-
5,+1) CARs are compared across the two groups.  
**** Insert Table XI about here **** 
Panels B and C of Table XI report CARs estimated with the Fama and French 
(1993) three-factor model and the market model, respectively. The results based on 
the Fama-French three-factor model (Panel B) are consistent with those from the 
four-factor model. Regarding the reaction of Lehman clients, results based on the 
market model (Panel C) are weaker than those from the four-factor and three-factor 
models. The mean market model adjusted abnormal return on Day 0 for Lehman 
clients is -0.18%, which is statistically indistinguishable from zero. However, the (-
5,+1) mean CAR for Lehman clients of -4.26% is significant both economically and 
statistically. In addition, the differences in mean market model CARs over the (0,0), 
(0,+1), and (-5,+1) windows between Lehman clients and clients of similar banks are 
again significantly negative, indicating that Lehman clients suffered significantly 
greater losses. In summary, the evidence from the factor models and market model in 
Table XI indicates strongly that Lehman’s equity underwriting clients respond more 
negatively to the announcement of Lehman’s bankruptcy than do clients of 
Lehman’s industry peers.  
C. Robustness Checks 
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A potential concern with the factor and market model abnormal returns is that 
market betas could have shifted up during the event period, which would render the 
abnormal returns we document negatively biased. Thus, we carry out multiple tests 
to address the possibility that our results may be affected by shifting market betas 
around the period of our study. We first conduct tests of parameter stability as 
discussed in Binder (1985), Kane and Unal (1988), MacKinlay (1997), and Coutts, et 
al. (1997) by modifying the market model to allow beta to change during the event 
window, enabling an event study of whether systematic risk shifted. The framework 
we use employs a continuous time series of daily returns and allows for beta to differ 
over three different regimes corresponding to the (-290,-31) period (the estimation 
period used in our baseline approach of estimating abnormal returns), the (-30,-6) 
period, and an event period that runs from Day -5 to some post-event day. We try 
both short and long intervals for the event period, where the ending dates range from 
two weeks (Day +10) to ten weeks (Day +50) after Lehman’s bankruptcy, since it is 
not clear whether shifts in beta around the bankruptcy would be relatively long-lived 
or transitory. However, regardless of the period, we find no evidence of a positive 
and significant shift in the average beta (relative to the (-290,-31) period) for the pre-
event period (-30,-6) or any of the event periods that follow. The results are reported 
in Table XII. 
**** Insert Table XII about here **** 
As a further robustness check against shifting betas, we compute abnormal 
returns with procedures that match sample firms to non-sample firms according to 
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characteristics that might be correlated with the time-series evolution in systematic 
risk. In these analyses, abnormal returns are computed as the raw return of the 
sample firm minus the raw return of a matched firm. Some obvious starting points 
for matching criteria are industry, size, book-to-market ratio, estimation period beta, 
or leverage. These choices are motivated by literature that has shown cross-sectional 
correlations between these characteristics and market beta (Fama and French (1993) 
and Fama and French (1997)) and empirical asset pricing literature that has 
concluded that these factors are important in explaining returns (Fama and French 
(1992) and Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999)). Firms in the same industry with similar 
size, for example, might be subject to similar shifts in systematic risk around 
Lehman’s bankruptcy. An added advantage of matching on characteristics such as 
industry and size is that firms similar along these dimensions may also be sensitive 
to the same unobservable risk factors that may not be captured by the factor models. 
In Panels D and E of Table XI, we report abnormal returns based on size and book-
to-market matching and industry and size matching. With both of these procedures 
we continue to find significantly negative abnormal returns among Lehman’s equity 
underwriting clients around Lehman’s bankruptcy announcement.  
An alternative explanation for the negative share price reaction among 
Lehman’s equity underwriting clients could be the loss of a lending relationship. As 
previously mentioned, 42 of Lehman’s equity underwriting clients had active credit 
facilities where Lehman was a member of the lending syndicate. To assess whether 
these firms drive our results, we repeat the event study in Table XI after dropping 
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these firms. For the remaining 142 firms, the mean (-5,+1), (0,0), and (0,+1) CARs 
based on the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model are -4.47%, -1.48%, and -
1.65%, which are all statistically and economically significant. Thus, our conclusions 
persist even after eliminating firms for which Lehman was a lender. 
Another alternative explanation for the negative reaction among sample firms 
could be implied lower liquidity due to the loss of a primary market maker. Thirteen 
Lehman equity underwriting clients used Lehman as their NYSE specialist, and 
Lehman was a registered dealer for all 104 Nasdaq firms in the sample. In order to 
assess the magnitude of Lehman’s market making role for sample Nasdaq firms, we 
obtain data directly from Nasdaq on the number of shares traded by Lehman as a 
registered dealer in the months prior to the bankruptcy. This data was publicly 
available to investors at the time of the bankruptcy. For each stock, we compute 
Lehman’s market making market share as the number of shares traded by Lehman as 
a dealer during the three months prior to the bankruptcy scaled by the total number 
of shares traded during the same period (as in Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (2002)). 
For Nasdaq firms, the average Lehman market share as a market maker is 6% and 
the maximum is only 16.6%. According to Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (2002), the 
dominant market maker typically has a market share in excess of 50%. Thus, 
Lehman played only a modest role as a Nasdaq market maker for sample firms. 
Nonetheless, for robustness, we examine how our results are affected if we eliminate 
all Nasdaq firms and firms for which Lehman was the specialist. The remaining 
firms are all listed on the NYSE, and investors would have been aware that Lehman 
68 
 
was not a key market maker for these firms since the identity of the specialist is in 
the public domain. For these 68 firms, the mean Fama-French-Carhart CARs over 
the (-5,+1), (0,0), and (0,+1) periods are -5.7%, -3.8%, and -2.3%, respectively, and 
all are statistically significant. Thus, our results persist when we focus on firms for 
whom the market would have known with certainty that Lehman was not a key 
market maker.
43
  
D. Debt Underwriting, M&A Advising, Market Making, and Analyst coverage 
Table XIII explores the market reaction of Lehman’s other client groups. We 
report four-factor model adjusted abnormal returns of firms that received debt 
underwriting services, M&A advising services, NYSE specialist services, and 
analyst coverage from Lehman. Additionally, we divide each of these groups into 
two subsamples: firms that did and did not also receive common stock underwriting 
services from Lehman. We report CARs for both subsamples, but in the interest of 
space only report results from the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model; abnormal 
returns computed using the different methodologies described in Subsections IV.B 
and C yield the same conclusions. Panel A of Table XIII reports mean CARs for all 
53 firms that employed Lehman as a lead underwriter for a public straight debt 
offering. We do not find statistically significant CARs over the (-5,+1), (0,0), and 
(0,+1) windows. Twelve of the straight debt clients were also equity underwriting 
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 We also investigate the possibility that abnormal returns of Lehman’s equity underwriting clients 
reflect temporary overreactions by examining mean CARs over the (+2,+30) window. However, all 
the post-event mean CARs in Table II are negative, which is inconsistent with temporary 
overreaction. Another concern is that the event period CARs will understate true client losses if 
Lehman’s collapse was highly anticipated prior to the event period. To explore this possibility, we 
examine abnormal returns over the (-30,-6) period. As reported in Table II, we find no evidence of 
significantly negative abnormal returns over this pre-event period, indicating that little would be 
gained by including the (-30,-6) CARs in our value loss estimates.  
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customers. Consistent with our previous results for equity underwriting, we find 
some evidence of a negative reaction among this subsample of debt clients, as the 
mean CARs over the (0,+1), and (-5,+1) windows are -4.08% and -7.29%, 
respectively, both statistically significant at the 10% level or better. In contrast, the 
41 straight debt clients that did not also receive equity underwriting services from 
Lehman show no evidence of a significant negative reaction to Lehman’s collapse. 
Overall, our event study analysis provides no compelling evidence that the rupture of 
straight debt underwriting relationships precipitated by Lehman’s collapse adversely 
affects straight debt underwriting clients.  
**** Insert Table XIII about here **** 
In Panel B of Table XIII, we find no evidence of a significantly negative 
reaction among convertible debt underwriting clients. While the event period 
abnormal returns for these seven firms tend to be large in magnitude, none are 
significantly negative, and it would be difficult to draw strong conclusions in any 
case, due to the very small number of firms in this sample. Panel C of Table XIII 
reports the stock price reaction of Lehman’s M&A clients. For all 87 firms, there is 
no evidence of a negative mean stock price reaction, as the mean CARs over the 
(0,0), (0,+1), and (-5,+1) windows are all (insignificantly) positive. Splitting this 
sample according to whether the firm also received equity underwriting services does 
not yield significantly negative abnormal returns for either subsample. Overall, we 
find no evidence that the M&A advisory relationship has enduring value for 
Lehman’s M&A clients. 
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Panel D of Table XIII documents the stock price reaction of firms for whom 
Lehman was the NYSE specialist. For all 151 firms, there is no evidence of 
significantly negative abnormal returns over the (0,0), (0,+1), and (-5,+1) windows. 
Splitting this sample according to whether the firm received equity underwriting 
services does not yield significantly negative abnormal returns for either group. 
Thus, we conclude that Lehman’s collapse had no significant adverse impact on 
Lehman’s NYSE market making clients. 
In Panel E of Table XIII, we report CARs for firms that received analyst 
coverage from Lehman just prior to Lehman’s bankruptcy. For all 633 firms, we find 
no evidence of a negative mean stock price reaction. For the 122 firms that received 
analyst coverage and equity underwriting services, the mean (0,0) and (-5,+1) CARs 
of -0.99% and -4.20%, respectively, are significant at the 10% level or better. 
However, this finding appears to be driven by the equity underwriting relationship 
since we do not find significant abnormal returns during the same periods for the 511 
firms that did not receive equity underwriting services from Lehman. 
E. Cross-Sectional Analysis of the Stock Price Reaction of Lehman’s Equity 
Underwriting Clients to Lehman’s Bankruptcy   
We have reported strong evidence that, on average, Lehman’s equity 
underwriting clients reacted negatively to Lehman’s collapse. In this section, we 
investigate the cross-sectional determinants of this market reaction by regressing 
two-day CARs on measures of the strength of the client’s relationship with Lehman 
and on various client characteristics.  
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 Table XIV reports the results of our cross-sectional analysis. Since all the 
firms in the sample have the same event period in calendar time, we use the portfolio 
weighted least squares (PWLS) approach of Chandra and Balachandran (1992), 
which produces unbiased estimates of the regression coefficient standard errors when 
abnormal returns over the event window are heteroskedastic and correlated across 
firms.
44
 We estimate the PWLS regressions over the period Day -290 to Day +10 
using the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model and a two-day event window 
(Days 0 and +1).  
**** Insert Table XIV about here **** 
 We find evidence that the stock price reaction to Lehman’s collapse is 
negatively related to the number of stock offerings that the client conducted with 
Lehman. The coefficient estimates on the natural logarithm of one plus the number 
of offerings underwritten by Lehman are all negative and significant at the 10% 
level. To the extent that multiple offerings with Lehman indicate a stronger 
relationship, this finding supports the hypothesis that an issuer with a stronger 
relationship to its underwriter should lose more value when its underwriter fails. In 
addition, we find that the client’s stock price reaction is negatively related to 
Lehman’s share of the client’s common stock offering, although not significantly.45 
                                                          
44
 PWLS is the weighted version of the portfolio time-series ordinary least squares (POLS) approach 
of Sefcik and Thompson (1986). As with weighted least squares (WLS), each observation receives a 
weight that is inversely proportional to its variance in PWLS, where the variance is estimated using a 
time-series of residuals from the chosen asset return generating model. We use the time-series of 
residuals from the four-factor model estimated over the pre-event estimation period (Day -290 to -31) 
to estimate the variance of each observation.  
45
 We employ several alternate ways of measuring the firm’s reliance on Lehman relative to other 
investment banks, including using Lehman’s share of the client’s common stock proceeds (rather than 
offerings), using the natural log of the number of lead underwriters that the firm dealt with in its 
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We find that equity underwriting clients lose more value if Lehman is also 
the lead lender in one of the firm’s syndicated credit facilities. In all specifications, 
the dummy variable that captures this effect is negative and significant. However, we 
do not find greater losses associated with Lehman acting merely as a participant 
lender to the firm, as the dummy variable capturing this effect is statistically 
insignificant.  
We find strong evidence that equity underwriting clients that also use 
Lehman for underwriting straight debt and convertible debt are especially adversely 
affected. In all specifications, the underwriting relationship scope index is negative 
and statistically significant. Regarding ownership stakes in clients, we find that client 
abnormal returns are not significantly related to the proportion of the client’s shares 
owned by Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. or the proportion of shares owned by 
Neuberger Berman LLC, although the coefficient estimates are negative as expected. 
The client’s stock price reaction is positively related to client size and age. In 
specifications (1), (2), (3), and (5), the client’s two-day CAR is positively related to 
the natural log of the client’s market capitalization of equity at either the 10% level 
or better.  In specifications (2) through (5), the coefficients on the natural log of the 
client’s age are positive and significant at the 10% level or better. These results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that larger and older clients should be less adversely 
affected by the failure of their underwriter. On the other hand, the shelf registration 
dummy is always positive, but also always insignificant.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
equity offerings during the sample period, and using a dummy variable to differentiate clients that 
dealt exclusively with Lehman. As with Lehman’s share of the client’s common stock offerings, these 
alternatives have the predicted sign but are never significant. 
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Firms with less cash and firms with higher likelihoods of financial distress 
respond more negatively to Lehman’s collapse. Two-day CARs are positively related 
to the cash/assets ratio at the 5% level in specifications (3) and (5) and positively 
related to Z-score at the 5% level in specification (4). This evidence is consistent 
with the hypothesis that firms with greater immediate need for external capital 
respond more negatively to the failure of their underwriter. 
Economically, the factors with the largest effects in Table XIV are the scope 
of the firm’s underwriting relationship with Lehman, whether Lehman also acted as a 
lead lender, and the firm’s cash holdings. The coefficient estimates on the 
underwriting relationship scope index imply that each additional underwriting 
service (straight debt or convertible debt) received from Lehman decreases the (0,+1) 
CAR by about 2.5 percentage points. Lehman acting as the firm’s lead lender also 
reduces the CAR by roughly 2.5 percentage points. Regarding the cash/assets ratio, 
the estimated coefficients indicate that moving from the sample’s 75th percentile 
(cash/assets = 0.464) to the 25
th
 percentile (cash/assets = 0.036) is associated with a 
decrease in the (0,+1) CAR of 1.57 percentage points.  
In light of these cross-sectional differences, we verify that our event study 
results in Table XI are not driven by specific sub-samples of Lehman equity 
underwriting clients (e.g., frequent issuers, newly IPO firms, financially constrained 
firms, etc.) by repeating our previous tests after excluding such firms. We continue 
to find negative mean event-period CARs that are statistically significant. 
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F. Cross-Sectional Analysis of the Stock Price Reaction of Lehman’s Debt 
Underwriting, M&A, NYSE Market Making, and Analyst Coverage Clients 
We investigate the cross-section of abnormal returns earned by Lehman’s 
debt underwriting, M&A Advisory, NYSE specialist, and analyst coverage clients. 
These findings are summarized below. 
Since there are so few convertible debt clients, we include them with the 
straight debt clients and utilize a dummy to differentiate convertible debt 
underwriting. In Table XV, We find that a debt underwriting client’s two-day CAR 
is significantly and negatively related to the proportion of the client’s shares owned 
by both Neuberger Berman LLC and Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., and the scope 
of the firm’s underwriting relationship with Lehman. It is positively and significantly 
related to the firm’s cash/assets ratio. Two-day CARs earned by debt underwriting 
clients are not significantly related to the natural logarithm of one plus the number of 
debt offerings underwritten by Lehman, Lehman’s share of the client’s debt 
offerings, whether or not the firm recently shelf registered a debt offering, firm size, 
firm age, Z-score, net market leverage, or whether Lehman was a lead lender or 
participant lender to the firm.  
**** Insert Table XV about here **** 
In Table XVI, we perform a cross-sectional analysis of Lehman’s M&A 
clients. The findings reveal that a client’s stock price reaction is negatively related to 
the natural logarithm of one plus the number of deals advised by Lehman (at the 10% 
level) and whether Lehman is the firm’s lead lender (at the 5% level). It is also 
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positively and significantly related to the firm’s Z-score at the 10% level in two of 
three specifications. An M&A client’s reaction is not significantly related to 
Lehman’s share of the client’s M&A deals, whether Lehman is a participant lender 
to the firm, the proportion of the client’s shares owned by Lehman entities, firm size, 
firm age, or whether the firm had a pending M&A deal with Lehman as the advisor. 
**** Insert Table XVI about here **** 
In Table XVII, we examine the cross-section of abnormal returns earned by 
firms for whom Lehman was the specialist on the NYSE. The findings reveal weak 
evidence that stock market liquidity is a determinant of these firms’ responses to the 
collapse of their specialist. The proportion of shares owned by non-Lehman 
institutions is significantly and positively related to two-day CARs in one of two 
specifications. If one considers institutional ownership as a proxy for liquidity, then 
the interpretation is that firms with less liquid stock respond more negatively. Share 
turnover, however, is not significantly related to abnormal returns. As with equity 
underwriting clients and M&A clients, the abnormal returns earned by these firms 
are also significantly and positively related to the firm’s Z-score at the 10% level or 
better. Two-day CARs are not significantly related to firm size, firm age, whether 
Lehman was a lead or participant lender, or the proportion of the firm’s shares 
owned by Lehman entities. 
**** Insert Table XVII about here **** 
In Table XVIII, we report cross-sectional results for for firms that received 
analyst coverage from Lehman just prior to the bankruptcy. We find no evidence that 
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firms followed by fewer non-Lehman analysts react more negatively to Lehman’s 
collapse, as the natural logarithm of the number of analysts covering the firm that are 
not employed by Lehman is not a significant determinant of the firm’s stock price 
reaction. Kelly and Ljungqvist (2007) find that, in the quarter after a firm loses 
analyst coverage from a broker, institutions are abnormally large net buyers of the 
firm’s stock, implying that retail investors are net sellers. They interpret this result as 
indicative that retail investors are more dependent on sell-side analyst research and 
that a loss of coverage may reduce their valuation and demand for the stock. 
Consistent with Kelly and Ljungqvist (2007), we find that the proportion of shares 
owned by non-Lehman institutions is significantly and positively related to the two-
day CAR, indicating that firms with low institutional ownership that receive analyst 
coverage from Lehman lose more value around the bankruptcy. There is some 
evidence that younger firms are more adversely affected, as the natural log of firm 
age is positive and significant at the 10% level, and also that the share price reaction 
of firms receiving analyst coverage from Lehman is positively and significantly 
related to the firm’s Z-score. 
**** Insert Table XVIII about here **** 
G. Pooled Cross-Sectional Analysis of the Stock Price Reaction of Lehman’s Equity 
Underwriting, Debt Underwriting, M&A, NYSE Market Making, and Analyst 
Coverage Clients 
Finally, we conduct a pooled cross-sectional analysis of (0,+1) CARs earned 
by all firms that received equity underwriting, debt underwriting, M&A advising, 
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NYSE market making, or analyst coverage services from Lehman. This analysis is 
presented in Table XIX. For each client group, we include a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if the client received that specific service from Lehman and 
zero otherwise. We also include as independent variables firm-specific 
characteristics (size, age, and Z-score), dummies for whether Lehman was a lead or 
participant lender, and ownership of the firm’s shares by Lehman Brothers Holdings 
Inc and Neuberger Berman LLC. Event study analyses suggest that equity 
underwriting is the principal source of value for clients in investment banking 
relationships. Our aim is to re-examine that conclusion in a multivariate analysis that 
disentangles the marginal effects of each type of client-bank relationship. If our 
conclusion is robust, we would expect to observe a negative and significant 
coefficient for equity underwriting, and this is exactly what we find. The coefficient 
on the dummy variable that equals one if the firm received equity underwriting 
services from Lehman and zero otherwise is negative and significant at the 1% level 
in specifications (1) and (2). The interpretation is that clients that received equity 
underwriting services reacted more negatively than clients that did not receive equity 
underwriting services, on average. In specifications (5) through (7), we use the 
natural logarithm of one plus the number of equity offerings underwritten by 
Lehman in lieu of a dummy and reach the same conclusion. In contrast, the 
coefficients on the dummies that correspond to receipt of straight debt underwriting 
and convertible debt underwriting are statistically insignificant  in specifications (1) 
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and (2) as are the coefficients on the natural logarithms of one plus the number of 
straight debt offerings and one plus the number of convertible debt offerings.  
**** Insert Table XIX about here **** 
The dummy for receipt of NYSE specialist service is also insignificant in all 
specifications. The analyst coverage dummy is positive and significant at the 10% 
level or better in two of seven specifications, indicating that firms that received 
analyst coverage were less adversely affected by the collapse of Lehman than the 
average client not receiving analyst coverage. The dummy for receipt of M&A 
advisory services is positive and statistically significant in specifications (1) and (2), 
as is the natural log of one plus the number of M&A deals advised by Lehman in 
specifications (5) through (7). While this finding suggests that Lehman M&A clients 
fared relatively better than the average Lehman client that did not receive M&A 
advisory services, it should not be construed as evidence of a positive reaction by 
M&A clients to the Lehman collapse. Indeed, the event study results reported in 
Panel C of Table XIII show an insignificant reaction by the 87 Lehman M&A clients 
to the collapse. As in Table XII, we find evidence that clients that used Lehman for 
multiple underwriting services (equity, debt and convertible debt) were especially 
adversely affected. The underwriting relationship scope index is negative in all three 
specifications in which it is included although statistically significant in only two of 
them. These results buttress our conclusion that equity underwriting is the principal 
source of value for clients in investment banking relationships. 
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V. Conclusions 
The unexpected collapse of Lehman Brothers provides a unique natural 
experiment to find answers to two key questions in the corporate finance and 
banking literatures: (1) Are investment banking relationships valuable for client 
firms and, if so, (2) what are the value drivers of these relationships? We examine 
the impact of Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy on different categories of the bank’s 
publicly traded clients by studying how their stock prices reacted to the collapse. We 
find that companies that used Lehman as lead underwriter for one or more equity 
offerings during the 10 years leading up to September 2008 suffered economically 
and statistically significant negative abnormal returns when Lehman Brothers 
declared bankruptcy. Based on Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model adjusted 
abnormal returns, the 184 equity underwriting clients that we study lose 4.85% of 
their market value, on average, over a seven-day period spanning the five trading 
days prior to and the first and second trading days immediately following Lehman’s 
bankruptcy, amounting to approximately $23 billion in aggregate, risk-adjusted 
losses. These losses were significantly larger than for firms that were equity 
underwriting clients of other large investment banks, and were especially severe for 
companies that were smaller, younger, more financially constrained, and had 
undertaken a larger number of Lehman-led equity offerings or equity offerings in 
conjunction with debt offerings. No other client groups were significantly adversely 
affected by Lehman’s collapse. These results show that Lehman’s collapse did, in 
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fact, impose material losses on its customers, but for the most part these losses were 
confined to those companies which employed Lehman for equity underwriting.  
Our findings also provide insights into the “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF) rationale 
for the government rescue of financial institutions. While TBTF has traditionally 
been used as a justification for the government rescue of commercial banks due to 
the systemic risk that their failure would pose to the banking system, the TBTF 
rationale was extended to nonbanks when the U.S. Federal Reserve orchestrated the 
1998 rescue of Long-Term Capital Management, whose failure threatened the 
financial markets. While the significant adverse effect of Lehman’s bankruptcy on 
the financial markets in general and Lehman’s financial counterparties in particular 
may have led the government to change its strategy toward allowing other large 
nonbank financial institutions (such as AIG) to fail (Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission, 2010), our findings shine the spotlight on another negative 
consequence of Lehman’s collapse that has been ignored hitherto. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
INVESTMENT BANK LENDING RELATIONSHIPS AND THE WEALTH 
EFFECTS OF BANK FAILURE: EVIDENCE FROM THE LEHMAN 
BROTHERS BANKRUPTCY 
 
 
I. Introduction 
The question of whether firms derive benefits from banking relationships has 
received considerable attention in the academic literature. Relationship lending is 
depicted as potentially beneficial to both banks and borrowers in much of the 
theoretical banking literature (Fama, 1985; Sharpe, 1990; Diamond, 1991; Boot, 
2000). The initial screening of a borrower enables a bank to acquire private 
information, thus affording the bank a comparative monitoring advantage. When 
private information is both costly to produce and reusable in future dealings, repeat 
dealings between the borrower and bank will result in scale economies. Thus, theory 
predicts that an established relationship with a bank will be valuable to the borrower 
as long as she captures a portion of the cost savings.  
Several empirical studies of small, privately held borrowers report evidence 
supporting the benefits of relationship lending (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and 
Udell, 1995; Cole, 1998). For larger, widely-held corporations, the evidence is less 
unified.
46
 Moreover, the idea that lending relationships entail both costs and benefits, 
                                                          
46
  See, for example, Bharath et al. (2009), who show that  repeat syndicated loan deals with the same 
lead bank results in significant reductions in loan spreads and Hale and Santos (2009) and Santos and 
Winton (2008), who find evidence that banks use their information advantage to extract rents from 
borrowers. Slovin et al. (1993) find that commercial bank insolvency negatively impacts the share 
prices of its borrower firms while, in contrast, Ongena et al. (2003) find insignificant share price 
effects for borrowers of distressed commercial banks. For announcements of new loans and/or loan 
renewals, James (1987) and Lummer and McConnell (1989) find significantly positive stock price 
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as theorized by Rajan (1992) and Sharpe (1990), has gained increasing empirical 
support in recent studies (Hale and Santos, 2009; Santos and Winton, 2008; 
Schenone, 2010). Thus, whether widely held firms derive significant net value from 
lending relationships is a question unresolved by the literature. Also unknown are the 
wealth effects of investment bank lending relationships for borrowers. While 
numerous authors have studied the entry of commercial banks into traditional 
investment banking services after the relaxation and repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act 
(Puri, 1994, 1996; Gande et al., 1997; Gande et al., 1999), few have studied the 
incursion of investment banks into commercial lending. One exception is Harjoto et 
al. (2006), who show that the annual volume of syndicated loans arranged by 
investment banks in the U.S. grew from a meager $2.6 billion in 1996 to nearly $100 
billion in 2003. Apart from shedding light on the unresolved questions in the extant 
literature, better insight into these issues have the potential to help guide future 
financial policy and regulation. 
In this paper, I use the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 to 
test whether lending relationships developed through syndicated loans have value for 
corporate borrowers. On Sunday, September 14, 2008, Lehman Brothers, the world’s 
fifth largest investment bank at the time, announced that it would file for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy the following day. Although many large, distressed financial firms had 
been rescued by other financial firms, sometimes with the aid of the U.S. 
government, Lehman Brothers was allowed to enter bankruptcy. When the market 
                                                                                                                                                                    
reactions for borrowers, while Fields et al. (2006) and Preece and Mullineaux (1996) find 
insignificant share price effects associated with bank loan announcements.  
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opened the following Monday, Lehman’s stock lost virtually all of its remaining 
value and the U.S. stock market lost nearly 5%, indicating that investors were 
surprised by the news.
47
 While Lehman Brothers was best known for its traditional 
investment banking services, such as securities underwriting, the firm also had a 
significant presence as a lender in the syndicated loan market.
48
 Therefore, Lehman’s 
unexpected collapse provides a natural experiment to address the above research 
issues. I use the Lehman failure and event study methodology to address the 
following research questions that are key to understanding if and how bank lending 
relationships create value for corporate borrowers: First, did Lehman’s failure result 
in abnormal losses for its borrowers, above and beyond those predicted by 
conventional asset pricing models and second, if so, what were the cross-sectional 
drivers of these losses?  
I identify 115 non-financial, non-utility firms that had active syndicated 
credit facilities with Lehman acting as either a lead-bank or participant lender at the 
time of its bankruptcy. I find that these firms suffered abnormal returns of  
approximately -3%, on average, during the seven-day period that spans the five 
market days prior to and first and second market days after Lehman’s bankruptcy 
announcement. These losses were significantly larger than those experienced by a 
group of control firms matched on size, credit rating, and industry that had 
                                                          
47
 The fact that many large, distressed financial institutions had historically been rescued by other 
financial firms, often with the aid of the U.S. government, may partially account for the market’s 
shock when Lehman was allowed to fail. 
48
 According to Reuters Loan Pricing Corporation, in 2007 Lehman Brothers acted as lead arranger 
for $46 billion of syndicated loans to U.S. firms and had the 8
th
 largest market share among all lead 
arrangers. 
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syndicated loans from other banks. In addition, Lehman’s borrowers also 
experienced significant reductions in profitability and investment relative to industry 
benchmarks in the year following Lehman’s failure. I conclude that Lehman’s 
borrowers incurred significant costs as a result of Lehman’s collapse, above and 
beyond those experienced by the market in general and by similar firms relying on 
syndicated loans from other banks. Cross-sectionally, borrower abnormal returns 
were more sever if Lehman was the lead lender for one or more of the firm’s 
facilities. The scope of the borrower’s relationship with Lehman also had important 
implications, as borrowers that procured equity underwriting services from Lehman 
in the five years prior to the bankruptcy experienced greater losses. In addition, more 
opaque firms, firms with more growth opportunities, and less profitable firms also 
suffered greater losses.  Finally, borrowers that had relatively large, undrawn credit 
lines from Lehman were also disproportionately harmed, but this effect was 
attenuated if the firm also held larger amounts of cash. Overall, these results suggest 
that lending relationships developed through syndicated loans are valuable to 
corporate borrowers and costly to replace, with the value to the borrower increasing 
with the strength and scope of the relationship, the extent of the borrower’s 
information and moral hazard problems, and the borrower’s reliance on bank credit 
as a principal source of liquidity.  
This paper extends the literature on lending relationships and is most notably 
related to Slovin et al. (1993) and Ongena et al. (2003). Slovin et al. (1993) find that 
the insolvency of  Continental Illinois Bank in 1984 had a negative effect on the 
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share prices of 53 borrower firms and that the FDIC’s subsequent rescue of the bank 
had a smaller (in magnitude) positive effect. Slovin et al. conclude that durable bank 
lending relationships are valuable to corporate borrowers. In contrast, Ongena et al. 
(2003) find that announcements of commercial bank distress during the Norwegian 
banking crisis of 1988-1991 had little impact on the share prices of Norwegian firms 
with lending relationships to troubled banks.
49
 My study differs in that I focus 
exclusively on lending relationships developed through syndicated loans – joint 
loans issued by more than one financial institution. Over the last 30 years, the 
syndicated loan market has evolved as the primary means through which banks lend 
to large corporations (Sufi, 2007; Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). The borrowers 
that I study tend to be larger and, by definition, have relationships with multiple 
lenders. A priori, it is unclear whether the failure of any one lender would impose 
significant costs on these firms. On the one hand, theory predicts smaller benefits of 
lending relationships since they should face lower costs in replacing a lender or 
raising capital in the public markets compared to smaller firms that rely on direct 
loans from sole-lenders (Diamond, 1991). On the other hand, syndicated loan 
borrowers should also be subject to lower “hold-up” costs, since a lender’s ability to 
extract rents decreases with the borrower’s transparency and access to alternative 
capital sources (Rajan, 1992; Hale and Santos, 2009). My study directly addresses 
the question of whether lending relationships developed through syndicated loans 
                                                          
49
 Kang and Stulz (2000) examine the effect of adverse shocks to Japanese bank solvency during the 
early 1990s on Japanse borrower firms. However, because Japan is a bank-based system where banks 
tend to own large equity stakes and exercise greater corporate control, the results are not directly 
comparable to those or firms in market-based systems such as the U.S. 
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add significant net value to corporate borrowers and my findings suggest that they 
do.  
My study also adds to the relatively sparse literature on investment banks as 
lenders. My findings show that investment bank lending relationships create value 
for corporate borrowers and that this value is enhanced for borrowers that engage 
their investment bank for both loan capital and equity underwriting.   
Finally, understanding the consequences of a failure like that of Lehman 
Brothers is important for regulatory policy design. On the day of Lehman’s 
bankruptcy filing, the U.S. stock market experienced one of its worst single-day 
losses ever. History provides few events of such magnitude for study, and thus 
scholars have begun to examine how Lehman’s collapse affected other firms in order 
to identify important channels of contagion. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) study 
the impact of Lehman’s failure on the banking sector, while Aragon and Strahan 
(2009) examine the effect on hedge funds that used Lehman as their prime broker. 
Fernando et al. (2011) examine how Lehman’s failure affected firms that dealt with 
Lehman for traditional investment banking services (e.g. securities underwriting).
50
 
My study complements this line of research by studying the impact of Lehman’s 
failure on its corporate borrowers, which, to my knowledge, is a question that has not 
been examined. I identify another channel of contagion, which should help policy 
makers better assess the costs and benefits of government intervention.  
                                                          
50
 Kovner (2010) uses the failure of Lehman Brothers and near failures of Bear Stearns, Merrill 
Lynch, and Wachovia to study the impact of underwriter distress on IPO client firms.   
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews 
relevant literature on banking relationships in corporate finance and the structure of 
syndicated loans. Section III discusses the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Section 
IV describes my data and methodology. Section V presents the results and Section 
VI concludes. 
 
II. Literature and Empirical Predictions 
A. Theories of Informed Debt and Lending Relationships 
In Myers and Majluf (1984), information asymmetries between investors and 
firms make it costly for firms to raise external capital, resulting in investment 
distortions. Diamond (1984) and Boyd and Prescott (1986) argue that banks' 
comparative advantage over dispersed public (“arms-length”) investors in acquiring 
private information and monitoring the firm reduces the information problem. In 
Fama (1985), Sharpe (1990), Diamond (1991), and Rajan (1992), this notion is 
modeled formally, with banks operating as “insiders” with access to private 
information. Due to their comparative monitoring advantage, banks can offer lower 
costs of capital to some borrowers relative to public markets, and the bilateral nature 
of loan contracts facilitates renegotiations and lowers costs of financial distress. 
These theories suggest that repeat dealings between the same borrower and bank will 
result in scale economies if information about the borrower is costly to produce, non-
transferable to outside investors, and useful in future dealings between the same 
borrower and bank. Under these assumptions, an existing lending relationship will 
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have value for the borrower since replacing it with an uninformed lender would be 
costly. 
The line of reasoning above relies on the premise that the relationship lender 
will be willing to pass on a portion of the cost savings to the borrower. However, 
Rajan (1992) argues that relationship lenders can use their private information 
advantage to extract rents from the borrower. Since the borrower faces high costs of 
switching lenders due to prospective lenders’ relative information disadvantage, the 
relationship lender effectively enjoys an information monopoly that can be exploited 
to the benefit of the lender and at the cost of the borrower. Thus, whether the 
borrower derives significant value from an existing lending relationship depends 
critically on whether the borrower is able to capture a share of the benefits.  
B. Empirical Evidence on the Benefits and Costs of Lending Relationships 
Empirical studies generally find support for the benefits of lending 
relationships for small, privately held firms. Petersen and Rajan (1994) find that 
banking relationships increase credit availability for small businesses, while Berger 
and Udell (1995) report that strong relationships lower interest rates and collateral 
requirements. Cole (1998) finds that greater relationship scope (procuring multiple 
financial services from the same bank) increases the probability that the bank 
provides a loan to the firm.  
For larger, public corporations, the evidence is less consensual. Early 
evidence takes the form of event studies that measure borrower stock returns around 
bank loan announcements. James (1987) finds that borrower abnormal returns are 
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significantly positive around bank loan announcements. Lummer and McConnell 
(1989) distinguish between loans with a new lender and loan renewals with an 
existing lender and find that the market reaction is positive only for loan renewals. In 
contrast, Fields et al. (2006) find that borrower stock prices do not react to either new 
loans or loan renewals after the 1980s. Fields et al. (2006) attribute this finding to 
advances in information technology that erode relationship lenders information 
advantage over prospective investors. Similarly, Preece and Mullineaux (1996) find 
that announcements of syndicated loans with more than three lenders do not induce 
significant share price effects. They attribute their findings to higher renegotiation 
costs, as a result of multiple lenders, that offset the benefits of bank monitoring. 
Slovin et al. (1993) find that Continental Illinois Bank’s (CIB) borrowers earned 
negative abnormal returns as a result of CIB’s insolvency and impending failure in 
1984. Conversely, they find that stock prices of the same borrowers reacted 
positively to the FDIC’s subsequent rescue of the commercial bank. In contrast, 
Ongena et al. (2003) find that announcements of commercial bank distress during the 
Norwegian banking crisis of 1988-1991 had little impact on the share prices of 
Norwegian firms with lending relationships to troubled banks.  
More recently, Bharath et al. (2009) show that repeat syndicated loan deals 
with the same lead lender result in significant reductions in loan spreads and 
collateral requirements, especially for opaque borrowers. Thus, their study provides 
evidence for the benefits of relationship lending even for publicly traded firms. 
However, Hale and Santos (2009) find evidence that banks use their information 
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advantage to extract rents from public firms, as theorized by Rajan (1992). They 
show that firms are able to take out loans at lower interest rates after their bond IPO 
and that firms that get their first credit rating at the time of their bond IPO benefit 
from larger interest rate reductions than those that already had a credit rating. Thus, 
their findings indicate that banks price their information advantage when it is 
relatively large (when the firm does not have public bonds or a public credit ratings). 
Santos and Winton (2008) find that, during recessions, syndicated loan spreads rise 
more for borrowers without access to public debt markets as compared to borrowers 
with access to bond markets. In their view, this finding is consistent with banks that 
have an exploitable information advantage (those that lend to firms which cannot 
access public bond markets) raising their interest by more than is justified by 
increased borrower default risk alone.   
C. Syndicated Loans 
 In contrast to the sole-lender transactions envisioned in many classical 
theories of bank lending, in a syndicated loan, two or more institutions agree jointly 
to make a loan to a borrower. Lenders are classified broadly into two categories: the 
lead bank(s) and participants. A firm seeking a syndicated loan will first sign a 
preliminary loan agreement with a lead bank that specifies covenants, fees, loan 
amounts, interest rate ranges, etc. The lead bank will then seek out potential 
participant lenders to fund portions of the loan.  This process involves the lead bank 
providing prospective participants with an “information memorandum” that contains 
information about the borrower’s business and financial condition (Sufi, 2007b).  
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The lead bank also typically meets with prospective participants to explain and 
negotiate the terms of the deal and further describe the borrower’s business and 
prospects, often with the aid of presentations by the borrower’s management (Dennis 
and Mullinex, 2000). Once participants commit to funding portions of the loan, a 
loan agreement is signed by all parties and the deal is “closed.” Over the life of the 
loan, one of the lead banks also acts as the “administrate agent,” who is responsible 
for monitoring and dealing directly with borrower, enforcing covenants, 
administering drawdowns, and collecting interest, principal, and fee payments on 
behalf of syndicate members. In addition to interest and commitment fee income, the 
lead bank receives additional fees for arranging and monitoring the loan (Sufi, 
2007b).   
D. Empirical Predictions 
 Existing literature does not provide a clear answer to whether lending 
relationships developed through syndicated loans add value for corporate borrowers. 
As discussed in Sufi (2007b) and Bharath et al. (2009), syndicated loan borrowers 
tend to be larger and more transparent than firms that rely heavily on direct bank 
loans. Moreover, firms that issue syndicated loans necessarily have relationships 
with multiple lenders. Thus, the potential benefits of relationship lending may be 
smaller but hold-up costs may also be lower. I measure the abnormal stock returns 
earned by firms that had lending relationships with Lehman around the time of 
Lehman’s collapse. If borrowers derived significant value from their lending 
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relationships with Lehman, I predict that they should experience negative abnormal 
returns in the days surrounding the bankruptcy. 
D.1. Strength and Scope of the Relationship 
For syndicated loans, the distinction between lead banks and participants 
provides a natural dividing line to separate strong lending relationships from weaker 
relationships. As argued by Sufi (2007b), the lead bank serves as an intermediary 
between the borrower and participants and develops a closer working relationship 
with the borrower. Some authors have even likened participants to “arm’s-length” 
lenders in that they typically do not deal directly with the borrower after the deal is 
closed and the loan is activated. This characterization is an oversimplification, 
however, since participant lenders would be privy to private information about the 
borrower that prospective lenders and widely-dispersed public investors would not 
have. Nonetheless, the lead bank is likely to have a greater information advantage 
with respect to the borrower, and thus replacing the lead bank in future loans might 
be more costly to the firm than replacing a participant. Furthermore, if a lead bank is 
unable to perform its duties as the administrative agent of the firm’s active loan, its 
duties would necessarily need to be assumed by another lender (most likely a 
member of the syndicate) for the remainder of the loan’s life, which could impose 
additional costs on the borrower. These costs may be either indirect, e.g., seeking 
out, negotiating with, and transferring important information to prospective lead 
banks, or direct, e.g., additional fees charged by the new lead bank.   
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The ability to procure investment banking services from a lender may be 
particularly valuable for borrowers due to economies of scope. The rationale is that 
information procured by the bank during the provision of loans is also useful in the 
provision of other services and vice versa. If so, the total cost of producing lending 
and investment banking services will be lower than if the firm deals with separate 
banks for the production of each. In addition, dealing with the same bank for both 
lending and securities underwriting, for example, may strengthen the bank’s 
information advantage and ability to monitor since underwriting also entails the 
production of information. Drucker and Puri (2005) find empirically that equity 
issuers that employ their lending investment bank as lead underwriter in equity 
offerings obtain lower underwriting fees. They find that issuers that employ their 
lending commercial bank as lead underwriter for equity offerings do not obtain lower 
underwriting fees but do enjoy lower interest rates on loans. Yasuda (2005) finds that 
a lending relationship with a commercial bank that has underwriting capabilities 
significantly increases the likelihood that the bank will be chosen to underwrite the 
firm’s bond offerings and that the bank will do so for a lower underwriting fee. 
Bharath et al. (2007) find that a lending relationship, whether with a commercial 
bank that has underwriting capabilities or an investment bank, significantly increases 
the probability of the bank being selected to underwrite the firm’s IPO and public 
bond offerings. Schenone (2004) shows that IPO issuing firms that have an existing 
lending relationship with either an investment bank or a commercial bank that could 
underwrite its securities offerings enjoy significantly lower IPO underpricing.  
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The evidence cited directly above suggests that the scope of the bank-
borrower relationship may be an important determinant of relationship value. The 
collapse of Lehman Brothers provides a unique opportunity to test this prediction 
since Lehman was, prior to its collapse, a large, reputable investment bank with a 
significant presence in securities underwriting markets. My empirical analysis 
reveals that many of Lehman’s borrowers also procured equity and debt underwriting 
services from Lehman. Equity underwriting involves investment in firm-specific 
information in order to credibly certify the offer to outside investors and is thus an 
informationally intensive service. Debt underwriting also entails the production of 
information but less so than equity due to the fixed-claim nature of public debt and 
the existence of third-party rating agencies that provide credit ratings for publicly 
issued bonds. I therefore predict greater losses for borrowers that also used Lehman 
to underwrite equity offerings. I also predict greater losses for borrowers that 
employed Lehman as their debt underwriter but expect that the incremental effect of 
a debt underwriting relationship will be smaller than that of an equity underwriting 
relationship. 
D.2.Information Asymmetry and Moral Hazard  
In Diamond (1991), the benefits of bank monitoring begin to decline when 
the borrower obtains a sufficiently long track record of repaying debt. More 
transparent borrowers with established reputations are able to access public debt 
markets more cheaply. Thus, Diamond (1991) predicts that the benefits of a banking 
relationship will be larger for opaque firms that suffer from higher information 
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problems. To the extent that hold-up costs do not completely negate these benefits, I 
predict more severe losses for more opaque borrowers.   
It is widely accepted that firms with more future growth opportunities face 
higher agency costs of debt (Myers, 1977; Barclay and Smith, 1996; Krishnaswami 
et al., 1999). In theory, firms with higher financial leverage should also suffer from 
greater agency costs of debt (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). These agency costs arise 
due to perverse incentives of shareholders to either underinvest in safe, profitable 
projects (underinvestment) or to substitute risky assets for safe assets (asset 
substitution). The underinvestment and asset substation problems are more severe in 
firms with more growth options due to greater conflicts between shareholders and 
bondholders over the exercise of the options (Myers, 1977; Houston and James, 
1996; Krishnaswami et al., 1999). Likewise, theory predicts that shareholders 
incentives for underinvestment and asset substitution increase with financial leverage 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977).   Myers (1977) argues that short-term, 
monitored debt can mitigate the underinvestment problem, while Houson and James 
(1996) and Krishnaswami et al. (1999) describe how bank debt can overcome the 
asset substitution problem with closer monitoring and stricter covenants. This line of 
thought leads to the prediction that banking relationships will be more valuable for 
growth firms and firms with higher leverage. Hence, I predict greater losses among 
highly levered firms and firms with higher growth opportunities.  
D.3. Profitability 
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 In Myers and Majluf (1984), highly profitable firms depend less on external 
sources of funds, such as bank debt, due to their ability to finance investments with 
cheaper internally generated funds. All else equal, this would imply that the loss of a 
bank lending relationship will be less consequential for more profitable firms. 
Cantillo and Wright (2000) examine the choice between bank debt and public debt 
and establish a theoretical link between profitability and a firm’s dependence on 
bank debt relative to public debt. In their model, lower renegotiation costs in the 
event of financial distress constitute the primary benefit of bank debt over dispersed 
public debt. For highly profitable firms, both the cost of accessing public credit 
markets and the expected benefits of bank financing are low because highly 
profitable firms are unlikely to encounter financial distress. The theoretical link 
between profitability and reliance on bank debt relative to public debt is confirmed 
empirically in Denis and Mihov (2003). Hence, the greater ability of profitable firms 
to finance projects internally as in Myers and Majluf (1984) or with public debt as in 
Cantillo and Winton (2000) implies that bank lending relationships will be less 
valuable to highly profitable firms. Thus, I predict greater losses as a result of 
Lehman’s failure among less profitable firms.    
D.4. Liquidity: Undrawn Credit Lines and Cash 
Sufi (2007a) examines the factors that determine whether firms use bank 
lines of credit or cash in liquidity management. He finds that many firms rely on 
credit lines as a liquidity substitute for cash. Lehman Brothers was a lender in many 
credit lines as well as some term loans with delayed draw provisions. Unsurprisingly, 
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in my empirical analysis I document that many borrowers reported in their SEC 
filings that Lehman failed to honor its commitments in funding draw-down requests 
under such facilities after the bankruptcy. The lost option to draw on a credit line 
could be particularly damaging to firms that rely heavily on credit lines for liquidity, 
especially in the wake of a financial crisis and tightening credit supplies. Thus, I 
predict greater losses for borrowers with large, undrawn credit commitments from 
Lehman. This effect, however, may be mitigated if the firm had viable alternative 
sources of liquidity. Larger amounts of cash on hand, for example, may soften the 
impact of losing the option to draw on a line of credit. Hence, I also predict that the 
losses suffered by firms with large, undrawn credit commitments from Lehman were 
attenuated if the firm also held large amounts of cash.  
 
III. The Collapse of Lehman Brothers 
 Table IX documents the significant events surrounding the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers and Lehman’s stock price performance. On Friday, September 5, 
2008, Lehman’s stock price closed at $16.94. Over the course of the following 
market week (September 8 - September 12), Lehman announced a $3.9 billion loss 
and a dividend cut, the rating agencies put Lehman’s credit rating on “watch,” and a 
deal involving a potential investment in Lehman by Korea Development Bank was 
put on hold. By market close on Friday, September 12, Lehman’s stock price had 
sunk to $3.65. On Saturday, September 13, Timothy Geithner, New York Fed 
president, called Lehman and two potential acquirers, Bank of America and 
98 
 
Barclays, into a special meeting to broker a sale of Lehman’s businesses before the 
market opened the following Monday. On Sunday, September 15, both Barclays and 
Bank of America walked away from negotiations Lehman announced that it would 
file bankruptcy late in the evening. The following day, Monday, September 15, 
Lehman’s stock lost nearly all its remaining value and the U.S. stock market lost 
nearly 5%.  
 
IV. Data and Methodology 
A. Sample Selection 
My data on syndicated loans is from Loan Pricing Corporation’s (LPC) 
Dealscan database. Dealscan contains data on large bank loans, almost all of which 
are syndicated. LPC collects information on loans to large corporations primarily 
through SEC filings, self-reporting by lenders, and staff reporters. I identify all 
loans
51
 for which Dealscan indicates that Lehman was a lender and with activation 
dates prior to and maturity dates after September 2008. Dealscan indicates whether a 
loan is syndicated or directly placed. There were no directly placed loans identified 
in this first step, and thus my focus is syndicated loans. I match the borrowers in this 
sample to U.S. firms in CRSP and Compustat with publicly traded common stock 
(CRSP share codes of 10 or 11). I exclude utilities (two-digit SIC code 49) because 
their financing decisions are highly regulated. I also exclude financial firms (one-
digit SIC code 6) because they are more likely to have had financial exposure to 
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 Loan packages often contain multiple credit facilities. Throughout, my use of the term “loan” refers 
to an individual credit facility. 
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Lehman unrelated to borrowings under syndicated loans. These screens resulted in a 
preliminary sample of 150 firms.  
I am interested in studying firms that had active loans from Lehman at the 
time of Lehman’s failure. The previously discussed criteria of requiring loans to have 
maturity dates after September 2008 does not necessarily ensure that firms in the 
final sample had active loans with Lehman Brothers at the time of the bankruptcy 
due to the following reason. Firms occasionally “amend,” “restate,” or “replace” 
their syndicated loans prior to maturity. For all practical purposes, such situations 
constitute the termination and replacement of the original loan with a new loan that 
typically has different terms and, in some cases, different lenders than the original 
loan. Dealscan is organized by loan, with the information reflecting original terms, 
and does not indicate whether a loan was eventually terminated and replaced prior to 
maturity. Loans that replace prior loans before their maturity are in Dealscan, but the 
data does not provide sufficient information to determine whether the loan replaced 
an existing loan or was simply a new loan taken out without terminating an existing 
loan. Hence, I also search each firm’s 8K, 10K, and 10Q filings with the SEC to 
identify any firms that may have terminated their syndicated loans with Lehman 
without retaining Lehman as a lender on any replacement loans.
52
 Such firms are 
dropped from the final sample. In addition, I also search sample firms’ 10K, 10Q, 
and 8K filings during the year prior to and year after Lehman’s bankruptcy and 
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 Specifically, I track the history of sample firms’ loans by reviewing the SEC filings that occurred 
between loan activation dates and September 2008. If a firm indicates in its filings that a loan with 
Lehman was terminated prior to September 2008 and replaced with another loan, I use Dealscan to 
identify the replacement loan and determine whether Lehman was a lender for that loan.   
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eliminate any firms that disclosed exposure from over-the-counter derivatives 
contracts with Lehman or securities issued by Lehman.
53
 After imposing the above 
mentioned screens, the final sample consists of 115 firms that had active credit 
facilities from Lehman at the time of Lehman’s failure.54 
Panel A of Table XX reports descriptive statistics for the sample. Consistent 
with Bharath et al.’s (2009) observation that Dealcan firms tend to be larger, the 
sample mean (median) market capitalization of equity is $19 billion ($3.7 billion), 
which is considerably larger than the CRSP/Compustat industrial mean (median) of 
$3.7 billion ($400 million). Although the sample is weighted toward larger firms, 
only 37% of firms have an investment grade credit rating. 50% of firms have a 
speculative grade credit rating, with the remaining 13% unrated. These observations 
are in line with Harjoto et al. (2006), who find that, compared to commercial banks, 
investment banks lend to riskier firms.
55
 Panel B of Table XX reports loan summary 
statistics by the type of loan (credit facility) that firms had with Lehman. The sample 
consists of 128 revolving credit lines, 84 straight (without delay draw provisions) 
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 Twenty firms disclosed that they dad derivatives contracts with Lehman or that they had exposure 
to securities issued by Lehman.  
54
 In addition to firms with active loans from Lehman, I also attempted to examine firms that had loan 
deals that were still pending and that had not closed at the time of Lehman’s failure. Dealscan 
contains a data field called “deal status” which indicates whether a loan was eventually closed or 
cancelled. I attempt to identify firms that had pending loans with Lehman at the time of the 
bankruptcy by examining Lehman loans that were cancelled either just prior to Lehman’s failure or 
after Lehman’s failure. However, there are few such loans in Dealscan, and none of the corresponding 
borrowers appear in CRSP or Compustat. Hence, I am unable to conduct an analysis of firms that had 
pending loans with Lehman that had not yet closed at the time of Lehman’s bankruptcy. 
55
 Consistent with Harjoto et al. (2006), my data indicates that Lehman’s borrowers had higher 
leverage and lower credit ratings, on average, than firms that had syndicated loans from Lehman’s 
four closest (in terms of loan market share) commercial bank industry peers (Wells Fargo, Wachovia, 
Deutsche Bank, and Credit Suisse) .  
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term loans, and 14 other types of loans. The latter category includes delay draw term 
loans and bridge loans. 
**** Insert Table XX here **** 
B. Control Firms 
Lehman’s collapse had an adverse impact on the stock market, especially the 
banking sector, and may have signaled that it would be relatively more difficult to 
borrow in the near future. Thus, I conjecture that the broader population of bank 
dependent firms may also have been abnormally affected by Lehman’s collapse. This 
raises the concern that any abnormal effects detected in the sample of Lehman 
borrowers are not necessarily specific to Lehman borrowers, per se, but to the 
broader population of firms that rely on syndicated bank debt. I address this concern 
by documenting and comparing the abnormal returns earned by a sample of control 
firms with active syndicated loans from banks other than Lehman at the time of the 
bankruptcy. This control sample is constructed by matching each sample firm to a 
control firm in Dealscan of similar industry classification, credit rating, and size that 
had active loans from other banks. I also require that control firms did not take out 
any syndicated loans from Lehman during the five years prior to the bankruptcy. I 
use credit rating and firm size as matching criteria since these characteristics should 
be highly correlated with the firm’s dependency on private debt.56 Investment grade 
firms should be less opaque and should have cheaper access to non-bank sources of 
capital, such as public debt and commercial paper markets. Large firms should suffer 
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 Denis and Mihov (2003) find that the most important empirical determinant of the choice between 
bank debt and public debt is a firm’s credit rating. They also find that smaller firms are much less 
likely to choose public debt.   
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less from the asymmetric information problems and should, therefore, be able to 
access public markets more easily than small firms.  
I use the 17 Fama-French industry classification scheme
57
 and three broad 
credit rating categories based on S&P’s long-term issuer ratings: investment grade, 
speculative grade, and unrated.
58
 For each sample firm, I select the control firm that 
is closest in size (percentage difference in market capitalization of equity), subject to 
the constraint that the control borrower is in the same Fama-French industry and  
broad credit rating category as the sample firm. Control firms are selected without 
replacement to ensure that the same control firm is not matched to more than one 
sample firm. 
C. Empirical Determinants of Borrower Abnormal Returns 
  I use the data field labeled “Lender Role” in Dealscan to identify firms with 
Lehman acting as a lead lender in at least one of its syndicated credit facilities. While 
syndicate members can broadly be placed into two categories, lead bank(s) and 
participants, in practice there are multiple roles within these categories that can be 
assigned to the members of a lending syndicate. While some syndicated loans have 
multiple lead arrangers, only one lead arranger acts as the administrative agent. As in 
Ivashina (2009), I follow the Standard and Poor’s (2009) definitions and identify the 
administrative agent as the lead lender, since the administrative agent deals directly 
with the firm throughout the life of the loan and handles all payments. For a small 
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 On his website, Ken French maintains several industry classifications schemes that map SIC codes 
into groups. These classification schemes are extensions of those used in Fama and French (1997) and 
range from very broad (5 groups) to much narrower (49 groups). I use the scheme that maps SIC 
codes into 17 different groups and match sample firms to control firms in the same group.  
58
 S&P issuer credit ratings from August 2008 are obtained from Compustat. 
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number of loans, Dealscan does not identify the administrative agent. In such cases, I 
follow Ivashina (2009) and identify lenders with the titles book runner, lead arranger, 
lead bank, lead manager, agent, or arranger as the lead bank. This procedure results 
in the identification of 24 firms for which Lehman was serving as a lead lender at the 
time of its bankruptcy. In my empirical analyses, I use a dummy variable that equals 
one for these firms and zero otherwise. 
 I use SDC’s New Issues database to identify borrowers that used Lehman to 
underwrite public equity and debt offerings. Specifically, I flag all firms in the 
sample that employed Lehman as a lead underwriter for a public common stock 
offering during the five years preceding Lehman’s bankruptcy announcement 
(September 14, 2003 – September 14, 2008). I do the same for firms that employed 
Lehman as lead underwriter in a public debt offering over the same period. In my 
empirical analyses, I use dummy variables that correspond to these firms. Table XX 
reports that 30% (35 firms) of the sample used Lehman to underwrite equity 
offerings while 24% (28 firms) used Lehman to underwrite debt offerings in the five 
years prior to Lehman’s failure.59 
 I use three variables to capture the extent of the firm’s information 
asymmetry problems. These are firm size, firm age, and credit quality. Larger firms, 
older firms, or investment grade firms should be less opaque or should have more 
established reputations in capital markets than their smaller, younger, or non-
                                                          
59
 In unreported analyses, I tried multiple cutoffs for the time period used to identify firms that 
employed Lehman as a securities underwriter, including the prior 3 years and the prior 10 years. The 
results using these alternative specifications are very similar to those reported and conclusions remain 
unchanged.  
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investment grade counterparts and should, therefore, have less severe information 
asymmetry problems. Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of market 
capitalization of equity and is obtained from Compustat for the firm’s most recent 
fiscal year. Age is computed with CRSP data and is measured as the natural 
logarithm of the number of years that the firm has had publicly traded equity. I 
measure credit quality by grouping firms into two categories: investment grade and 
non-investment grade. I base these groupings on S&P’s long-term issuer credit 
ratings in August 2008, which are collected from Compustat.  
 To measure the extent of the firm’s growth opportunities, I use the ratio of 
the market value of assets to the book value of assets. This variable is commonly 
interpreted in the literature as increasing in the firm’s growth opportunities. As a 
measure of financial leverage, I use the book value of total debt scaled by the book 
value of assets. For firm profitability, I use return on assets (ROA), defined as 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) scaled by 
the book value of assets. I measure the firm’s cash holdings as cash and equivalents 
scaled by the book value of assets.  
I use Dealscan and sample firms’ annual (10K) and quarterly (10Q) filings 
with the SEC to gather data on undrawn credit lines from Lehman at the time of the 
bankruptcy. The large majority of firms in the sample had credit facilities with 
features that enable the firm to draw down portions of the total loan amount over the 
loan’s life rather than requiring the entire amount to be drawn upfront. These are 
mostly revolving credit lines and a few term loans with delayed draw provisions. I 
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treat these types of loans as credit lines since they provide the borrower the option to 
draw down portions of the loan over time. For these types of loans, each lender in the 
syndicate commits to fund a portion of the total loan amount, with draw-downs 
funded on a pro-rata basis (e.g., a lender with a 10% committed share funds 10% of 
every draw-down). Where available, I collect information on Lehman’s committed 
share of each borrower’s loan(s) from Dealscan but, unfortunately, this information 
is missing for the majority of loans in Dealscan.
60
 For 43 sample firms, Dealscan 
provides sufficient information to compute Lehman’s share of the firm’s loans. For 
these firms, I manually examine the most recent SEC filing (10K or 10Q) prior to 
Lehman’s bankruptcy and collect information on total drawn and undrawn portions 
of their credit facilities. This information can be found in the “Liquidity and Capital 
Resources” section of quarterly and annual reports, in which firms are required by 
the SEC to explicitly discuss their liquidity, including access to bank lines of credit 
(Sufi, 2007) and any events that may have a “material” effect on the firm’s liquidity. 
I use the reported undrawn amounts along with Lehman’s committed share of the 
loan(s) as reported in Dealscan to compute the undrawn amount committed by 
Lehman for each firm. For example, if Lehman’s share of the facility was 10%, and 
the firm reported that $100 million remained undrawn under the facility just prior to 
the bankruptcy, then the undrawn amount committed by Lehman is computed as $10 
million (0.1x$100 million). This computation is consistent with the pro rata basis on 
which draw-downs are funded. Thus, I am able to compute the undrawn 
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 Missing data on lender shares in Dealscan is due to the fact that many firms do not explicitly make 
public the shares of each syndicate member in their loan facilities.  
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commitments from Lehman for 43 of the 115 firms in the sample with information 
that would have been publicly available at the time of the bankruptcy.  
For the 72 remaining firms in the sample, I search SEC filings made after the 
bankruptcy announcement to ascertain whether any disclosed ex post Lehman’s 
committed share of their undrawn credit facilities. 33 of these firms did, and thus I 
record the amounts. All of these firms also reported that Lehman had either failed to 
fund its portion of the firm’s latest draw-down request or that the firm’s management 
did not expect Lehman to honor its commitments in any future draw-down requests.  
Panel A of Table XX reports summary statistics on the amount of undrawn credit 
lines from Lehman scaled by total assets for the 76 firms with available data needed 
to construct this variable. On average, undrawn credit lines from Lehman equal 0.8% 
of the firm’s total assets. With respect to market expectations during the collapse, 
this variable is measured with error because it is constructed with ex post 
information for many firms. To mitigate this problem, in addition to this 
specification I also separately use a dummy variable in my empirical analyses that 
equals one if undrawn credit lines from Lehman exceed 1% (roughly the 75
th
 
percentile) of the firm’s total assets and zero otherwise.61 Because these variables are 
defined only for the 76 firms with sufficient information to construct them, the 
analyses that include these variables are restricted to those firms.  
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 In unreported analyses, I also tried scaling the amount of undrawn credit lines from Lehman by the 
firm’s (i) total drawn and undrawn credit lines from all banks and, alternatively, (ii) total undrawn 
credit lines committed by all banks. The rationale for these alternative specifications is that larger 
amounts of credit lines committed by other banks might partially offset any negative effects 
associated with a lost Lehman credit line. However, I find that neither of these alternative 
specifications has statistically significant explanatory power over sample firms’ abnormal returns, and 
neither has greater explanatory power than the reported specification.    
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D. Estimating Abnormal Stock Returns 
I estimate daily abnormal stock returns using the Fama-French-Carhart four-
factor model that includes the three factors from Fama and French (1993) and the 
momentum factor from Carhart (1997): 
 i,t i i M,t i t i t i t i,t
R = α +β R +s SMB +h HML +u UMD +ε       (5) 
where on Day t, Ri,t is the return to firm i, RM,t is the return to the value-weighted 
CRSP market index, and SMBt, HMLt, and UMDt are the returns to the Small-
Minus-Big, High-Minus-Low, and Up-Minus-Down portfolios meant to capture size, 
book-to-market, and return momentum effects, respectively.
62
 For each firm in the 
sample, I estimate the parameters in the four-factor model over a 260-day pre-event 
period (Day -290 to Day -31). Lehman announced its intention to file for bankruptcy 
late in the evening on Sunday, September 14, 2008 and subsequently did so the 
following day. Thus, I identify Monday, September 15, 2008 as Day 0.  
While most short-term event studies typically employ a simpler return 
generating model, such as the market model, I choose the four-factor model as the 
primary method due to the unusual nature of the event. The market portfolio lost 
nearly 5% on September 15, indicating that Lehman’s collapse had a system-wide 
impact. Additionally, the SMB portfolio gained 1.4%, indicating that larger firms 
were more adversely affected than smaller firms, the HML portfolio lost over 2%, 
indicating that value stocks suffered greater losses than growth stocks, and the UMD 
portfolio gained nearly 3%, indicating that past losers were more adversely affected 
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 The daily factor returns for the SMB, HML, and UMD portfolios are generously provided on Ken 
French’s website.  
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than past winners. I aim to isolate the effect of Lehman’s collapse on its borrowers 
after filtering out systematic effects. Thus, I consider the four-factor model more 
robust than the market model because it attempts to control for systematic size, 
value, and momentum effects, which were significant during the event period. 
However, for robustness, in some of my analyses I also report abnormal returns 
estimated with the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) and the market 
model.  
Because all firms in the sample have the same event period in calendar time, 
abnormal returns are likely to be cross-sectionally, which would bias conventional 
test-statistics that rely on cross-sectional variance estimates. In addition, tests that 
rely on time-series variance estimates from the estimation period will be 
misspecified if variances increased during the event period. Hence, I test for 
statistical significance of abnormal returns using the t-statistic proposed by Kolari 
and Pynnönen (2010), which is a modified version of the widely used standardized 
cross-sectional test of Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (BMP) (1991). Kolari and 
Pynnönen modify the BMP t-statistic to account for contemporaneous correlation in 
abnormal returns across sample firms. The modification is a multiplier applied to the 
standard error that is increasing with the average correlation
63
 of abnormal returns 
across stocks in the sample. If correlations are positive on average (as they are in my 
sample), the modification will result in a more conservative (closer to zero) test-
statistic. Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) find that this statistic is well-specified when 
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 Correlations of abnormal returns across stocks are computed form the time-series of abnormal 
returns during the estimation period. 
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the variance of abnormal returns is higher during the event period than in the 
estimation period and when abnormal returns are cross-sectionally correlated. Since 
it tests whether the mean standardized cumulative abnormal return (CAR) differs 
from zero, it can differ in sign from the mean CAR. For completeness, I also report a 
z-statistic from a Wilcoxon signed rank test of whether the median CAR differs from 
zero. 
 
V. Results 
A. Borrower Abnormal Returns around Lehman’s Bankruptcy 
In Table XXI, I report abnormal returns earned by sample firms and control 
firms. I examine CARs over various windows, including three that include the 
bankruptcy announcement, (-5,+1), (0,0), and (0,+1), where Day 0 is September 15. 
The (-5,+1) window has the advantage that it includes the week prior to the 
bankruptcy announcement (Day -5 to -1), in which many of Lehman’s troubles 
became public and Lehman began aggressively shopping itself to potential bidders. 
Although the large market movements on September 15 indicate that the bankruptcy 
announcement was not completely anticipated, Lehman’s publicized troubles, 
coupled with the fact that its stock price declined from $16.20 to $3.65 indicates that 
including the prior week may be important in estimating the value lost as a result of 
Lehman’s collapse. In addition, Day +1 is also considered in some of the event 
windows to account for the possibility that the market did not fully capitalize the 
information conveyed in Lehman’s collapse by the close of Day 0, since history 
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provides few comparable failures of very large, complex financial institution from 
which market participants could learn. In addition to CARs in the days surrounding 
the bankruptcy, Table XXI also reports CARs over a pre-event window, (-30,-6), and 
a post-event window (+2,+30). The pre-event window is used to assess whether there 
was any additional anticipation not captured by the primary event windows. Returns 
over the post-event window are examined to account for the possibility of temporary 
overreaction to Lehman’s collapse.  
**** Insert Table XXI here **** 
Table XXI separately reports CARs estimated with the Fama-French-Carhart 
four-factor model, the Fama-French three-factor model, and the market model. The 
abnormal returns from all three models provide some evidence of a negative mean 
reaction among Lehman borrowers. In Panel A, although the Day 0 abnormal return 
of -1.11% from the four-factor model is insignificant, the (-5,+1) and (0,+1) mean 
CARs of -3.37% and -2.6%, respectively, are statistically significant at the 10% level 
or better. The signed-rank statistics for these two windows indicate that the median 
four-factor model CARs are significant at the 5% level. In contrast, (-5,+1), (0,0) and 
(0,+1) mean four-factor CARs of control firms are small in magnitude and 
statistically insignificant. In addition, the mean differences in (-5,+1) and (0,+1) 
CARs across sample and control firms of -3.15% and -2.5%, respectively, are 
significant at the 5% level. The two-sample signed rank tests indicate that the median 
differences over the same two windows are significant at the 10% level or better.   
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Panels B and C of Table XXI report mean CARs estimated with the Fama 
and French (1993) three-factor model and the market model, respectively. The 
results based on the Fama-French three-factor model (Panel B) are consistent with 
those from the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model. In Panel C, the market 
model abnormal returns over the (0,0), (0,+1), and (-5,+1) windows for both Lehman 
borrowers and control firms are less negative than those for the four-factor and three-
factor models. On Day 0, the mean market model abnormal return earned by Lehman 
borrowers is -0.62%, which is statistically insignificant. However, the (0,+1) mean 
market model CAR for Lehman borrowers of -1.95% is statistically significant at the 
10% level. Comparatively, the mean market model CARs earned by control firms 
over the (0,0), (0,+1), and (-5,+1) periods are all positive but insignificant. 
Furthermore, the differences in mean market model CARs between Lehman 
borrowers and control firms over the same three windows are statistically significant 
at the 10% level or better.  Median differences over the latter two windows are 
statistically significant at the 5% level. Overall, these event study results provide 
evidence that Lehman’s failure harmed its borrowers and that their losses were 
significantly greater than those of similar firms with syndicated loans from other 
banks. Depending on the return model, the results indicate that Lehman’s borrowers 
lost between -3.01% and -3.54%, on average, during a period that spans the week 
prior to the bankruptcy announcement to the day after the bankruptcy announcement 
and that these losses were significantly more negative than those of control firms that 
had syndicated loans from other banks. In addition, there is no evidence of a 
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temporary overreaction, as none of the mean CARs over the (+2,+30) window are 
positive and significant.
64
 Furthermore, the mean (-30,-6) CARs are insignificant 
according to all return models, indicating that Lehman borrowers did not experience 
significant losses, on average, during the five weeks prior to September 8. 
B. Cross-Sectional Analyses of Borrower Abnormal Returns  
B.1. Univariate Tests 
Table XXII reports a matrix of simple correlation coefficients, including 
correlations between (-5,+1) four-factor CARs and predicted determinants of 
borrower abnormal returns. The correlations indicate that firms that used Lehman as 
a lead lender and firms that used Lehman as their equity underwriter were harmed 
more by Lehman’s collapse, as both are negative and significant at the 1% level. 
Additionally, Table XXII shows that the investment grade dummy, firm size 
(Ln(market cap)), and firms age (Ln(age)) are significantly and positively correlated 
with borrower abnormal returns at the 5%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. This is 
consistent with greater losses among firms with more severe information asymmetry 
problems. ROA is positively and significantly correlated with borrower abnormal 
returns at the 10% level, consistent with less profitable firms experiencing greater 
losses. Simple correlations between (-5,+1) CARs and all the remaining proposed 
determinants are  not statistically significant at the 10% level or better.   
**** Insert Table XXII here **** 
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 I also examined abnormal returns for the (+2,+10) and (+2,+20) windows (unreported for brevity) 
but did not find any evidence of positive abnormal returns during these periods.  
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While useful, these univariate tests may be misleading due to correlations 
between several potentially important determinants. For example, borrowers that 
used Lehman to underwrite debt offerings tend to be larger, older, investment grade 
firms as indicated by the correlations in Table XXII, which may help explain why 
their abnormal return tend to be less negative. On the other hand, borrowers that 
employed Lehman as their equity underwriter tend to be smaller, younger, non-
investment grade firms. Thus, in the next subsection, I turn to a multivariate analysis 
of borrower abnormal returns.   
B.2. Multivariate Analysis of Borrower Abnormal Returns 
In Table XXIII, I report results of multivariate regressions with borrower 
abnormal returns as the dependent variable. Since all the firms in the sample have the 
same period in calendar time, I use the portfolio weighted least squares (PWLS) 
approach of Chandra and Balachandran (1992), which produces unbiased standard 
errors when abnormal returns over the event window are heteroskedastic and 
correlated across firms.
65
 I estimate the PWLS regressions over the period Day -290 
to Day +10 using the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model and a seven-day (-
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 PWLS is the weighted version of the portfolio time-series ordinary least squares (POLS) approach 
of Sefcik and Thompson (1986). As with weighted least squares (WLS), each observation receives a 
weight that is inversely proportional to its variance in PWLS, where the variance is estimated using a 
time-series of residuals from the chosen asset return generating model. I use the time-series of 
residuals from the four-factor model estimated over the pre-event estimation period (Day -290 to -31) 
to estimate the variance of each observation.  
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5,+1) event window.
66
 All regressions include industry fixed effects (coefficients 
unreported) that correspond to the 12 Fama-French industry classifications.
67
 
**** Insert Table XXIII here **** 
 The regression results in Table XXIII provide consistent evidence that 
borrower abnormal returns were more negative if Lehman was the firm’s lead lender 
(as opposed to a mere participant) at the time of the bankruptcy. The coefficient 
estimates for this dummy variable are significant at the 10% level or better in all 
specifications and indicate that the (-5,+1) CARs was between 2.8 and  3.5 
percentage points more negative if Lehman was the firm’s lead lender. This result is 
consistent with borrowers developing closer and more valuable relationships with 
lead banks than with participants. Additionally, the dummy variable that corresponds 
to Lehman acting as the firm’s equity underwriter is negative and significant at the 
5% level or better in all specifications, with the most conservative estimate 
indicating a reduction in the (-5,+1) CAR of 2.7 percentage points for such firms. 
Thus, expanding the scope of the relationship through the procurement of equity 
underwriting services enhances the value of the relationship to the borrower, 
consistent with equity underwriting entailing significant information production. In 
contrast, there is no evidence that borrowers that used Lehman as a debt underwriter 
reacted more negatively, as the coefficient estimates for this dummy variable are 
statistically insignificant.  
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 I also estimated these regressions using the Fama-French three-factor model and the market model. 
My conclusions based on those results (unreported for brevity) remain unchanged.  
67
 I use the Fama-French classification scheme that maps SIC codes in to 12 groupings here because 
the 17 Fama-French classification scheme is to narrow to use for fixed effects (i.e., some of the 17 
industry groupings contain only one sample firm).  
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Results in Table XXIII also indicate that less transparent borrowers with 
more severe information asymmetry problems suffered greater losses. In 
specifications (1), (2), and (3), the investment grade dummy, firm size, and firm age, 
respectively, are positive and significant at the 10% level or better when each is 
included without the other two. In specifications (4) through (7), in which all three 
variables are included, firm age remains positive and significant at the 10% level and 
subsumes firm size and the investment grade dummy.  
The market-to-book assets ratio is negative and significant at the 10% level 
or better in 5 of the 8 specifications in Table XXIII. The most conservative 
coefficient estimate of -2.2 implies that a one standard deviation increase in the 
market-to-book assets ratio decreases the firm’s abnormal return by 1.36 points, 
consistent with firms with more growth opportunities losing more in response to 
Lehman’s failure. Consistent with greater losses among less profitable firms, ROA is 
positive and significant at the 5% level in all specifications. The most conservative 
coefficient estimate of 28 implies that a one standard deviation decrease in ROA is 
associated with a 1.88 percentage point reduction in the firm’s abnormal return. In 
contrast, leverage is not statistically significant at the 10% level or better in any 
specification.  
In specification (6), the amount of undrawn credit lines from Lehman scaled 
by assets is negative and significant at the 10% level, while its interaction with the 
cash/assets ratio is positive and significant. The interpretation is that, at low levels of 
cash/assets, abnormal returns become more negative as the amount of undrawn credit 
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lines from Lehman scaled by assets increase. As the cash/assets ratio increases, this 
effect grows weaker (less negative). Economically, the coefficients indicate that a 
one standard deviation increase in undrawn Lehman credit lines scaled by assets (an 
increase of about 0.01) decreases the (-5,+1) CAR by about 1.2 percentage points 
when the cash/assets ratio is at its minimum of zero. This negative effect becomes -
0.70 percentage points when the cash/assets ratio increases to its 25
th
 percentile
68
  
value of 0.01 and is virtually eliminated (very close to zero) when the cash/assets 
ratio is at its median value of 0.04.  Similar conclusions can be drawn from 
specification (8), which replaces the undrawn Lehman credit line variable with its 
dummy counterpart. The coefficient estimates indicate that the loss of a relatively 
large undrawn Lehman credit line (in excess of 1% of total assets) decreases the 
firm’s CAR by 3.31 percentage points when the cash/assets ratio is zero. This 
negative effect is completely eliminated when the cash/assets ratio increases to its 
70
th
 percentile value of 0.077.  These results are consistent with greater losses among 
firms with less cash and larger undrawn credit lines from Lehman.
69
   
C. Abnormal Profitability and Investment 
I focus on stock returns in the days surrounding Lehman’s collapse as the 
primary outcome variable since it allows me to detect the unanticipated effect of 
Lehman’s collapse on firm value with precision. Short-run stock returns are also 
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 The percentile figures cited here are for the 76 firms included in specification (5) through (8) in 
Table IV (those with non-missing data on undrawn Lehman credit lines), so they may differ slightly 
from those for the full sample reported in Table I. 
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 In unreported tests, I also tried interacting the undrawn Lehman credit line variables with leverage. 
These test are motivated by the conjecture that very high financial leverage might be associated with a 
high probability of distress in the near future, and the lost option to draw on a credit line may be 
particularly damaging for such firms. However, neither leverage or its interactions with the variables 
that measure undrawn Lehman credit lines are statistically significant in these tests.   
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immune to the effect of subsequent unexpected firm-specific or market-wide events 
during the financial crisis unrelated to sample firms’ relationships with Lehman. 
Nonetheless, as a complement to the return-based analysis, in this section I study 
long-term abnormal operating performance around Lehman’s bankruptcy. I conduct 
event studies on annual measures of profitability and investment, as theory suggests 
that both might be affected by the involuntary rupture of a banking relationship.
70
 
For profitability, I use ROA, defined as EBITDA scaled by total assets and, 
alternatively, cash-flow-ROA, defined as operating cash flow scaled by total assets. 
Use of the latter measure is motivated by the fact that the former is an accrual-based 
measure and can be manipulated by managers, as pointed out by Barber and Lyon 
(1996). Let a firm’s fiscal Year 0 be the fiscal year in which Lehman failed and let 
Pi,t equal the chosen profitability measure for sample firm i in fiscal Year t. I define 
abnormal profitability for firm i in fiscal Year t as: 
APi,t =Pi,t - Pi,-1 – (PIi,t – PIi,-1)                                                (6) 
where PIi,t is the profitability in fiscal Year t of a non-sample firm matched to sample 
firm i on the basis of industry and profitability in fiscal Year -1. In this specification, 
expected profitability is encompassed in the last three terms on the right-hand side 
and is equated to the sample firm’s profitability in fiscal Year -1 (the last completed 
fiscal year prior to Lehman’s bankruptcy) plus the change in profitability from Year -
1 to Year t of a matched firm. Matching firms are selected such that the absolute 
value of the difference in profitability measures between the matching firm and 
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 Myers (1977) and Petersen and Rajan (1994) suggest that bank debt can overcome the 
underinvestment problem. In the context of  Myers and Majluf (1984), bank debt (as inside debt) is 
less subject to information asymmetry than outside funds and, thus, may mitigate underinvestment.  
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sample firm in Year -1 is minimized, subject to the constraint that the matching firm 
has the same two-digit SIC code as the sample firm.
71
 In addition, I also limit the set 
of matching firms to those in Dealscan that issued at least one bank loan during the 
three years prior to Lehman’s bankruptcy because Billett et al. (2006) find negative 
abnormal stock returns and negative abnormal profitability in the years following  
the issuance of a bank loan.   
In addition to profitability, I also examine abnormal investment in the year of 
and a year following Lehman’s bankruptcy. Let a firm’s fiscal Year 0 be the fiscal 
year in which Lehman failed and let Ii,t equal sample firm i’s  investment in fiscal 
Year t, defined as the sum of capital expenditures, increase in investments, and 
acquisition expenses from Compustat.
72
 I define abnormal investment for firm i in 
fiscal Year t as: 
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where IIi,t is investment in fiscal Year t of a non-sample firm matched to sample firm 
i on the basis of industry and market-to-book ratio of assets in fiscal Year -1. Ai,-1 is 
sample firm i’s total assets (book value) in Year -1, and AIi,-1 is the matching firm’s 
total assets in Year -1. Matching firms are selected such that the absolute value of the 
percentage difference in market-to-book asset ratios between the sample firm and 
matching firm is minimized, subject to the constraint that the matching firm has the 
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 Barber and Lyon (1996) advocate matching based on industry and prior profitability because 
profitability is mean-reverting. They find that statistical tests on abnormal profitability measures that 
do not incorporate pre-event performance are misspecified. 
72
 Capital expenditures, increase in investments, and acquisition expense are obtained from 
Compustat. 
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same two-digit SIC code as the sample firm. I use the ratio of market value of assets 
to book value of assets as a matching criteria because it is commonly used in the 
literature as a measure of the investment opportunity set.
73
 
 Table XIV reports abnormal profitability and investment in the year of (Year 
0) and year following (Year 1) Lehman’s bankruptcy. The smaller number of 
observations reflects that fact that four firms in the sample delisted prior to the end of 
their fiscal Year 0 and 12 firms delisted prior to the end of their fiscal Year 1. My 
primary focus is Year 1, since a substantial portion of fiscal Year 0 occurred prior to 
Lehman’s bankruptcy for many firms in the sample. Panel A reports mean and 
median profitability, where profitability is measured as ROA (EBITDA scaled by 
total assets). Panel A provides no evidence of abnormal profitability among Lehman 
borrowers, as the mean and median abnormal profitability in Years 0 and 1 are 
statistically insignificant. Panel B reports mean and median abnormal profitability 
with profitability defined as Cash-flow-ROA (operating cash flow scaled by total 
assets). Based on this measure, there is some evidence that Lehman borrowers 
experience significantly negative abnormal profitability in Year 1, as the mean 
(median) of -1.24% (-1.19%) is statistically significant at the 10% (5%) level. Mean 
and median abnormal profitability in Year 0 is negative but statistically insignificant. 
Panel C shows that Lehman borrowers exhibit significantly negative mean and 
median abnormal investment in Year 1 of -6.09% and -1.41%, respectively. Both 
estimates are significant at the 5% level. Both the mean mean and median abnormal 
investment in Year 0 are negative but statistically insignificant. In summary, the 
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 See, for example, Polk and Sapienza (2009) and Barclay, Fu, and Smith (2010).   
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results in Table XIV indicate that Lehman’s borrowers experience significant 
reductions in profitability, as measured by operating cash flow scaled by assets, and 
investment relative to their industry peers in the year following Lehman’s 
bankruptcy.  
**** Insert Table XIV here **** 
 
VI. Conclusions 
I use the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 as a natural 
experiment to test whether lending relationships developed through syndicated loans 
have value for corporate borrowers. Firms with active syndicated credit facilities 
with Lehman as a lender at the time of Lehman’s failure experienced abnormal stock 
returns of -3%, on average, during a seven day period that includes the bankruptcy 
announcement. These losses were significantly larger than those earned by a group 
of control firms of similar credit quality, size, and industry that had syndicated loans 
from other banks. In addition, Lehman’s borrowers also experienced significant 
reductions in profitability and investment relative to their industry peers in the year 
following Lehman’ failure. I conclude that Lehman’s borrowers incurred significant 
costs as a result of Lehman’s failure, above and beyond those experienced by the 
stock market in general and by similar firms. In the cross-section, I find that 
borrower abnormal stock returns vary with both the strength and scope of the 
borrower’s relationship with Lehman. Losses were larger if Lehman was the lead 
lender for one or more of the firm’s credit facilities or if the firm recently employed 
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Lehman as a lead underwriter in a public equity offering. More opaque firms with 
fewer sources of external capital, as measured by firm size, age, or credit quality, 
also suffered greater losses, consistent with bank lending relationships having greater 
value for less transparent borrowers that suffer from more severe information 
problems. Firms with more growth opportunities suffered greater losses, which is 
consistent with bank lending relationships having greater value for firms with more 
severe moral hazard problems that stem from potential conflicts between 
shareholders and debtholders. Firms with larger, undrawn credit lines from Lehman 
also suffered greater losses, but this effect was attenuated if the firm also held larger 
amounts of cash.  
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APPENDIX A 
Chapter II Variable Definitions 
This table provides definitions of all variables in Chapter II and Tables IX through XIX. Numbers in 
parentheses refer to the annual Compustat item for the firm’s most recent fiscal year. 
   Variable Definition 
   # of non-Lehman 
analysts 
# of equity analysts in I/B/E/S not employed by Lehman during the 
firm’s current fiscal quarter or last fiscal quarter (as of September 14, 
2008) that made at least one earnings forecast during the same period, 
# of common stock 
offerings with Lehman 
# of public common stock offerings by the client lead underwritten by 
Lehman during September 14, 1998 to September 14, 2008. 
# of debt offerings with 
Lehman 
# of public debt (straight and convertible) offerings by the client lead 
underwritten by Lehman during September 14, 1998 to September 14, 
2008. 
# of M&A deals with 
Lehman 
# of acquisitions by the firm of U.S. targets announced during September 
14, 1998 to September 14, 2008 for which the firm employed Lehman 
as a financial advisor. 
Age # of years elapsed between when the firm first appears in CRSP and 
September 14, 2008. 
Book-to-market Book value of common equity ( #60) divided by market value of 
common equity (#25*#199). 
Cash / assets Cash and short-term investments (#1) scaled by the total assets (#6). 
Common stock proceeds 
raised with Lehman 
Client's public common stock proceeds (in December 2007 $ millions) 
underwritten by Lehman during the period Sep 14, 1998 to Sep. 14, 
2008. For offerings in which Lehman was one of n lead underwriters, 
Lehman is credited with 1/n of the proceeds. Proceeds are converted to 
Dec. 2007 $ using the Producer Price Index.  
Debt shelf registration 
dummy 
 
Dummy variable: = 1 if the firm shelf registered (SEC Rule 415) a public 
debt (straight or convertible) offering  during Sep. 14, 2006 to Sep. 14, 
2008 without taking any of the registered debt off the shelf before Sep. 
14, 2008 and zero otherwise. 
Equity shelf registration 
dummy 
 
Dummy variable: = 1 if the firm shelf registered (SEC Rule 415) a 
common stock offering during Sep. 14, 2006 to Sep. 14, 2008 without 
taking any of the registered equity off the shelf before Sep. 14, 2008 
and zero otherwise. 
Lehman convertible debt 
underwriting client 
Dummy variable: = 1 if the firm employed Lehman as a lead underwriter 
in a public convertible debt offering during Sep. 14 1998 to Sep. 2008 
and zero otherwise. 
Lehman debt 
underwriting client 
Dummy variable: = 1 if the firm employed Lehman as a lead underwriter 
in a public straight or convertible debt offering during Sep. 14 1998 to 
Sep. 2008 and zero otherwise. 
Lehman is lead lender Dummy variable: = 1 if Lehman was acting as the lead lender in at least 
one of the firm’s syndicated credit facilities as of Sep. 14, 2008. 
Lehman is participant 
lender 
Dummy variable: = 1 if Lehman was a lender in at least one of the firm’s 
active credit facilities but not a lead lender as of Sep. 2008. 
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  Variable Definition 
  Lehman equity 
underwriting client 
Dummy variable: = 1  if the firm employed Lehman as a lead 
underwriter in at least one public common stock offering during Sep. 
14, 1998 to Sep. 14, 2008. 
Lehman M&A client Dummy variable: = 1 if the firm was an acquirer in a completed 
acquisition of a U.S. target for which Lehman served as an advisor 
during Sep. 14, 1998 to Sep. 14, 2008 and zero otherwise. 
Lehman’s market share 
as a Nasdaq market 
maker 
For Nasdaq firms only (CRSP exchange code of 3): Equals the total 
number of shares traded by Lehman as a Nasdaq market maker during 
the previous three calendar months (Jun., Jul., and Aug. 2008) divided 
by the total number of shares traded over the same time period.  
Lehman NYSE specialist  Dummy: = 1 if Lehman was the NYSE specialist for the firm’s stock as 
of September 14, 2008 and zero otherwise. 
Lehman’s share of 
client’s common stock 
offerings  
 
# of client’s public common stock offerings credited to Lehman divided 
by the total # of public common stock offerings by the client during 
September 14, 1998 to September 14, 2008. For offerings in which 
Lehman was one of n lead underwriters, Lehman is credited with a 1/n 
share of the offering. 
Lehman’s share of 
client’s common stock 
proceeds 
Client's public common stock proceeds (in December 2007 $ million) 
underwritten by Lehman during the period Sep 14, 1998 to Sep. 14, 
2008 divided by the total amount of public commons stock proceeds 
raised by the client during the same period (in December 2007 $ 
millions).  For offerings in which Lehman was one of n lead 
underwriters, Lehman is credited with 1/n share of the proceeds. 
Proceeds are converted to Dec. 2007 $ using the Producer Price Index. 
Lehman’s share of 
client’s debt offerings 
# of client’s public debt (straight and convertible) offerings credited to 
Lehman divided by the total # of public debt offerings by the client 
during September 14, 1998 to September 14, 2008. For offerings in 
which Lehman was one of n lead underwriters, Lehman is credited 
with a 1/n share of the offering. 
Lehman’s share of 
client’s M&A deals 
 
# of client’s completed acquisitions of U.S. targets credited to Lehman 
divided by the total # of completed acquisitions of U.S. targets by the 
firm during September 14, 1998 to September 14, 2008. For deals in 
which Lehman was one of n financial advisors to the firm, Lehman is 
credited with a 1/n share of the deal. 
Lehman straight debt 
underwriting client 
Dummy variable: = 1 if the firm employed Lehman as a lead underwriter 
in a public straight debt offering during Sep. 14 1998 to Sep. 2008 and 
zero otherwise. 
Leverage 
 
Long term debt (#9) plus short term debt (#34) divided by the market 
value of assets, where the market value of assets equals total  assets 
(#6) minus the book value of common equity (#60) plus the market 
value of common equity (#25*#199). 
Ln(# of non-Lehman 
analysts) 
Natural logarithm of the number of equity analysts in I/B/E/S that were 
not employed by Lehman during the firm’s current fiscal quarter or last 
fiscal quarter that made at least one earnings forecast during the same 
period, where the current fiscal quarter contains Sep. 14, 2008. 
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APPENDIX A-Continued 
   Variable Definition 
  Market cap Market value of common equity (#25*#199) in $ millions. 
Net market leverage Long term debt (#9) plus short term debt (#34) minus cash and short-
term investments (#1) divided by the market value of assets for the 
latest fiscal year, where the market value of assets equals the book 
value of  assets (#6) minus the book value of common equity (#60) 
plus the market value of common equity (#25*#199). 
Pending M&A deal with 
Lehman 
Dummy variable: = 1 if Lehman advised the firm in an acquisition of a 
U.S. target that was announced prior to Sep. 14, 2008 and completed 
after Sep. 14, 2008 and zero otherwise.  
Proportion of 
outstanding shares 
owned by Lehman 
Brothers Holdings Inc. 
Number of the firm’s common shares owned by Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. (LBHI) divided by the client's total number outstanding 
shares as of June 30, 2008. From Thomson CDS/Spectrum database on 
13f Holdings (available through WRDS). 
Proportion of 
outstanding shares 
owned by Neuberger 
Berman LLC. 
Number of the firm’s common shares owned by Neuberger Berman LLC 
divided by the client's total number outstanding shares as of June 30, 
2008. From Thomson CDS/Spectrum database on 13f Holdings 
Proportion of 
outstanding shares 
owned by non-Lehman 
institutions 
Number of the firm’s common shares owned by institutions required to 
report holdings under SEC Rule 13f other than Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. and Neuberger Berman LLC as of June 30, 2008, divided 
by the client's total outstanding shares. From Thomson CDS/Spectrum 
database on 13f Holdings. 
Recent IPO underwritten 
by Lehman 
Dummy variable: = 1 if the Lehman served as a lead underwriter for the 
client’s IPO and the IPO took place during Sep. 14, 1998 to Sep. 14, 
2008 
Share turnover Total number of shares traded during Aug. 2008 divided by the total 
number of shares outstanding. 
Total common stock 
offerings 
Total number of public common stock offerings conducted by the firm 
during Sep. 14, 1998 to Sep. 14, 2008. 
Total common stock 
proceeds 
Total public common stock proceeds (in December 2007 $ millions) 
raised by the firm during Sep 14, 1998 to Sep. 14, 2008.Proceeds are 
converted to Dec. 2007 $ using the Producer Price Index. 
Underwriting 
relationship scope 
index 
=0 if the firm did not receive lead underwriting services from Lehman 
for public common stock, straight debt, or convertible debt during Sep. 
14, 1998 to Sep. 14, 2008; =1 if the firm received one of the three 
aforementioned services from Lehman; =2 if the firm received two of 
the three aforementioned underwriting services from Lehman; =3 if the 
firm received all three of the aforementioned services from Lehman. 
Z-score From Altman (1968): = [3.3*EBIT(#178) + 1.0*sales(#12) + 
1.4*retained earnings(#36) + 1.2*working capital(#179)]/total 
assets(#6) + 0.6*market cap(#25*#199)/total liabilities(#181). 
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APPENDIX B 
Chapter III Variable Definitions 
This table provides definitions of all variables in Chapter III and Tables XX through XXIV. All 
Compustat items are for the firm’s most recent fiscal year. 
   Variable Definition 
  # of syndicate lenders The number of lenders in the credit facility. 
Age 
Assets 
The number of years elapsed between the time that the firm first appears 
in CRSP and Sep. 14, 2008. 
The book value of assets for the latest fiscal year. 
Cash / assets Cash and short-term investments scaled by the book value of assets for 
the latest fiscal year. 
Debt underwriter dummy Dummy variable: = 1 if the firm employed Lehman as a lead underwriter 
in a public debt offering during Sep. 14, 2003 to Sep. 14, 2008 and 
zero otherwise. 
Equity underwriter 
dummy 
Dummy variable: = 1  if the firm employed Lehman as a lead 
underwriter in at least one public common stock offering during Sep. 
14, 2003 to Sep. 14, 2008. 
Investment grade dummy Dummy variable: = 1 if the firm’s long-term issuer credit rating assigned 
by S&P was investment grade in August 2008.  
Large undrawn Lehman 
credit line dummy 
Dummy variable: = 1 if the amount committed by Lehman under the 
firm’s active credit facilities that remained undrawn at the time of 
Lehman’s bankruptcy exceeded 1% of the firm’s book value of assets 
and zero otherwise.  
Lead lender dummy Dummy variable: = 1 if the Lehman was acting as the lead lender in at 
least one of the firm’s syndicated credit facilities as of Sep. 14, 2008.  
Leverage 
 
Long term debt plus short term debt, all divided by the book value of 
assets for the latest fiscal year 
Loan amount Total amount of the credit facility ($ millions). 
Loan amount Total amount of the credit facility scaled by the borrower’s book value of 
assets. 
Market cap Market value of common equity (price per share multiplied by shares 
outstanding) for the latest fiscal year ($ millions). 
Market –to-book assets The ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets, where the 
market value of assets is defined as the book value of assets minus the 
book value of common equity plus the market value of common equity. 
Original maturity The maturity (years) of the credit facility as of the activation date. 
ROA Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) 
scaled by the book value of assets. 
Speculative grade Dummy variable: = 1 if the firm’s long-term issuer credit rating assigned 
by S&P was speculative grade in August 2008.  
Undrawn Lehman credit 
line / assets 
Defined only for firms with sufficient information in Dealscan and the 
firm’s SEC filings. Equals the amount committed by Lehman under the 
firm’s active credit facilities that remained undrawn at the time of 
Lehman’s bankruptcy scaled by the book value of assets.  
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Table I. Summary Statistics on Trading Activity 
The unit of observation is a rating change at the issue level. The “full” sample consists of 6,920 bond rating downgrades and 
1,906 rating upgrades by Moody's, S&P, and Fitch during September 2002 to March 2009 that affected firms with corporate 
bond data in TRACE. The sample is restricted to bonds that traded on Days -1 and +1 and on at least ten days during Day +31 
to +50, where Day 0 is the day of the rating change. The “uncontaminated” sample consists of rating changes not accompanied 
by contaminating news during Day -1 to +1.  “Avg. Par Vol.” is the total trading volume in $1,000 averaged across all bonds in 
the sample for the given event day. “Avg. # of Trades” is the total number of trades averaged across all bonds in the sample for 
the given event day. “% of Bonds Traded” refers to the % of bonds in the sample that were traded on the given event day.    
  
 Downgraded Bonds   
 
Upgraded Bonds   
        
 
Full Sample 
(N=6920)  
Uncontaminated 
(N=2210) 
Full Sample  
(N=1906)  
Uncontaminated 
(N=1230) 
                
Day 
Avg. 
Par 
Vol. 
Avg. 
# of 
Trades 
% of 
Bonds 
Traded  
Avg. 
Par 
Vol. 
Avg. # 
of 
Trades 
% of 
Bonds 
Traded 
Avg. 
Par 
Vol. 
Avg. 
# of 
Trades 
% of 
Bonds 
Traded 
Avg. 
Par 
Vol. 
Avg. 
# of 
Trades 
% of 
Bonds 
Traded 
    
-20 3,979 15 80  4,594 13 77  2,857 7 80  2,736 6 79 
-19 4,001 15 79  3,951 13 76  2,476 7 81  2,392 6 81 
-18 4,170 15 80  4,106 12 75  2,631 7 78  2,517 6 77 
-17 4,038 16 81  3,812 13 77  2,636 7 81  2,732 7 81 
-16 4,300 15 81  4,216 12 76  2,959 7 79  2,755 7 79 
-15 4,635 15 81  5,000 12 77  2,890 7 81  3,003 6 80 
-14 4,365 15 81  5,022 13 79  2,999 7 78  2,837 6 76 
-13 4,627 16 80  4,333 13 76  2,918 7 80  2,763 7 79 
-12 4,816 17 82  4,547 13 79  2,966 7 80  2,749 6 79 
-11 4,446 16 82  4,213 12 78  2,672 7 80  2,567 6 79 
-10 4,296 16 82  4,314 12 79  2,525 7 81  2,427 6 80 
-9 4,266 16 82  4,183 12 78  3,195 7 81  2,983 6 81 
-8 4,133 16 83  4,187 12 82  2,961 7 81  2,788 6 80 
-7 3,999 16 84  3,760 12 83  2,851 7 80  2,878 7 80 
-6 3,930 16 84  3,810 12 83  2,999 7 81  3,202 7 80 
-5 4,099 16 84  3,958 12 83  3,136 7 84  3,279 7 83 
-4 4,299 16 83  4,350 14 83  2,936 7 82  2,917 6 81 
-3 4,236 16 84  4,464 13 83  2,874 7 81  2,782 7 81 
-2 4,161 16 85  3,912 12 83  3,105 7 82  2,771 6 81 
-1 4,444 15 100  4,232 12 100  2,792 6 100  2,644 6 100 
0 7,495 18 88  6,628 14 86  3,972 8 87  3,771 7 86 
+1 5,654 17 100  4,725 11 100  3,530 7 100  3,431 6 100 
+2 4,808 17 86  4,371 13 84  3,506 7 84  3,481 7 83 
+3 4,534 17 86  4,009 11 85  3,177 7 84  3,272 7 83 
+4 4,501 16 84  4,229 13 83  3,038 7 82  3,199 7 80 
+5 4,382 16 85  4,810 12 82  3,028 7 83  3,076 7 82 
+6 3,998 16 84  3,928 12 83  3,123 7 82  3,061 7 81 
+7 4,032 16 84  3,907 12 83  2,872 7 81  2,678 7 80 
+8 3,932 16 85  4,037 12 83  3,037 7 80  3,049 7 79 
+9 4,049 16 84  4,195 13 82  3,342 7 81  3,259 7 80 
+10 4,195 16 83  4,604 13 83  3,140 7 80  2,907 7 81 
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Table II. Sample Distribution by Rating Agency and Rating Change Characteristics 
The unit of observation is a rating change at the firm level. The “full” sample consists of 1,159 bond rating downgrades and 610 rating upgrades by Moody's, S&P, and Fitch during 
September 2002 to March 2009 that affected firms with corporate bond data in TRACE. The sample is restricted to bonds that traded on Days -1 and +1 and on at least ten days during Day 
+31 to +50, where Day 0 is the day of the rating change. The “uncontaminated” sample consists of rating changes not accompanied by contaminating news during Day -1 to +1. Panel A 
reports the sample distribution by calendar year. Panel B reports the sample distribution by size of the rating change (# of fine or modified grades that the rating is changed). Panel C reports 
the sample distribution by pre-downgrade or pre-upgrade letter rating class. Panel D reports the number of downgrades (upgrades) that moved the firm out of (into) the investment grade 
category, where investment grade refers to BBB- or Baa3 and above. Panel E reports the number of rating changes that were preceded by a credit watch listing with an indicated direction. 
   Downgrades        Upgrades    
           Full Sample  Uncontaminated  Full Sample  Uncontaminated 
                 All Moody’s S&P Fitch  All Moody’s S&P Fitch  All Moody’s S&P Fitch  All Moody’s S&P Fitch 
               Panel A: Sample distribution by calendar year             
  2002 21 8 10 3  10 7 2 1  2 2 0 0  1 1 0 0 
2003 71 25 29 17  43 16 16 11  19 9 7 3  13 5 7 1 
2004 45 17 16 12  21 6 9 6  17 6 8 3  11 2 6 3 
2005 195 72 103 20  109 48 54 7  110 49 44 17  79 39 30 10 
2006 201 96 78 27  126 66 48 12  183 95 62 26  138 77 44 17 
2007 186 84 70 32  109 53 36 20  153 58 61 34  109 41 45 23 
2008 303 128 118 57  164 76 61 27  113 19 68 26  83 10 53 20 
2009 137 74 36 27  70 38 16 16  13 6 3 4  7 2 2 3 
Total 1159 504 460 195  652 310 242 100  610 244 253 113  441 177 187 77 
  Panel B: Sample distribution by size of the rating change             
  1 grade 814 348 337 129  461 220 172 69  495 203 205 87  363 151 153 59 
2 grades 214 103 77 34  121 60 46 15  86 28 41 17  62 18 31 13 
3 grades 75 31 27 17  41 19 14 8  13 6 3 4  8 5 1 2 
4 grades 22 7 8 7  14 4 5 5  5 4 0 1  3 2 0 1 
5 grades 15 8 5 2  8 5 2 1  5 2 2 1  1 0 0 1 
≥6 grades 19 7 6 6  7 2 3 2  6 1 2 3  4 1 2 1 
  Panel C: Sample distribution by pre-downgrade or pre-upgrade letter rating class          
  Aaa, AAA 25 10 9 6  13 7 3 3  0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 
Aa, AA 126 59 50 17  51 29 18 4  24 13 10 1  16 9 7 0 
A 230 80 99 51  116 39 53 24  98 35 43 20  67 26 28 13 
Baa, BBB 253 93 98 62  142 56 50 36  129 43 43 43  83 25 32 26 
Ba, BB 184 84 67 33  112 53 38 21  123 49 50 24  94 36 38 20 
B 247 129 97 21  161 95 55 11  161 68 74 19  124 55 56 13 
Caa, CCC 94 49 40 5  57 31 25 1  75 36 33 6  57 26 26 5 
 
 
1
3
8
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Table II-Continued 
  Panel D: Number of rating changes that cross the investment grade boundary        
  Across 
inv. grade 
105 44 37 24  50 22 16 12  53 19 22 12  39 13 16 10 
  Panel E: Number of rating changes where the firm was placed on credit watch prior to the rating change        
  Placed on 
credit 
watch 
518 265 200 53  289 153 110 26  178 95 62 21  122 66 43 13 
  
 
1
3
9
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Table III. The Corporate Bond Market Response to Bond Rating Changes 
The unit of observation is a rating change at the firm level. The “full” sample consists of 1,159 bond rating downgrades and 610 
rating upgrades by Moody's, S&P, and Fitch during September 2002 to March 2009 that affected firms with corporate bond data 
in TRACE. The sample is restricted to bonds that traded on Days -1 and +1 and on at least ten days during Day +31 to +50, where 
Day 0 is the day of the rating change. The “uncontaminated” sample consists of rating changes not accompanied by 
contaminating news during Day -1 to +1.  “CAR” is the sum of the firm’s daily abnormal bond returns over the event window. 
Daily abnormal bond returns are computed as the bond’s raw return minus the contemporaneous return on an index of corporate 
bonds matched on rating and maturity. Daily bond prices are computed with the “trade-weighted price, all trades” method of 
Bessembinder et al. (2009). If a sample bond is not traded on a given day, the bond’s daily price for that day is set equal to the 
most recent observed daily price.  If a firm has multiple bonds affected by the same rating announcement, the firm’s daily 
abnormal bond return is the market value-weighted average of abnormal returns on its individual bond issues.   *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively in two-tailed tests. 
  Event 
Window 
(days) 
Mean 
CAR t-stat 
signed-
rank 
 
Mean 
CAR t-stat 
signed-
rank  
Mean 
CAR t-stat 
signed-
rank 
  Panel A: Full sample of downgrades 
  
 All (N=1159)  Investment Grade (N=634)  Speculative Grade (N=525) 
   
(-30,-1) -3.19% -9.92*** -12.53***  -2.09% -6.59*** -8.93***  -4.52% -7.62*** -8.94*** 
(-15,-1) -1.78% -6.79*** -10.10***  -1.30% -4.87*** -7.23***  -2.36% -4.92*** -7.14*** 
(0,+1) -0.99% -6.46*** -9.57***  -1.09% -4.60*** -6.39***  -0.88% -4.80*** -7.01*** 
(+2,+10) -0.65% -3.31*** -5.01***  -0.43% -1.74* -4.08***  -0.93% -2.90*** -3.18*** 
  Panel B: Uncontaminated downgrades 
  
 All (N=652)   Investment Grade (N=322)  Speculative Grade (N=330) 
              
(-30,-1) -2.85% -7.63*** -8.75***  -1.63% -4.99*** -5.04***  -4.05% -6.13*** -7.18*** 
(-15,-1) -1.44% -4.69*** -6.43***  -0.78% -2.55** -3.77***  -2.09% -3.96*** -5.31*** 
(0,+1) -0.64% -5.72*** -5.64***  -0.45% -3.06*** -2.28**  -0.83% -4.92*** -5.48*** 
(+2,+10) -0.95% -4.63*** -4.87***  -0.56% -2.48** -2.78***  -1.33% -3.92*** -4.08*** 
 
Panel C: Full sample of upgrades 
  
 All (N=610)   Investment Grade (N=251)  Speculative Grade (N=359) 
   
(-30,-1) 0.04% 0.32 -0.66  -0.13% -1.07 -2.44**  0.16% 0.84 0.71 
(-15,-1) 0.06% 0.57 0.19  0.00% -0.01 -0.94  0.09% 0.65 0.72 
(0,+1) 0.24% 4.89*** 5.47***  0.14% 1.76* 1.44  0.31% 4.97*** 5.65*** 
(+2,+10) 0.01% 0.16 -0.03  0.05% 0.60 -0.28  -0.02% -0.20 -0.01 
  Panel D: Uncontaminated upgrades 
  
 All (N=441)  Investment Grade (N=166)  Speculative Grade (N=275) 
    
(-30,-1) 0.16% 1.10 0.26  0.08% 0.83 -0.87  0.20% 0.92 0.79 
(-15,-1) 0.19% 2.12** 0.73  0.20% 2.31** 0.32  0.18% 1.38 0.56 
(0,+1) 0.21% 4.50*** 4.91***  0.02% 0.35 0.76  0.33% 4.90*** 5.43*** 
(+2,+10) -0.01% -0.22 -0.46  -0.01% -0.22 -0.62  -0.02% -0.15 -0.20 
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Table IV. The Corporate Bond Market Response to Bond Rating Changes: Alternative Samples Based on Trading 
Activity 
The unit of observation is a rating change at the firm level. The sample consists of bond rating downgrades and upgrades by 
Moody's, S&P, and Fitch during September 2002 to March 2009 that affected firms with corporate bond data in TRACE. The 
sample is restricted to rating changes not accompanied by contaminating news during Day -1 to +1. In Panels A and C, the 
samples are constructed using all bonds that traded on at least ten days during Day +31 to +50, irrespective of trading activity 
during Day -1 to Day +1. In Panels B and D, the samples are constructed using “liquid” bonds that traded on every day during 
Day +31 to +50, irrespective of trading activity during Day -1 to Day +1. “CAR” is the sum of the firm’s daily abnormal bond 
returns over the event window. Daily abnormal bond returns are computed as the bond’s raw return minus the contemporaneous 
return on a value-weighted index of corporate bonds matched on rating and maturity. Daily bond prices are computed with the 
“trade-weighted price, all trades” method of Bessembinder et al. (2009). If a sample bond is not traded on a given day, the bond’s 
daily price for that day is set equal to the most recent observed daily price. If a firm has multiple bond issues affected by the same 
rating announcement, the firm’s daily abnormal bond return is the market value-weighted average of abnormal returns on its 
individual bond issues. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively in two-tailed 
tests. 
  Event 
Window 
(days) 
Mean 
CAR t-stat 
signed-
rank 
 
Mean 
CAR t-stat 
signed-
rank  
Mean 
CAR t-stat 
signed-
rank 
  Panel A: Uncontaminated downgrades, all bonds traded on at least ten days during Day +31 to Day +50 
  
 All (N=959) 
 
Investment Grade (N=438) 
 
Speculative Grade (N=521) 
   
(-30,-1) -2.39% -5.39*** -9.82*** 
 
-1.08% -1.98** -5.41*** 
 
-3.50% -5.19*** -8.08*** 
(-15,-1) -1.59% -5.94*** -7.36*** 
 
-0.89% -3.88*** -4.78*** 
 
-2.17% -4.82*** -5.69*** 
(0,+1) -0.47% -4.37*** -5.94*** 
 
-0.32% -2.99*** -2.20** 
 
-0.61% -3.39*** -5.75*** 
(+2,+10) -1.55% -6.02*** -7.88*** 
 
-1.11% -4.83*** -5.05*** 
 
-1.91% -4.44*** -6.00*** 
  Panel B: Uncontaminated downgrades, all bonds traded on every day during Day +31 to Day +50 
  
 All (N=214) 
 
Investment Grade (N=130) 
 
Speculative Grade (N=84) 
              
(-30,-1) -3.43% -5.15*** -5.11*** 
 
-2.09% -4.00*** -3.81*** 
 
-5.51% -3.75*** -3.55*** 
(-15,-1) -1.35% -3.29*** -3.54*** 
 
-0.78% -2.48** -2.91*** 
 
-2.22% -2.42** -2.36** 
(0,+1) -0.45% -2.57** -2.47** 
 
-0.24% -1.28 -1.18 
 
-0.77% -2.30** -2.34** 
(+2,+10) -1.42% -3.49*** -4.07*** 
 
-0.49% -1.66* -1.38 
 
-2.87% -3.13*** -4.15*** 
 
Panel C: Uncontaminated upgrades, all bonds traded on at least ten days during Day +31 to Day +50 
  
 All (N=689) 
 
Investment Grade (N=247) 
 
Speculative Grade (N=442) 
   
(-30,-1) 0.31% 2.72*** 1.50 
 
-0.05% -0.48 -0.85 
 
0.51% 3.02*** 2.49** 
(-15,-1) 0.22% 2.58*** 1.37 
 
-0.08% -0.68 -0.60 
 
0.38% 3.36*** 2.06** 
(0,+1) 0.12% 2.75*** 2.63*** 
 
0.02% 0.34 0.63 
 
0.17% 2.99*** 2.80*** 
(+2,+10) 0.01% 0.18 -0.55 
 
0.03% 0.47 -0.34 
 
-0.00% -0.03 -0.46 
  Panel D: Uncontaminated upgrades, all bonds traded on every day during Day +31 to Day +50 
  
 All (N=137) 
 
Investment Grade (N=77) 
 
Speculative Grade (N=60) 
    
(-30,-1) -0.11% -0.36 -0.44 
 
-0.02% -0.13 -1.10 
 
-0.24% -0.34 0.29 
(-15,-1) 0.08% 0.54 -0.26 
 
0.00% -0.03 -0.99 
 
0.19% 0.60 0.41 
(0,+1) 0.21% 2.80*** 3.52*** 
 
0.04% 0.62 1.75* 
 
0.43% 2.91*** 3.19*** 
(+2,+10) 0.12% 1.01 -0.05 
 
0.07% 0.82 -0.21 
 
0.19% 0.74 0.16 
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Table V. Monthly Abnormal Bond Returns Around Bond Rating Changes 
The unit of observation is a rating change at the firm level. The sample consists of bond rating downgrades and upgrades by 
Moody's, S&P, and Fitch during September 2002 to March 2009 that affected firms with corporate bond data in TRACE. In 
Panels A and D, the samples includes all bonds that that traded in Month -1 and Month 0, where Month 0 is the calendar month 
of the rating change. In Panels B and E, the samples includes all bonds that that traded on Days -1 and +1 and on at least ten 
days during Day +31 to +50, where Day 0 is the day of the rating change. The samples in Panels C and F are the same as those 
in Panels B and E respectively, except that observations where there was contaminating news about the firm during Day -1 to 
Day +1 have been removed. Abnormal bond returns are computed as the bond’s raw return minus the contemporaneous return 
on a value-weighted index of corporate bonds matched on rating and maturity. A bond’ raw bond return in Month t includes 
accrued interest and is computed using the last transactions prices in Months t and t-1. If a firm has multiple bond issues 
affected by the same rating announcement, the firm’s monthly abnormal bond return is the market value-weighted average of 
abnormal returns on its individual bond issues.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
respectively in two-tailed tests. 
  Event 
Month 
Mean 
CAR t-stat 
signed-
rank  
Mean 
CAR t-stat 
signed-
rank  
Mean 
CAR t-stat 
signed- 
rank 
             Panel A: Downgrades, all bonds traded in Month -1 and Month 0 
  All (N=2405)   Investment Grade (N=1139)  Speculative Grade (N=1161) 
    
-1 -1.43% -9.43*** -9.80***  -0.79% -5.38*** -5.68***  -2.06% -7.84*** -8.05*** 
0 -2.29% -11.42*** -15.06***  -1.66% -8.16*** -9.60***  -2.90% -8.46*** -11.60*** 
+1 0.75% 0.62 -4.90***  0.05% 0.14 -2.64***  1.44% 0.61 -4.21*** 
  Panel B: Downgrades, full sample, bonds traded on Days -1 and +1 and on at least ten days during Day +31 to +50 
  All (N=1098)  Investment Grade (N=598)  Speculative Grade (N=500) 
    
-1 -1.41% -6.46*** -7.26***  -0.92% -3.83*** -4.40***  -1.99% -5.22*** -5.86*** 
0 -2.74% -9.24*** -12.15***  -2.17% -5.97*** -8.26***  -3.42% -7.07*** -8.87*** 
+1 -0.33% -1.04 -3.17***  -0.02% -0.06 -1.13  -0.69% -1.23 -3.28*** 
  Panel C: Downgrades, uncontaminated sample, bonds traded on Days -1 and +1 and on at least ten days during Day +31 to +50 
  All (N=615)   Investment Grade (N=298)  Speculative Grade (N=317) 
    
-1 -1.28% -4.99*** -4.77***  -0.64% -2.38** -2.18**  -1.89% -4.41*** -4.46*** 
0 -2.37% -7.18*** -8.43***  -1.69% -4.86*** -4.82***  -3.02% -5.49*** -6.88*** 
+1 -0.71% -1.93* -2.94***  0.22% 0.46 -0.29  -1.58% -2.92*** -3.51*** 
  Panel D: Upgrades, all bonds traded in Month -1 and Month 0 
  All (N=1771)  Investment Grade (N=644)  Speculative Grade (N=1127) 
    
-1 0.18% 2.95*** 2.46**  0.12% 1.43 0.42  0.21% 2.58*** 2.81*** 
0 0.30% 5.44*** 7.73***  0.20% 3.16*** 4.21***  0.36% 4.53*** 6.56*** 
+1 0.09% 1.71* 1.51  0.00% 0.03 0.23  0.15% 1.94* 1.68* 
  Panel E: Upgrades, full sample, bonds traded on Days -1 and +1 and on at least ten days during Day +31 to +50 
  All (N=589)   Investment Grade (N=243)  Speculative Grade (N=346) 
    
-1 0.07% 0.65 0.86  0.10% 1.03 0.89  0.05% 0.30 0.56 
0 0.36% 3.70*** 4.42***  0.17% 1.65 1.75*  0.49% 3.32*** 4.12*** 
+1 0.01% 0.17 1.29  0.03% 0.30 0.65  0.00% 0.03 1.06 
  Panel F: Upgrades, uncontaminated sample, bonds traded on Days -1 and +1 and on at least ten days during Day +31 to +50 
  All (N=425)   Investment Grade (N=160)  Speculative Grade (N=265) 
    
-1 0.11% 0.79 1.71*  0.26% 2.21** 1.72*  0.02% 0.09 0.96 
0 0.48% 4.71*** 4.50***  0.13% 1.38 1.51  0.69% 4.56*** 4.43*** 
+1 0.01% 0.07 0.40  0.01% 0.15 -0.20  0.00% 0.01 0.49 
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Table VI. Stock and Bond Price Reactions to Downgrades 
The unit of observation is a rating change at the firm level. The sample consists of bond rating downgrades by Moody's, S&P, 
and Fitch during September 2002 to March 2009 that affected firms with corporate bond data in TRACE and common stock data 
in CRSP. All samples are restricted to firms with non-missing stock returns in CRSP on Days 0 and +1 and corporate bonds that 
trade on Days -1 and +1 and on at least ten days during Day +31 to +50, where Day 0 is the day of the rating change. The 
“uncontaminated” sample consists of rating changes not accompanied by contaminating news during Day -1 to +1. In Panels A 
and B (C and D), “CAR” is the sum of the firm’s daily abnormal stock (bond) returns over the event window. In Panels A and B, 
daily abnormal stock returns are computed as the raw stock return minus the contemporaneous return on the CRSP value-
weighted index. Daily abnormal bond returns are computed as the bond’s raw return minus the contemporaneous return on an 
index of corporate bonds matched on rating and maturity. Daily bond prices are computed with the “trade-weighted price, all 
trades” method of Bessembinder et al. (2009). If a sample bond is not traded on a given day, the bond’s daily price for that day is 
set equal to the most recent observed daily price. If a firm has multiple bonds affected by the same rating announcement, the 
firm’s daily abnormal bond return is the market value-weighted average of abnormal returns on its individual bond issues. *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively in two-tailed tests. 
  Event 
Window 
(days) 
Mean 
CAR t-stat 
signed-
rank 
 
Mean 
CAR t-stat 
signed-
rank  
Mean 
CAR t-stat 
signed-
rank 
  Panel A: Abnormal stock returns, full sample of downgrades 
  
 All (N=775) 
 
Investment Grade (N=485) 
 
Speculative Grade (N=290) 
   
(-30,-1) -8.76% -9.33*** -8.86*** 
 
-7.35% -6.73*** -6.71*** 
 -
11.10% -6.49*** -5.86*** 
(-15,-1) -4.60% -6.49*** -6.67*** 
 
-3.71% -4.25*** -4.78*** 
 
-6.09% -5.06*** -4.75*** 
(0,+1) -2.45% -5.59*** -7.72*** 
 
-2.28% -3.80*** -5.58*** 
 
-2.74% -4.51*** -5.31*** 
(+2,+10) -0.26% -0.46 -1.70* 
 
-0.22% -0.34 -0.94 
 
-0.34% -0.31 -1.54 
  Panel B: Abnormal stock returns, uncontaminated downgrades 
  
 All (N=401) 
 
Investment Grade (N=239) 
 
Speculative Grade (N=162) 
              
(-30,-1) -7.40% -6.23*** -5.39*** 
 
-5.94% -4.79*** -4.04*** 
 
-9.55% -4.16*** -3.63*** 
(-15,-1) -3.48% -3.57*** -3.88*** 
 
-2.49% -2.10** -2.67*** 
 
-4.95% -2.98*** -2.97*** 
(0,+1) -1.68% -4.29*** -5.97*** 
 
-1.16% -2.40** -4.26*** 
 
-2.44% -3.76*** -4.14*** 
(+2,+10) -1.01% -1.31 -1.67* 
 
-0.87% -1.15 -1.18 
 
-1.23% -0.79 -1.22 
 
Panel C: Abnormal bond returns, full sample of downgrades 
  
 All (N=775) 
 
Investment Grade (N=485) 
 
Speculative Grade (N=290) 
   
(-30,-1) -3.02% -8.02*** -10.49*** 
 
-2.40% -6.80*** -8.81*** 
 
-4.05% -5.00*** -5.94*** 
(-15,-1) -1.63% -5.29*** -7.99*** 
 
-1.45% -4.51*** -6.84*** 
 
-1.94% -3.10*** -4.57*** 
(0,+1) -1.19% -5.95*** -8.59*** 
 
-1.26% -4.32*** -6.39*** 
 
-1.06% -4.95*** -5.70*** 
(+2,+10) -0.64% -2.51** -3.90*** 
 
-0.37% -1.25 -3.45*** 
 
-1.10% -2.32** -2.15** 
  Panel D: Abnormal bond returns, uncontaminated downgrades 
  
 All (N=401) 
 
Investment Grade (N=239) 
 
Speculative Grade (N=162) 
    
(-30,-1) -2.60% -5.21*** -5.83*** 
 
-1.74% -4.39*** -4.51*** 
 
-3.88% -3.58*** -3.68*** 
(-15,-1) -1.19% -3.20*** -4.03*** 
 
-0.73% -1.90* -3.07*** 
 
-1.86% -2.58** -2.85*** 
(0,+1) -0.63% -4.84*** -4.65*** 
 
-0.51% -3.10*** -2.82*** 
 
-0.81% -3.80*** -3.82*** 
(+2,+10) -0.96% -3.34*** -3.77*** 
 
-0.50% -1.81* -2.22** 
 
-1.63% -2.82*** -3.17*** 
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Table VII. Stock and Bond Price Reactions to Upgrades 
The unit of observation is a rating change at the firm level. The sample consists of bond rating upgrades by Moody's, S&P, and 
Fitch during September 2002 to March 2009 that affected firms with corporate bond data in TRACE and common stock data in 
CRSP. All samples are restricted to firms with non-missing stock returns in CRSP on Days 0 and +1 and corporate bonds that 
traded on Days -1 and +1 and on at least ten days during Day +31 to +50, where Day 0 is the day of the rating change. The 
“uncontaminated” sample consists of rating changes not accompanied by contaminating news during Day -1 to Day +1. In Panels 
A and B (C and D), “CAR” is the sum of the firm’s daily abnormal stock (bond) returns over the window. Daily abnormal stock 
returns are computed as the raw return minus the return on the CRSP value-weighted index. Daily abnormal bond returns are 
computed as the bond’s raw return minus the contemporaneous return on a value-weighted index of bonds matched on rating and 
maturity. Daily bond prices are computed with the “trade-weighted price, all trades” method of Bessembinder et al. (2009). If a 
sample bond is not traded on a given day, the bond’s daily price for that day is set equal to the most recent observed daily price. If 
a firm has multiple bond issues affected by the same rating announcement, the firm’s daily abnormal bond return is the market 
value-weighted average of abnormal returns on its individual bond issues. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively in two-tailed tests. 
  Event 
Window 
(days) 
Mean 
CAR t-stat 
signed-
rank 
 
Mean 
CAR t-stat 
signed-
rank  
Mean 
CAR t-stat 
signed-
rank 
  Panel A: Abnormal stock returns, full sample of upgrades 
  
 All (N=364) 
 
Investment Grade (N=158) 
 
Speculative Grade (N=206) 
   
(-30,-1) 1.38% 2.26** 2.67*** 
 
0.30% 0.54 0.60 
 
2.22% 2.23** 2.86*** 
(-15,-1) 0.48% 1.23 1.57 
 
0.08% 0.22 0.45 
 
0.78% 1.26 1.59 
(0,+1) 0.25% 1.65 1.69* 
 
0.16% 0.93 0.88 
 
0.32% 1.36 1.46 
(+2,+10) 0.24% 0.87 0.45 
 
0.02% 0.06 -0.38 
 
0.41% 0.98 0.85 
  Panel B: Abnormal stock returns, uncontaminated upgrades 
  
 All (N=263) 
 
Investment Grade (N=110) 
 
Speculative Grade (N=153) 
              
(-30,-1) 1.01% 1.36 2.20** 
 
0.89% 1.44 1.15 
 
1.09% 0.91 1.81* 
(-15,-1) 0.24% 0.51 1.27 
 
0.29% 0.59 0.89 
 
0.20% 0.28 0.91 
(0,+1) 0.17% 1.13 1.47 
 
0.16% 0.85 0.31 
 
0.19% 0.81 1.46 
(+2,+10) 0.15% 0.46 0.21 
 
0.00% -0.00 -0.40 
 
0.25% 0.52 0.54 
 
Panel C: Abnormal bond returns, full sample of upgrades 
  
 All (N=364) 
 
Investment Grade (N=158) 
 
Speculative Grade (N=206) 
   
(-30,-1) -0.07% -0.42 -1.61 
 
-0.15% -1.39 -3.31*** 
 
-0.01% -0.03 0.08 
(-15,-1) 0.12% 1.14 -0.08 
 
0.02% 0.29 -1.50 
 
0.20% 1.11 0.84 
(0,+1) 0.20% 3.73*** 3.92*** 
 
0.10% 1.74* 1.31 
 
0.27% 3.31*** 3.89*** 
(+2,+10) -0.05% -0.64 -0.64 
 
-0.01% -0.13 -0.90 
 
-0.07% -0.65 -0.30 
  Panel D: Abnormal bond returns, uncontaminated upgrades 
  
 All (N=263) 
 
Investment Grade (N=110) 
 
Speculative Grade (N=153) 
    
(-30,-1) -0.05% -0.25 -1.23 
 
-0.06% -0.51 -2.37** 
 
-0.04% -0.12 -0.06 
(-15,-1) 0.18% 1.69* 0.21 
 
0.13% 1.29 -0.58 
 
0.22% 1.30 0.61 
(0,+1) 0.13% 2.36** 2.80*** 
 
-0.02% -0.35 0.12 
 
0.24% 2.82*** 3.44*** 
(+2,+10) 0.01% 0.16 -0.37 
 
0.08% 0.96 -0.29 
 
-0.03% -0.29 -0.30 
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Table VIII. Tests of Determinants of the Corporate Bond Market Response to Bond Rating Changes 
The unit of observation is a rating change at the firm level. The sample consists of bond rating changes by Moody's, S&P, and Fitch during September 2002 to March 2009 
that affected firms with corporate bond data in TRACE.  The sample consists only of rating changes not accompanied by contaminating news during Day -1 to +1.The 
sample is restricted to bonds that traded on Days -1 and +1 and on at least ten days during Day +31 to +50. The dependent variable is the firm’s cumulative abnormal bond 
return over Days 0 and +1. “CAR(-15,-1) ≥ 0” (“CAR(-15,-1) ≤ 0” ) is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm’s cumulative abnormal bond return over Day -15 to Day -1 
is greater than or equal to (less than or equal to) zero and zero otherwise. “Credit Watch” is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm was placed on credit watch with the 
indicated direction prior to the rating change and zero otherwise. For downgrades (upgrades), “Second Mover” is a  dummy variable that equals one if the rating assigned by 
one or both of the other agencies at the time of the rating change is lower (higher) than the pre-downgrade (pre-upgrade) rating assigned by the agency making the rating 
change and zero otherwise. “Moody’s” (“S&P) is a dummy variable equal to one if the rating change is a Moody’s (S&P) rating change and zero otherwise. “Old Rating” is 
a rating scale integer assigned to the pre-upgrade or pre-downgrade rating (CCC- = 1, CCC = 2, CCC+ = 3, … , AAA = 19). “Across Inv. Grade” is a dummy variable equal 
to one if the downgrade (upgrade) moved the firm out of (into) investment grade and zero otherwise. “# of Grades” is the absolute value of the number of grades that the 
rating is decreased (increased) by the downgrade (upgrade).  “Recession” is a dummy variable equal to one if the rating change occurred during or after December 2007 and 
zero otherwise. All regressions are estimated with OLS. T-stats based on robust standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses below estimated 
coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively in two-tailed tests.  
   Uncontaminated Downgrades  Uncontaminated Upgrades 
          (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  CAR(-15,-1) ≥ 0 -0.51    -0.49       
(-2.30)**    (-2.24)**       
CAR(-15,-1) ≤ 0       0.26    0.28 
      (2.74)**    (2.91)*** 
Credit Watch  0.04   0.14   0.17   0.17 
 (0.16)   (0.57)   (1.72)*   (1.64) 
Moody’s   -0.52  -0.51    0.21  0.17 
  (-1.57)  (-1.46)    (1.93)*  (1.44) 
S&P   -0.31  -0.31    0.30  0.30 
  (-0.97)  (-0.94)    (2.31)**  (2.30)** 
Second Mover    0.16 0.10     0.00 0.01 
   (0.69) (0.40)     (0.01) (0.13) 
Old Rating 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06  -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
(2.66)*** (2.47)** (2.36)** (2.42)** (2.09)**  (-2.36)** (-2.38)** (-2.03)** (-2.21)** (-2.34)** 
Across Inv. Grade 0.14 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.10  0.57 0.57 0.59 0.58 0.57 
(0.37) (0.18) (0.12) (0.20) (0.26)  (3.18)*** (3.19)*** (3.28)*** (3.22)*** (3.13)*** 
# of Grades -0.09 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.11  0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 
(-0.74) (-0.65) (-0.66) (-0.73) (-0.89)  (0.07) (-0.05) (0.19) (0.07) (0.05) 
Recession -0.89 -0.90 -0.90 -0.90 -0.88  0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 
 (-3.29)*** (-3.33)*** (-3.38)*** (-3.32)*** (-3.24)***  (0.10) (-0.03) (-0.16) (-0.17) (0.17) 
Intercept -0.71 -0.90 -0.46 -0.96 -0.33  0.29 0.41 0.17 0.42 0.04 
 (-2.11)** (-2.78)** (-1.01) (-3.04)*** (-0.67)  (1.70)* (2.39)** (0.85) (2.29)** (0.17) 
Adj. R² 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03  0.05 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.06 
Observations 652 652 652 652 652  441 441 441 441 441 
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Table IX. Events Surrounding Lehman’s Bankruptcy and Abnormal Returns 
This table reports news and stock returns associated with events surrounding Lehman’s bankruptcy. The sample of “Lehman Equity Underwriting Clients” consists of 184 
industrial (non-financial, non-utility) firms that used Lehman Brothers as a lead underwriter for at least one public common stock offering during the September 14, 1998 to 
September 14, 2008 period.  Daily abnormal returns (ARs) calculated with the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model and a 260-day estimation period (Day -290 to Day -31). 
Statistical significance levels of the mean abnormal return are based on the standardized cross-sectional t-statistic of Boehmer, et al. (1991) adjusted for cross-sectional 
correlation following Kolari and Pynnönen (2010). The *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively in two-tailed tests. 
  
  Lehman Brothers  
Lehman Equity Underwriting 
Clients (N=184) 
 
 
              
Date 
Event 
Day 
Closing 
Stock 
Price  
Daily 
Raw 
Return  
Mean Daily 
AR 
Value-
Weighted 
Daily AR News 
  Aug. 29 -10 $16.09 1.4%  0.14% 0.09%  
Sep.2 -9 $16.13 0.3%  -0.42% -0.69% Korea Development Bank (KDB) CEO, Min Euoo-Sung, confirmed rumors that 
KDB was considering a potential investment in Lehman. 
Sep 3 -8 $16.94 5.0%  0.01% -0.93%  
Sep. 4 -7 $15.17 -10.5%  -0.35% -0.15%  
Sep. 5  -6 $16.2 6.8%  0.02% 0.01%  
Sep. 8 -5 $14.15 -12.7%  -0.62% -1.11%**  
Sep. 9 -4 $7.79 -45.0%  -1.31%*** -1.90%*** Dow Jones Newswire reported that KDB put talks with Lehman on hold. (2) S&P 
put Lehman's credit rating on negative "watch." 
Sep. 10 -3 $7.25 -6.9%  -0.17% -0.08% (1) Lehman announced an expected $3.9 billion loss and plans to sell a majority 
stake in its investment management division, spin off real estate assets, and cut its 
dividend. (2) Moody's put Lehman's credit rating on "watch", saying it would be 
downgraded unless Lehman could negotiate "a strategic transaction with a stronger 
financial partner." 
Sep. 11 -2 $4.22 -41.8%  -0.70%* -0.19% The Wall Street Journal reported that Lehman spent the day shopping itself to 
potential buyers, including Bank of America.  
Sep. 12 -1 $3.65 -13.5%  0.02% 0.22%  
Sep. 13 -- -- --  -- -- (1) Timothy Geithner, president of the New York Fed, called a special meeting to 
discuss Lehman's future and a possible emergency asset liquidation. (2) Lehman 
reported that it had been talking with Bank of America and Barclays for the 
company's possible sale.  
Sep. 14 -- -- --  -- -- Lehman announced that the company would file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection. 
Sep. 15 0 $0.21 -94.3%  -1.48%*** -1.76%*** First day of trading after Lehman bankruptcy announcement. 
Sep. 16 +1 $0.3 42.9%  -0.58% -0.04% Barclays announced that it had agreed to purchase, subject to regulatory approval, 
Lehman's New York headquarters and North American investment banking and 
capital markets businesses.  
Sep. 17 +2 $0.13 -56.7%  -1.09% -0.52% Lehman’s stock delisted from the NYSE at market close. 
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Table X. Summary Statistics for Lehman’s Equity Underwriting Clients 
The sample consists of 184 industrial (non-financial, non-utility) firms that used Lehman Brothers as a 
lead underwriter for at least one public common stock offering during September 14, 1998 to September 
14, 2008. This table provides descriptive statistics for the sample. Variable definitions are in Appendix 
A. 
  
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev 
25th 
Percentile Median 
75th 
Percentile N 
  # of common stock offerings 
with Lehman 
1.516 0.947 1.000 1.000 2.000 184 
Total common stock offerings 2.190 1.551 1.000 2.000 3.000 184 
Common stock proceeds raised 
with Lehman 
189 253 56 105 207 184 
Total common stock proceeds 483 665 134 265 569 184 
Lehman’s share of client’s 
common stock offerings  
0.508 0.274 0.313 0.500 0.633 184 
Lehman’s share of client’s 
common stock proceeds 
0.499 0.280 0.273 0.500 0.537 184 
Exclusive Lehman equity 
underwriting client 
0.179 0.385 0.000 0.000 0.000 184 
Lehman is lead lender 0.076 0.266 0.000 0.000 0.000 184 
Lehman is participant lender 0.152 0.360 0.000 0.000 0.000 184 
Lehman straight debt 
underwriting client 
0.065 0.248 0.000 0.000 0.000 184 
Lehman convertible debt 
underwriting client 
0.027 0.163 0.000 0.000 0.000 184 
Lehman M&A client 0.130 0.338 0.000 0.000 0.000 184 
Lehman analyst coverage 0.663 0.474 0.000 1.000 1.000 184 
Lehman NYSE specialist 0.071 0.257 0.000 0.000 0.000 184 
Lehman’s market share as a 
Nasdaq market maker 
0.060 0.027 0.044 0.061 0.076 104 
Recent IPO underwritten by 
Lehman 
0.484 0.501 0.000 0.000 1.000 184 
Proportion of outstanding shares 
owned by Lehman Brothers 
Holdings, Inc. 
0.004 0.020 0.000 0.001 0.002 184 
Proportion of outstanding shares 
owned by Neuberger Berman, 
LLC 
0.006 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.001 184 
Equity shelf registration dummy 0.087 0.283 0.000 0.000 0.000 184 
Age 12.217 12.791 4.000 9.000 15.000 184 
Z-score 4.820 9.732 1.094 2.338 4.657 184 
Market cap 2603 6402 362 1066 2220 184 
Book-to-market 0.427 0.281 0.217 0.381 0.559 168 
Net Market Leverage 0.065 0.255 -0.116 0.081 0.254 184 
Cash / Assets 0.270 0.291 0.036 0.133 0.464 184 
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Table XI. The Stock Price Reaction of Lehman’s Equity Underwriting Clients to Lehman’s 
Bankruptcy 
“Lehman Clients” are 184 non-financial, non-utility firms that employed Lehman as lead underwriter in a 
public common stock offering during Sep. 14, 1998 to Sep. 14, 2008. “Clients of IBs with Similar Industry 
Status” are 946 non-financial, non-utility firms that didn’t employ Lehman but did employ one of the 
following banks in a public common stock offering during the same period: Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, 
Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan, Citi, UBS, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Bank of America, and Wachovia. In 
Panels A, B, and C, model parameters are estimated over Day -290 to -31, where Day 0 is September 15, 
2008. In Panels D and E, abnormal returns equal the sample firm’s raw return minus the raw return of a 
matched, non-sample firm. In Panel D, matched firms are selected such that the sum of the absolute 
percentage differences between the market values of equity and book-to-market ratios of the sample firm and 
matched firm is minimized. In Panel E, each sample firm is matched to the non-sample firm in the same 
Fama-French 49 industry that is closest in market value of equity. For mean CARs, t-statistics are computed 
with the standardized cross-sectional method of Boehmer, et al. (1991) and adjusted for cross-sectional 
correlation following Kolari and Pynnönen (2010). The t-statistics for the difference in means is computed 
with the cross-sectional variances of CARs and assumes unequal variances across the two samples. The *, 
**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively in two-tailed tests. 
  
 Lehman Clients (N=184)  
Clients of IBs with Similar 
Industry Status (N=946)  Difference in Means 
             (1)  (2)  
Event Window Mean CAR t-stat  Mean CAR t-stat  (1) - (2) t-stat 
  Panel A: Fama-French-Carhart Four-Factor Model Adjusted Abnormal Returns  
  (-30,-6) 0.18% 0.25  -0.21% -0.31  0.39% 0.22 
(-5,+1) -4.85%*** -3.19  -1.91% -1.59  -2.94%*** -2.84 
(0,0) -1.48%*** -2.78  -0.66% -1.38  -0.82%** -1.98 
(0,+1) -2.07%** -2.30  -0.93%* -1.81  -1.14%* -1.84 
(+2,+30) -7.07%** -2.41  -4.42%*** -2.87  -2.65% -1.11 
(-30,+30) -11.7%** -2.54  -6.54%*** -2.84  -5.20% -1.45 
  Panel B: Fama-French Three-Factor Model Adjusted Abnormal Returns   
  (-30,-6) 0.25% 0.25  -0.12% -0.23  0.37% 0.21 
(-5,+1) -5.09%*** -3.43  -2.21%* -1.81  -2.88%*** -2.93 
(0,0) -1.46%*** -2.74  -0.64% -1.26  -0.83%* -1.97 
(0,+1) -2.17%** -2.35  -1.05%** -2.02  -1.11%* -1.86 
(+2,+30) -6.72%** -2.35  -3.90%** -2.55  -2.82% -1.13 
(-30,+30) -11.56%** -2.49  -6.23%*** -2.63  -5.33% -1.45 
  Panel C: Market Model Adjusted Abnormal Returns   
  (-30,-6) 2.42% 0.76  2.92% 1.07  -0.50% -0.27 
(-5,+1) -4.26%** -2.14  -1.23% -0.47  -3.04%*** -3.05 
(0,0) -0.18% -0.46  0.68% 0.61  -0.87%** -2.10 
(0,+1) -0.84% -0.69  0.46% 0.51  -1.29%** -2.10 
(+2,+30) -11.4%*** -2.74  -9.42%*** -2.68  -1.94% -0.81 
(-30,+30) -13.2%** -2.11  -7.73% -1.64  -5.48% -1.49 
  Panel D: Size-Book-to-Market Matched Abnormal Returns   
  (-30,-6) -2.09% -0.55  -1.54% -0.94  -0.55% -0.27 
(-5,+1) -4.77%*** -3.00  -1.29%* -1.67  -3.48%*** -2.72 
(0,0) -1.25%** -2.17  0.20% 0.25  -1.45%*** -2.83 
(0,+1) -1.95%** -1.97  -0.16% -0.47  -1.79%** -2.26 
(+2,+30) -10.9%** -2.56  -9.47%*** -3.56  -1.39% -0.43 
(-30,+30) -17.7%*** -2.90  -12.3%*** -3.59  -5.41% -1.17 
  Panel E: Industry-Size Matched Abnormal Returns   
  (-30,-6) -1.37% -0.55  -0.94% -0.78  -0.43% -0.24 
(-5,+1) -4.03%*** -3.19  -1.44%** -2.25  -2.59%** -2.34 
(0,0) -1.23%*** -2.65  0.02% -0.24  -1.24%*** -2.69 
(0,+1) -1.36%* -1.87  -0.04% -0.25  -1.33%* -1.89 
(+2,+30) -8.15%** -2.53  -5.13%** -2.36  -3.02% -1.04 
(-30,+30) -13.6%*** -3.06  -7.51%*** -2.84  -6.04% -1.52 
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Table XII. Tests of Market Beta Stability around Lehman’s Bankruptcy 
The sample consists of 184 industrial (non-financial, non-utility) firms that employed 
Lehman as a lead underwriter for at least one public common stock offering during 
September 14, 1998 to September 14, 2008.The table reports average beta estimates for 
different time periods, where Day 0 is September 15, 2008.  Average betas are estimated 
by forming an equally weighted portfolio consisting of sample firms and regressing 
portfolio returns on the CRSP value weighted index. The alternative hypothesis in the 
Chow Test is that the sample average beta for the given period differs from the sample 
average beta during the estimation period (-290,-31). The *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance in the Chow test (two-tailed) at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
  
Time Interval 
Average 
Market Beta 
Chow Test of Beta Stability 
(relative to the (-290,-31) period) 
 
  Estimation Period 
 (-290, -31) 
 
1.071 
 
-- 
 
Pre-Event Period 
 (-30,-6) 
 
1.072 
 
0.01 
 
Event Periods     
 (-5,+10) 0.959 -1.01  
 (-5,+20) 1.036 -0.50  
 (-5,+30) 1.044 -0.47  
 (-5,+40) 1.008 -0.88  
 (-5,+50) 1.064 -0.11  
  
150 
 
 
Table XIII. The Stock Price Reaction of Firms that Received Debt Underwriting, M&A Advisory, 
NYSE Specialist, and Analyst Coverage Services from Lehman 
In Panel A, the sample consists of 53 industrial (non-financial, non-utility) firms that used Lehman as a 
lead underwriter for at least one public straight debt offering during September 14, 1998 to September 
14, 2008. In Panel B, the sample consists of 7 industrial firms that used Lehman as a lead underwriter 
for at least one public convertible debt offering during the same period. In Panel C, the sample consists 
of 87 industrial firms that used Lehman as a financial advisor on a completed acquisition announced 
during the same time period. In Panel D, the sample consists of 151 industrial firms listed on the NYSE 
for which Lehman was the NYSE specialist at the time of Lehman’s bankruptcy. In Panel E, the sample 
consists of 633 industrial firms for which an analyst from Lehman made at least one earnings forecast 
during the firm’s current fiscal quarter or last fiscal quarter. The “Equity Underwriting” samples consist 
of firms that also received equity underwriting services from Lehman. Day 0 is September 15, 2008. 
Abnormal returns are estimated using the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model and a 260-day 
estimation period (-290,-31). All t-statistics are computed with the standardized cross-sectional method 
of Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991) and adjusted for cross-sectional correlation following 
Kolari and Pynnönen (2010). The t-statistic for the difference in means is computed with the cross-
sectional variances of CARs and assumes unequal variances across the two samples. The *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively in two-tailed t-tests. 
  Event 
Window 
Mean 
CAR t-stat 
 Mean 
CAR t-stat   
Mean 
CAR t-stat  
  Panel A: Lehman Public Straight Debt Underwriting Clients   
  
 All (N=53) 
 Equity Underwriting 
(N=12) 
 No Equity Underwriting 
(N=41) 
            (-30,-6) 2.55%* 1.85  -1.20% -0.89   3.65%** 2.13  
(-5,+1) -0.37% -0.01  -7.29%* -2.27   1.66% 1.66  
(0,0) 0.25% 0.63  -2.08% -1.74   0.93%** 2.13  
(0,+1) -0.88% -0.98  -4.08%** -2.31   0.06% 0.44  
(+2,+30) -7.72%** -2.10  -20.62%* -2.09   -3.95% -1.24  
(-30,+30) -5.54% -0.82  -29.11%** -2.96   1.36% 0.49  
  Panel B: Lehman Public Convertible Debt Underwriting Clients    
  
 All (N=7) 
 Equity Underwriting 
(N=5) 
 No Equity Underwriting 
(N=2) 
            (-30,-6) 2.96% 1.03  3.75% 1.02   0.99% 0.21  
(-5,+1) -5.25% -1.24  -7.17% -1.33   -0.46% 0.04  
(0,0) -2.98% -1.57  -2.28% -1.09   -4.74% -3.13  
(0,+1) -1.18% -0.68  -0.69% -0.47   -2.43% -1.32  
(+2,+30) -12.27% -1.31  -9.34% -0.7   -19.58% -4.87  
(-30,+30) -14.56% -1.09  -12.76% -0.75   -19.05% -1.39  
  Panel C: Lehman M&A Clients       
  
 All (N=87) 
 Equity Underwriting 
(N=24) 
 No Equity Underwriting 
(N=63) 
            (-30,-6) 3.02%* 1.68  5.56%* 1.84   2.05% 1.14  
(-5,+1) 1.30% 1.06  0.43% 0.14   1.63% 1.21  
(0,0) 0.47% 0.42  -0.86% -0.90   0.97% 0.64  
(0,+1) 0.49% 0.36  -0.37% -0.09   0.82% 0.43  
(+2,+30) -8.54%** -2.17  -8.86%** -2.20   -8.42%* -1.70  
(-30,+30) -4.22% -0.68  -2.87% -0.55   -4.74% -0.56  
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Table XIII-Continued 
  Panel D: Lehman is the NYSE Specialist       
  
 All (N=151) 
 Equity Underwriting 
(N=13) 
 No Equity Underwriting 
(N=138) 
            (-30,-6) 0.65% 0.37  4.31% 1.66   0.31% 0.16  
(-5,+1) 0.03% 0.27  -1.47% -0.17   0.17% 0.32  
(0,0) -0.07% 0.08  1.92% 1.45   -0.26% -0.14  
(0,+1) -0.70% -0.93  1.91%* 2.13   -0.95% -1.20  
(+2,+30) -7.84%** -2.54  -16.63%** -2.25   -7.01%** -2.23  
(-30,+30) -7.16%* -1.68  -13.80% -1.15   -6.54% -1.53  
  Panel E: Firms Receiving Analyst Coverage from Lehman    
  
 All (N=633) 
 Equity Underwriting 
(N=122) 
 No Equity Underwriting 
(N=511) 
            (-30,-6) 1.40% 1.32  1.81% 0.54   1.30% 1.36  
(-5,+1) -0.38% -0.02  -4.20%** -2.55   0.54% 0.93  
(0,0) -0.11% 0.07  -0.99%* -1.92   0.10% 0.66  
(0,+1) -0.16% -0.39  -0.55% -1.08   -0.06% -0.08  
(+2,+30) -5.33%** -2.83  -5.84%* -1.93   -5.21%*** -2.60  
(-30,+30) -4.31%* -1.76  -8.23%* -1.82   -3.37% -1.39  
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Table XIV. Cross- Sectional Analysis of Lehman’s Equity Underwriting Clients’ Stock 
Price Reaction to Lehman's Bankruptcy 
The sample consists of 184 industrial (non-financial, non-utility) firms that used Lehman 
Brothers as a lead underwriter for at least one public common stock offering during 
September 14, 1998 to September 14, 2008. All regressions are estimated using the portfolio 
weighted least squares (PWLS) approach of Chandra and Balachandran (1992) over Day -
290 to Day +10 using a two-day event period (Day 0 and Day +1) and the Fama-French-
Carhart four-factor model. Day 0 is September 15, 2008. The reported coefficients represent 
the marginal effect of the independent variable on the client’s two-day percentage CAR. All 
variable definitions are in Appendix A. All t-statistics are reported in parentheses below 
estimated coefficients. The *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels respectively in two-tailed tests. 
  
      (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)    (5) 
  Ln(1 + # of common stock 
offerings with Lehman) 
-1.51*  -1.54* -1.434* -1.444* 
(-1.88)  (-1.92) (-1.80) (-1.72) 
Lehman’s share of client’s 
common stock offerings  
 -0.934   -0.652 
 (-0.92)   (-0.62) 
Lehman is lead lender -2.548** -2.834** -2.392** -2.622** -2.440** 
 (-2.25) (-2.52) (-2.17) (-2.37) (-2.22) 
Lehman is participant lender -0.34 -0.53 -0.18 -0.378 -0.214 
 (-0.46) (-0.73) (-0.25) (-0.52) (-0.29) 
Proportion of outstanding 
shares owned by Lehman 
Brothers Holdings Inc 
-18.652 -19.66 -18.576 -18.328 -19.378 
(-1.14) (-1.20) (-1.14) (-1.12) (-1.18) 
Proportion of outstanding 
shares owned by Neuberger 
Berman LLC 
-13.632 -14.454 -7.668 -12.27 -6.254 
(-0.81) (-0.84) (-0.46) (-0.73) (-0.37) 
Equity shelf registration 
dummy 
1.782 1.848 1.896 1.824 1.874 
 (1.42) (1.48) (1.51) (1.45) (1.50) 
Ln(age) 0.582 0.702* 0.684* 0.772** 0.712* 
(1.56) (1.88) (1.86) (2.08) (1.94) 
Ln(market cap) 0.508* 0.452* 0.606** 0.356 0.578** 
(1.90) (1.67) (2.24) (1.37) (2.11) 
Net Market Leverage -1.896 -2.074    
 (-1.14) (-1.22)    
Cash /  Assets   3.68**  3.728** 
   (2.06)  (2.07) 
Z-score    0.08**  
    (2.09)  
Underwriting relationship 
scope index 
-2.438** -2.798** -2.458** -2.432** -2.472** 
(-2.05) (-2.34) (-2.07) (-2.05) (-2.09) 
Intercept -2.296 -2.562 -4.218* -2.254 -3.820* 
 (-1.11) (-1.21) (-1.95) (-1.09) (-1.74) 
# Firms 184 184 184 184 184 
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Table XV. Cross-Sectional Analysis of Lehman Debt Underwriting Clients’ Stock Price Reaction  
to Lehman's Bankruptcy 
The sample consists of 56 industrial (non-financial, non-utility) firms that used Lehman Brothers as a lead 
underwriter for  at least one public debt (straight or convertible) offering during September 14, 1998 to 
September 14, 2008. All regressions are estimated using the portfolio weighted least squares (PWLS) 
approach of Chandra and Balachandran (1992) over Day -290 to Day +10 using a two-day event period (Day 
0 and Day +1) and the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model. Day 0 is September 15, 2008. The reported 
coefficients represent the marginal effect of the independent variable on the client’s two-day percentage 
CAR. All variable definitions are in Appendix A. All t-stats are reported in parentheses below estimated 
coefficients. The *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively 
in two-tailed tests. 
      (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5) 
  Ln(1+ # of debt offerings with 
Lehman) 
0.886  0.664 0.976 0.554 
(1.27)  (0.96) (1.41) (0.77) 
Lehman’s share of client’s debt 
offerings 
 2.448   0.878 
 (1.12)   (0.40) 
Lehman convertible debt 
underwriting client 
1.366 1.534 -1.506 2.096 -0.632 
(0.63) (0.71) (-0.62) (0.88) (-0.25) 
Lehman is lead lender -2.14* -1.882 -1.634 -1.874 -1.868 
 (-1.69) (-1.50) (-1.32) (-1.45) (-1.42) 
Lehman is participant lender 1.07 1.718* 1.404 1.188 1.366 
 (1.15) (1.71) (1.53) (1.24) (1.28) 
Proportion of outstanding shares 
owned by Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc 
-40.82** -45.278** -46.028** -38.632* -45.432** 
(-1.98) (-2.14) (-2.26) (-1.89) (-2.15) 
Proportion of outstanding shares 
owned by Neuberger Berman 
LLC 
-46.75** -47.492** -50.298** -48.85** -44.058** 
(-2.14) (-2.18) (-2.32) (-2.26) (-2.06) 
Debt shelf registration dummy 0.116 -0.724 0.252 0.912 -0.316 
(0.07) (-0.45) (0.16) (0.57) (-0.19) 
Ln(age) 0.706 0.686 0.666 0.776 0.368 
(1.49) (1.45) (1.49) (1.57) (0.76) 
Ln(market cap) -0.26 0 -0.18 -0.306 -0.01 
 (-0.81) (-0.00) (-0.57) (-0.97) (-0.03) 
Net Market Leverage -4.584 -4.052   2.632 
 (-1.44) (-1.23)   (0.53) 
Cash /  Assets   12.442***  15.386** 
   (2.81)  (2.43) 
Z-score    0.114 0.436 
    (0.36) (1.10) 
Underwriting relationship scope 
index 
-3.452** -3.584** -3.656** -3.86** -3.404** 
(-2.04) (-2.07) (-2.38) (-2.36) (-2.00) 
Intercept 3.116 0.806 1.414 2.506 -1.428 
 (0.85) (0.21) (0.39) (0.66) (-0.36) 
# Firms   56   56   56   56   56 
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Table XVI. Cross-Sectional Analysis of Lehman M&A Clients’ Stock Price Reaction to 
Lehman's Bankruptcy  
The sample consists of 87 industrial (non-financial, non-utility) firms that employed Lehman 
as a financial advisor in a completed acquisition of a U.S. target announced during September 
14, 1998 to September 14, 2008..All regressions are estimated using the portfolio weighted 
least squares (PWLS) approach of Chandra and Balachandran (1992) over Day -290 to Day 
+10 using a two-day event period (Day 0 and Day +1) and the Fama-French-Carhart four-
factor model. Day 0 is September 15, 2008. The reported coefficients represent the marginal 
effect of the independent variable on the client’s two-day percentage CAR. All variable 
definitions are in Appendix A. All t-stats are reported in parentheses below estimated 
coefficients. The *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
respectively in two-tailed tests. 
  
     (1)    (2)    (3) 
  Ln(1+ # of M&A deals with Lehman) -1.262*  -1.508* 
(-1.75)  (-1.80) 
Lehman’s share of client’s M&A deals  -0.158 0.668 
 (-0.15) (0.56) 
Lehman is lead lender -3.514** -3.418** -3.576** 
 (-2.24) (-2.19) (-2.29) 
Lehman is participant lender 0.100 0.004 0.086 
 (0.13) (0.00) (0.11) 
Proportion of outstanding shares owned by 
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc 
78.574 49.104 78.196 
(0.61) (0.39) (0.61) 
Proportion of outstanding shares owned by 
Neuberger Berman LLC 
-77.404 -87.666 -67.684 
(-1.39) (-1.50) (-1.10) 
Pending M&A deal with Lehman 2.658 2.552 2.816 
 (1.27) (1.24) (1.36) 
Ln(age) 0.272 0.334 0.314 
(0.57) (0.69) (0.65) 
Ln(market cap) -0.212 -0.292 -0.18 
 (-0.93) (-1.27) (-0.76) 
Z-score 0.200* 0.220* 0.182 
 (1.80) (1.91) (1.53) 
Intercept 2.090 1.62 1.55 
 (1.17) (0.76) (0.72) 
# Firms   87   87   87 
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Table XVII. Cross-Sectional Analysis of Lehman NYSE Market Making Clients’ Stock 
Price Reaction to Lehman's Bankruptcy 
The sample consists of 150 industrial (non-financial, non-utility) firms listed on the NYSE 
for which Lehman was the NYSE specialist at the time of Lehman’s bankruptcy 
announcement. All regressions are estimated using the portfolio weighted least squares 
(PWLS) approach of Chandra and Balachandran (1992) over Day -290 to Day +10 using a 
two-day event period (Day 0 and Day +1) and the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model. 
Day 0 is September 15, 2008. The reported coefficients represent the marginal effect of the 
independent variable on the client’s two-day percentage CAR. All variable definitions are in 
Appendix A. All t-stats are reported in parentheses below estimated coefficients. The *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively in two-
tailed tests. 
  
     (1)    (2)    (3) 
  Share turnover -1.596  -3.088 
(-0.62)  (-1.12) 
Proportion of outstanding shares 
owned by non-Lehman institutions 
 1.516 2.828* 
 (0.97) (1.87) 
Lehman is lead lender -4.454 -4.126 -4.094 
 (-1.64) (-1.52) (-1.51) 
Lehman is participant lender 0.394 0.348 0.178 
 (0.47) (0.41) (0.21) 
Proportion of outstanding shares 
owned by Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc 
-9.292 -18.338 -22.642 
(-0.13) (-0.26) (-0.32) 
Proportion of outstanding shares 
owned by Neuberger Berman LLC 
16.502 15.832 15.278 
(1.51) (1.44) (1.39) 
Ln(age) 0.028 0.062 0.036 
(0.08) (0.19) (0.11) 
Ln(market cap) 0.226 0.244 0.224 
 (1.10) (1.17) (1.09) 
Z-score 0.224* 0.236** 0.268** 
 (1.96) (2.00) (2.22) 
Intercept -3.014* -4.82** -4.958** 
 (-1.74) (-2.28) (-2.35) 
# Firms  150   150   150 
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Table XVIII. Cross-Sectional Analysis of Firms’ Receiving Analysts Coverage Stock 
Price Reaction to Lehman's Bankruptcy 
The sample consists of 633 industrial (non-financial, non-utility) firms for which an 
analyst from Lehman made at least one earnings forecast during the firm’s current fiscal 
quarter or last fiscal quarter. All regressions are estimated using the portfolio weighted 
least squares (PWLS) approach of Chandra and Balachandran (1992) over Day -290 to 
Day +10 using a two-day event period (Day 0 and Day +1) and the Fama-French-Carhart 
four-factor model. Day 0 is September 15, 2008. The reported coefficients represent the 
marginal effect of the independent variable on the client’s two-day percentage CAR. All 
variable definitions are in Appendix A. All t-stats are reported in parentheses below 
estimated coefficients. The *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels respectively in two-tailed tests. 
  
     (1)     (2)   (3)    (4) 
  Ln(# of non-Lehman analysts) 0.172 -0.088  -0.106 
(0.64) (-0.31)  (-0.29) 
Proportion of outstanding shares 
owned by non-Lehman 
institutions 
 1.664** 1.644** 1.69** 
 (2.06) (2.05) (2.20) 
Lehman is lead lender  -1.682** -1.676** -1.682** 
  (-2.13) (-2.12) (-2.13) 
Lehman is participant lender  0.042 0.034 0.038 
  (0.13) (0.10) (0.11) 
Proportion of outstanding shares 
owned by Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc 
 54.662 54.804 55.012 
 (1.52) (1.52) (1.53) 
Proportion of outstanding shares 
owned by Neuberger Berman 
LLC 
 -26.658** -26.688** -26.614** 
 (-2.44) (-2.44) (-2.45) 
Ln(age)  0.426* 0.424* 0.416* 
 (1.86) (1.90) (1.91) 
Ln(market cap)   -0.01 0.014 
   (-0.08) (0.09) 
Z-score  0.12*** 0.118*** 0.118*** 
  (3.94) (3.85) (3.94) 
Intercept -0.592 -2.928** -3.05** -2.994** 
 (-0.74) (-2.40) (-2.12) (-2.08) 
# Firms   633    631   631   631 
  
157 
 
Table XIX. Pooled Cross-Sectional Analysis of Lehman Clients’ Stock Price Reaction to Lehman’s Bankruptcy 
The sample consists of 807 industrial (non-financial, non-utility) firms that received at least one of the following services 
from Lehman Brothers: underwriting of a public common stock, public straight debt, or public convertible debt offering  
during September 14, 1998 to September 14, 2008; financial advisory service in a completed acquisition of a U.S. target 
announced during September 14, 1998 to September 14, 2008; market making service as the NYSE specialist at the time of 
Lehman’s bankruptcy; coverage (at least one earnings forecast) by an equity analyst from Lehman during the firm’s current 
fiscal quarter or last fiscal quarter, where the current fiscal quarter contains September 15, 2008. All regressions are estimated 
using the portfolio weighted least squares (PWLS) approach of Chandra and Balachandran (1992) over Day-290 to Day +10 
using a two-day event period (Day 0 and Day +1) and the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model. Day 0 is September 15, 
2008. The reported coefficients represent the marginal effect of the independent variable on the client’s two-day percentage 
CAR. All variable definitions are in Appendix A. All t-statistics are reported in parentheses below estimated coefficients. The 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively in two-tailed tests. 
      (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)    (7) 
  Lehman equity underwriting 
client 
-1.71*** -1.27***      
(-3.25) (-2.70)      
Ln(1+ # of common stock 
offerings with Lehman) 
    -
2.815*** 
-2.36*** -2.20*** 
    (-4.77) (-4.45) (-4.26) 
Lehman straight debt 
underwriting client 
-0.477 -0.034      
(-1.42) (-0.09)      
Ln(1+ # of straight debt 
offerings with Lehman) 
    0.417 0.560 0.639 
    (1.03) (1.48) (1.46) 
Lehman convertible debt 
underwriting client 
-0.292 0.079      
(-0.14) (0.04)      
Ln(1+ # of convertible debt 
offerings with Lehman) 
    -1.753 -1.496 -1.259 
    (-0.26) (-0.22) (-0.19) 
Lehman M&A client 0.911*** 1.021*** 0.991*** 1.034***    
 (2.74) (3.07) (2.95) (3.11)    
Ln(1+ # of M&A deals with 
Lehman) 
    0.871** 1.15*** 1.19*** 
    (1.97) (2.64) (2.81) 
Lehman NYSE specialist -0.091 -0.002 -0.069 0.027 -0.196 -0.134 -0.145 
 (-0.26) (-0.01) (-0.20) (0.08) (-0.56) (-0.39) (-0.42) 
Lehman analyst coverage 0.692* 0.703 0.802** 0.693 0.451 0.517 0.520 
 (1.69) (1.60) (1.99) (1.58) (1.10) (1.19) (1.20) 
Underwriting relationship scope 
index 
  -1.16*** -0.75**   -0.190 
  (-3.48) (-2.17)   (-0.50) 
Lehman is lead lender  -2.89***  -2.81***  -3.167*** -3.05*** 
  (-3.76)  (-3.65)  (-4.06) (-3.96) 
Lehman is participant lender  -0.151  0.02  -0.084 -0.014 
  (-0.46)  (0.06)  (-0.27) (-0.04) 
Proportion of outstanding shares 
owned by Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc 
 -19.216  -18.733  -15.698 -14.879 
 (-1.26)  (-1.22)  (-1.02) (-0.96) 
Proportion of outstanding shares 
owned by Neuberger Berman 
LLC 
 -8.435  -9.358  -8.264 -8.076 
 (-0.96)  (-1.06)  (-0.93) (-0.92) 
Ln(age) 
 0.468**  0.507**  0.463** 0.46** 
 (2.34)  (2.49)  (2.29) (2.29) 
Ln(market cap)  -0.121  -0.073  -0.139 -0.141 
 (-1.02)  (-0.63)  (-1.21) (-1.23) 
Z-score  0.118***  0.114***  0.112*** 0.11*** 
  (4.05)  (3.95)  (3.90) (3.90) 
Intercept -0.645 -1.500 -0.759 -2.048* -0.472 -1.114 -1.072 
 (-1.21) (-1.36) (-1.48) (-1.91) (-0.90) (-1.04) (-1.00) 
# Firms 807 804 807 804 807 804 804 
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Table XX. Summary Statistics for Lehman’s Borrowers 
In Panel A, the unit of observation is a sample firm. Summary statistics are reported for a 
sample of 115 industrial (non-financial, non-utility) firms in Dealscan, CRSP, and 
Compustat that had active syndicated loans from Lehman Brothers at the time of 
Lehman’s bankruptcy. In Panel B, the unit of observation is a sample firm’s loan (credit 
facility). Summary statistics are reported for the active loans that sample firms had with 
Lehman as a lender at the time of Lehman’s bankruptcy.  “Term Loans” include straight 
term loans without delay draw provisions. “Other Loans” include delay draw term loans 
and bridge loans. All variable definitions are in Appendix B.  
  
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev 
25
th
 
Percentile Median 
75
th
 
Percentile N 
  Panel A: Summary Statistics on Sample Firms     
  Lead lender dummy 0.21 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 115 
Equity underwriter 
dummy 
0.30 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 115 
Debt underwriter dummy 0.24 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 115 
Investment grade dummy 0.37 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 115 
Speculative grade dummy 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 115 
Market cap 19,175 37,869 1,086 3,693 16,831 115 
Assets 18,422 35,368 1,723 4,731 15,366 115 
Age 22.16 22.35 6.25 13.50 35.83 115 
Market-to-book assets 1.66 0.62 1.24 1.47 1.99 115 
Leverage 0.38 0.23 0.23 0.35 0.49 115 
ROA 0.14 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.17 115 
Cash/assets 0.07 0.11 0.01 0.04 0.09 115 
Undrawn Lehman credit 
line/assets 
0.008 0.010 0.002 0.005 0.01 76 
  Panel B: Summary Statistics on Sample Firms’ Loans   
      Revolving Credit Lines       
Loan amount 1,014 1,621 100 400 1,200 128 
Loan amount / assets 0.106 0.120 0.039 0.071 0.115 128 
Original maturity 4.976 0.907 5.000 5.000 5.000 128 
# of syndicate lenders 14.898 12.458 7.000 12.000 20.000 128 
Term Loans       
Loan amount 521 740 173 323 575 84 
Loan amount / assets 0.202 0.242 0.050 0.109 0.265 84 
Original maturity 5.899 1.422 5.000 6.000 7.000 84 
# of syndicate lenders 10.583 9.860 5.000 7.000 12.500 84 
Other Loans       
Loan amount 1,200 1,847 100 225 1,400 14 
Loan amount / assets 0.072 0.057 0.044 0.051 0.106 14 
Original maturity 5.232 3.360 2.000 5.500 7.000 14 
# of syndicate lenders 9.286 4.445 7.000 8.000 15.000 14 
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Table XXI. The Stock Price Reaction of Lehman’s Borrowers to Lehman’s Bankruptcy 
The “Lehman Borrowers” sample consists of 115 industrial (non-financial, non-utility) firms in Dealscan, CRSP, and 
Compustat that had active syndicated loans with Lehman Brothers acting as a lender at the time of Lehman’s bankruptcy. 
The “Control Borrowers of Other Banks” sample consists of industrial firms in Dealscan, Compustat, and CRSP with 
active syndicated loans from other banks at the time of Lehman’s bankruptcy that did not take out any loans from 
Lehman during Sep. 2003 to Sep. 2008 and is constructed by matching each “Lehman Borrower” to the non-Lehman 
borrower that is closest in size (percentage difference in market capitalization of equity), subject to the constraint that the 
control firm is in the same Fama-French industry (17 industry classifications) and the same broad credit rating category 
(investment grade, speculative grade, or unrated) as the “Lehman Borrower.” Daily abnormal returns are estimated 
separately with the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model, the Fama-French three-factor model, and the market model. 
Day 0 is Sep. 15, 2008. Model parameters are estimated over the (-290,-31) period. “CAR” is the cumulative daily 
abnormal return over the event window. For “Lehman Borrowers” and “Control Borrowers of other Banks,” the t-statistic 
(signed rank statistic) tests whether the mean standardized CAR (median CAR) differs from zero. For “Differences” the t-
statistic tests whether the mean standardized paired difference in CARs differs from zero and the signed rank statistic 
tests whether the median paired difference in CARs differs from zero.  All t-statistics are computed with the standardized 
cross-sectional method of Boehmer et al. (1991) and are adjusted for cross-sectional correlation following Kolari and 
Pynnönen (2010). *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively in two-tailed 
tests. 
  
 Lehman Borrowers (N=115) 
 Control Borrowers of other 
Banks (N=115)  Difference 
             (1)    (2)      
Event 
Window 
Mean 
CAR t-stat 
signed-
rank 
 Mean 
CAR t-stat 
signed-
rank  (1)-(2) t-stat 
signed-
rank 
  Panel A: Fama-French-Carhart Four-Factor Model Adjusted Abnormal Returns   
 
 
  
(-30,-6) -1.33% -0.07 -0.24  1.46% 0.92 0.47  -2.79% -0.58 -0.37 
(-5,+1) -3.37% -1.82* -2.01**  -0.22% 0.20 0.39  -3.15% -2.16** -1.92* 
(0,0) -1.11% -1.20 -1.15  0.01% 0.17 0.00  -1.12% -1.57 -0.95 
(0,+1) -2.60% -2.50** -3.35***  -0.10% -0.14 -0.86  -2.50% -2.58** -2.19** 
(+2,+30) -9.9% -3.4*** -4.33***  -10.4% -3.3*** -3.9***  0.44% 0.02 -0.40 
  Panel B: Fama-French Three-Factor Model Adjusted Abnormal Returns 
  
(-30,-6) -1.30% -0.06 -0.15  1.50% 0.98 0.53  -2.80% -0.60 -0.40 
(-5,+1) -3.54% -2.10** -2.70***  -0.32% 0.39 0.28  -3.22% -2.38** -2.44** 
(0,0) -1.12% -1.18 -1.06  0.02% 0.32 -0.01  -1.14% -1.59 -0.90 
(0,+1) -2.68% -2.7*** -3.75***  -0.14% -0.08 -0.78  -2.54% -2.70*** -2.40** 
(+2,+30) -9.87% -3.2*** -3.99***  -10.2% -3.3*** -3.8***  0.31% 0.06 -0.28 
  Panel C: Market Model Adjusted Abnormal Returns 
  
(-30,-6) 0.79% 0.63 1.47  4.16% 1.56 2.31**  -3.37% -0.72 -0.57 
(-5,+1) -3.01% -1.63 -1.94*  0.30% 0.74 1.04  -3.31% -2.47** -2.33** 
(0,0) -0.62% -0.69 0.11  0.50% 1.20 1.26  -1.12% -1.93* -1.21 
(0,+1) -1.95% -1.92* -2.03**  0.68% 0.92 0.45  -2.63% -2.87*** -2.49** 
(+2,+30) -12.4% -3.5*** -4.91***  -13.3% -3.6*** -4.8***  0.88% 0.25 -0.19 
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Table XXII. Correlation Matrix 
  
The sample consists of 115 industrial (non-financial, non-utility) firms in Dealscan, CRSP, and Compustat that had active syndicated loans with Lehman Brothers 
acting as a lender at the time of Lehman’s bankruptcy. “CAR(-5,+1)” is the cumulative abnormal return over Day-5 to +1 estimated with the Fama-French-Carhart 
four-factor model. All other variable definitions are in Appendix B.  P-values are reported in parentheses below correlation coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively in two-tailed tests. 
  
 
CAR 
(-5,+1) 
Lead 
lender 
dummy 
Equity 
under-
writer 
dummy 
Debt 
under-
writer 
dummy 
Invest-
ment 
grade 
dummy 
Ln(mark
et cap) Ln(age) 
Market-
to-book 
assets Leverage ROA 
Cash/ 
assets 
  Lead lender dummy -0.30*** --          
 (0.00)           
Equity underwriter dummy -0.23*** 0.26*** --         
 (0.01) (0.00)          
Debt underwriter dummy 0.11 -0.04 -0.08 --        
 (0.22) (0.68) (0.38)         
Investment grade dummy 0.21** -0.23*** -0.39*** 0.33*** --       
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)        
Ln(market cap) 0.21** -0.26*** -0.31*** 0.37*** 0.69*** --      
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)       
Ln(age) 0.15* -0.16* -0.36*** 0.19** 0.49*** 0.48*** --     
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)      
Market-to-book assets 0.00 0.00 -0.05 -0.02 0.15* 0.30*** 0.09 --    
 (0.99) (0.99) (0.54) (0.84) (0.08) (0.00) (0.31)     
Leverage -0.02 0.14 0.25*** -0.16* -0.39*** -0.50*** -0.22** 0.10 --   
 (0.85) (0.10) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.24)    
ROA 0.15* -0.07 -0.01 0.03 0.25*** 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.48*** 0.17* --  
 (0.09) (0.41) (0.90) (0.69) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05)   
Cash/assets 0.05 0.09 -0.08 -0.20** -0.06 0.00 -0.12 0.29*** -0.15* 0.01 -- 
 (0.57) (0.28) (0.34) (0.02) (0.46) (0.98) (0.18) (0.00) (0.09) (0.89)  
Undrawn Lehman credit line 
/ assets 
-0.02 0.33*** 0.20* -0.05 -0.27** -0.40*** -0.15 0.15 0.29*** -0.01 0.05 
(0.83) (0.00) (0.06) (0.64) (0.01) (0.00) (0.16) (0.17) (0.01) (0.92) (0.62) 
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Table XXIII. Multivariate Analyses of Borrower Abnormal Returns 
The sample consists of 115 industrial (non-financial, non-utility) firms in Dealscan, CRSP, and Compustat that had active 
syndicated loans with Lehman Brothers acting as a lender at the time of Lehman’s bankruptcy. All regressions are estimated 
with the portfolio weighted least squares (PWLS) approach of Chandra and Balachandran (1992) over Day -290 to Day +10 
using a seven-day event period (-5,+1) and the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model. Day 0 is September 15, 2008. The 
reported coefficients represent the marginal effect of the independent variable on the client’s (-5,+1) percentage CAR. In 
specifications (5) through (8), the sample consists of only those firms with non-missing data on the amount of undrawn credit 
lines from Lehman. All variable definitions are in Appendix B. All specifications include industry dummies (coefficients 
unreported) that correspond to the 12 Fama-French industry classifications.  T-statistics are reported in parentheses below 
estimated coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively in two-tailed 
tests. 
       (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)   (7)   (8) 
  Lead lender dummy -3.150** -3.248** -3.514** -3.402** -3.212* -2.772* -3.27** -2.981* 
(-2.19) (-2.28) (-2.44) (-2.33) (-1.95) (-1.67) (-1.99) (-1.77) 
Equity underwriter 
dummy 
-2.814** -2.779** -2.821** -2.744** -4.46*** -4.9*** -4.3*** -4.2*** 
(-2.07) (-2.10) (-2.09) (-2.06) (-2.79) (-3.03) (-2.68) (-2.63) 
Debt underwriter dummy 1.204 0.896 1.232 1.085 -1.827 -1.358 -1.722 -0.994 
(1.09) (0.75) (1.10) (0.91) (-1.22) (-0.91) (-1.16) (-0.66) 
Investment grade dummy 1.407*   0.378 -0.917 -0.511 -0.63 0.595 
(1.66)   (0.27) (-0.52) (-0.29) (-0.36) (0.32) 
Ln(market cap)  0.504*  0.091 0.455 0.385 0.245 0.063 
  (1.67)  (0.18) (0.70) (0.59) (0.39) (0.09) 
Ln(age)   1.155** 1.050* 1.372* 1.519* 1.386* 1.148 
  (2.18) (1.75) (1.73) (1.89) (1.74) (1.42) 
Market-to-book assets -2.261** -2.590* -2.541** -2.583* -2.457 -2.653* -2.226 -2.289 
 (-1.77) (-1.95) (-1.96) (-1.96) (-1.55) (-1.66) (-1.41) (-1.44) 
Leverage -1.701 -1.148 -1.533 -0.924 -2.66 -1.813 -2.387 -0.441 
 (-0.52) (-0.34) (-0.49) (-0.27) (-0.54) (-0.36) (-0.48) (-0.09) 
ROA 33.89** 34.29*** 32.5*** 31.8*** 28.9** 30.8** 28.1** 32.5** 
 (2.87) (2.87) (2.77) (2.71) (2.08) (2.20) (2.02) (2.27) 
Cash /assets 0.490 0.455 3.346 3.654 -2.324 -21.525 -1.302 -21.049 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.45) (0.49) (-0.18) (-1.30) (-0.10) (-1.25) 
Undrawn Lehman credit 
line / assets 
    -49.18 -120.8*   
    (-0.83) (-1.73)   
(Undrawn Lehman credit 
line / 
assets)x(Cash/assets) 
     2576**   
     (2.10)   
Large undrawn Lehman 
credit line dummy 
      -1.322 -3.318* 
      (-1.18) (-1.82) 
(Large undrawn Lehman 
credit line 
dummy)x(Cash/assets) 
       43.16* 
       (1.93) 
R² 0.37 0.37 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.42 0.41 0.44 
# Firms 115 115 115 115 76 76 76 76 
  
162 
 
Table XXIV. Abnormal Profitability and Investment after Lehman’s Failure 
The sample consists of 111  industrial (non-financial, non-utility) firms in Dealscan, CRSP, 
and Compustat that had active syndicated loans with Lehman Brothers acting as a lender at 
the time of Lehman’s bankruptcy and that survived to the end of fiscal Year 0, where fiscal 
Year 0 is the fiscal year of Lehman’s bankruptcy. In Panels A and B, abnormal profitability 
of sample firm i in fiscal Year t is defined as: 
 
APi,t =Pi,t - Pi,-1 – (PIi,t – PIi,-1) 
 
where Pi,t is profitability of sample firm i in fiscal Year t and PIi,t is the profitability in fiscal 
Year t of a non-sample firm matched to sample firm i on the basis of industry and profitability 
in fiscal Year -1.  Matching firms are selected such that the absolute value of the difference in 
profitability between the matching firm and sample firm in Year -1 is minimized, subject to 
the constraint that the matching firm issued at least one bank loan in the three years prior to 
Lehman’s bankruptcy and has the same two-digit SIC code as the sample firm.  In Panel A, 
profitability in Year t is measured as EBITDA (Compustat annual item #13) scaled by the 
book value of assets (item #6) in Year t and is expressed as a percentage.  In Panel B, 
profitability in Year t is measured as operating cash flow (item #308) scaled by the book 
value of assets in Year t and is expressed as a percentage. In Panel C, abnormal investment is 
expressed as a percentage and is defined as: 
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where Ii,t is sample firm i’s  investment in fiscal year t, defined as the sum of capital 
expenditures (item #128), increase in investments (item #113), and acquisition expenses (item 
#129), IIi,t is investment in fiscal year t of a non-sample firm matched to sample firm i on the 
basis of industry and market-to-book ratio of assets in fiscal Year -1, Ai,-1 is sample firm i’s 
total assets (book value) in Year -1, and AIi,-1 is the matching firm’s total assets in Year -1. 
Matching firms are selected such that the absolute value of the percentage difference in 
market-to-book asset ratios between the sample firm and matching firm is minimized, subject 
to the constraint that the matching firm has the same two-digit SIC code as the sample firm. 
The table reports means and medians. The t-statistic is based on the cross-sectional standard 
deviation. The signed-rank statistic is based on a Wilcoxon signed-rank test of whether the 
median differs from zero. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels respectively in two-tailed tests. 
  Event 
Year 
(fiscal) Mean t-stat Median 
signed-
rank N  
  Panel A: Abnormal Profitability (ROA) 
  Year 0 0.43% 0.43 0.01% 1.14 111  
Year 1 -0.92% -0.81 0.52% 0.56 103  
  Panel B: Abnormal Profitability (Cash-flow-ROA) 
  Year 0 -1.04% -1.25 -0.36% -1.07 111  
Year 1 -1.24% -1.66* -1.19% -2.18** 103  
  Panel C: Abnormal Investment 
  Year 0 -1.5% -0.33 -0.24% -0.96 111  
Year 1 -6.09% -2.36** -1.41% -2.12** 103  
   
